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_ I 
? REFACE. 
My motive for doing this analysis was to examine sorne 
of the effects of price uncertainty and instab ility upon production 
and profit in the hope that this would g ive some insight into 
agricultural p rice policy. So rnany theoretical ,. roblen-i s were 
involved that it soon b ecarne a pparent that it would b e necessary 
to concentrate upon then-1 rather than upon the policy side of 
things. C onsequently, this thesis presents m y current thoughts 
upon the theory of p roduction and profit under conditions of 
price uncertainty and under pure competition. However, there 
is m uch m ore to be done at the group level, i.e. at the industry 
and econorny level. Also, m ore allowance should b e made for 
the elem ent of time. 
I thank P rofessor F . H. Gruen who has supervised my 
work at the Atiat r alian National University. He has always 
encouraged me to forrr n"ly own ideas, express them and to 
learn techniques to develo p them . Nevertheless , he has not 
failed to express such criticism as he felt was warranted. I 
am also grateful to P rofessor T . \V . Swan for his constructive 
criticism. Discussions with Dr. J. Dillon, Dr. A. ::_:::.owell and 
other rn.embers of the University of Adelaide have een 
stimulating and useful. I am also indebted to P rofessor W . P . 
Hogan, P . W . Sherwood and other m embers of Newcastle 
University College who helped to create my inte rest in research 
and inquiry. 
Also, I wish to thank Mrs. E. Fitt who has p atiently 
typed the whole manuscript and the Australian National 
University for granting r..1e a post-graduate scholarship to 
make this study possible. 
Canberra, A. C . T. 
October 1963. CLEM TISDELL. 
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P ECIS. 
~---· 
CHAPTER I: Uncertainty is i rnportant in econom ic life 
because actions limit future poss ibilities . fo. retros pect, one 
is always liable to be disappointed by an action if i t is chosen 
under conditions of uncertainty a Vv e can rarely avoid the 
possibility of thi s dicappoin tment but w e can allow for it in 
deciding u pon our actions. 
CHAP TER II: We su ppos e that an individual acts rationally 
if he selects from his set o f alternative acts , as known by 
him, the one who s e po ssib le outcomes a re m os t p referred by 
h im. This fo r mulation of ra: ional dec~.sion theory raise s the 
question o f what is meant b y possib leo We suppose the possi-
b ilities to be s ubjectiv e and to exp ress the ind ividual ' s con-
sidered o p inion. They need not accord with "the" ob jectiv e 
set of poss ib ilities. 
Sometimes an individual I s preference ordering 
indicates that his 1·ational b ehaviou r is in accordance with a 
simple r ule o r criterion. Vv e dis cuss so7'11e criteria by 
d ividing the m in""o a g . oup which i o de pendent upon cardinal 
p robabilities and one which is not. Account is taken of 
Simon's ob jections to "orthodox" decision theory and it is 
suggested t _at II satisficing" and n'laxim ising a re not 
inconsistent~ The concept o f a decision set is then intro-
ducedo The decision set is any set o f values to which the 
firm applies a criterion in o rder to decide u pon its act. 
CHAPTEi III: In this chapter, the W ald,m ax.max, Hurwicz 
and expected ;>r ofit criterion are applied to the determination 
of the pure ly competitive firm I s level of f roduction. An 
underl y ing assumption of this chapter and of all others 
except VII is that the firm makes its output decision for t in 
t-n and that this output decision is unalterab le n ~ 1. 
iv 
The principle of m axirnum equivalence is introduced. 
The b asic idea is that although the firm may not decide u pon 
its output by consciously m aximising an irn puted profit function 
upon the b asis of some price vector, nevertheless its actual 
output maximises profit for some price vector. Sometim es 
it is easy to identify the appropriate price v ectors for different 
criteria and £or different modes of b ehaviour . 
CHAPTER N: By using the principle of mcUdmum equivalence, 
it is possible to apply Hicks' production theorem s of Value and 
f_apital in a different context to his. It can b e applied to predict 
the effect upon a firm's output of a change of its criterion or 
of a change of its decision set of possib ilities. 
CHAPTER V: Two models are introduced. The first model 
shows that if price uncertainty exists increased p rice insta ility 
need not increase a firm' s average profit. The publication of 
this model lead Oi to revise an assertion of his and to state: 
"So long as price instability contains a systematic component, 
greater price instab ility will lead to higher expected profits". 
By using a second m odel, we show that even if the correlation 
between actual price and shadow ("predicted") p rice is positive 
and constant, increased p rice instability can decrease the firm 's 
average profit. 
A "general" average profit function b ased upon a 
linear marginal cost function is introduced and some theorems 
are derived for the effect of price uncertainty and price 
instability upon average profit. Vv e show that a recent 
model of Nelson's involves special restrictions upon this 
average profit function. 
V 
CHAPTER VI: In this chapter two models are used to express 
doubts about Baumol's hypothesis that increased price un-
certainty increases the probability of a firm adopting a 
flexible technique, and to support Stigler' s conclusion that, 
under certainty, increased price instability increases the 
probability of the adoption of the flexible technique. The 
first model is b ased upon a general cost function but makes 
restrictive assumptions about the relationship between actual 
and shadow prices whereas the second is based upon a 
quadratic total cost function but allows a more general rela-
tionship b etween shadow and actual prices. 
CHAPTER VII: A m odel is introduced which permits actual 
output to diverge from plan at extra cost. The model is 
based upon a quadratic cost function and enables us to 
reconsider Oi' s revised conclusion and other theorems upon 
the effect of p rice uncertainty and instability upon average 
profit. Also, it enables us to see the relevance of Hart's 
notion of :flexibility for technique choice. 
CHAPTER VIII: The possible effect of price uncertainty 
upon industry profit {at a point of time) is briefly examined. 
If price prediction errors lead to a m onoply .. like restriction 
of output, p rice uncertainty can raise industry profit ab ove 
its level under certainty. This possibility has been over-
looked by Nelson in a recent article but has been foreseen 
by Knight. 
vi 
CHAPTER IX: vVe assume the economy's p roduction function 
to b e convex and conside r the effect upon aggregate p r oduction 
of d ifferent shadow p rice ratios on the par t of different firm s 
in the econom y. V./ e then put the p roposition that forward 
price schem es can feas ib ly raise aggregate p roduction and 
consumption above their free cornpetition level ev en if their 
o pe r ation involves incre a sed surpl uses of commodities. 
APPENDIX I: This a ppendix illustrate s the idea that i t is 
po ss ible t o combine the "s atisficing" and rnaxim i sing 
approach. The firm is seen as wishing to rnaxirnise expected 
profit sub ject to the achievement of a satisfactory security 
level. 
I 
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CHAPTER I 
Uncertainty and Economic Actions 
" We live only by knowing sorn ething about the future, 
while the problems of life, or of conduct at least, 
arise fro m the fact that we know so little . This is as 
true of business as of other s pheres of activity. T he 
essence of the situation is action according to 
o pinion, of greater or less foundation and value, 
neither entire i gnorance nor complete and pe rfect 
information, but partial knowledge. If w e are to 
understand the workings of the econo.mic s ystem we 
must examine the me~ing and significance of 
uncertainty. 11, 11 1 (F. H. Knight ) 
11W e live in a world full of contradiction and p aradox, 
a fact of which perhaps the m ost fundamental illustra-
tion is this t that the existence of the problem of 
knowledge de pends on the future being d1fferent f:rom 
the pas t, while the possib ility of the solution of the 
Froblem depends on the future being like the pas t . 2 
(F. H. Knight) 
M an has less than pe rfect knowledge of his universe. 
He lives and a cts in the twilight. In his partial state of know-
ledge he is always li able to b e incorrect in his predictions and 
to be dissatisfied, ex post, with his actions. His state of 
knowledge is important to him because it shapes his actions and 
these in turn affect the pattern of the universe. If he lacks full 
knowledge of the consequences of any action, h is adopted acts 
may b ring results which are contrary to his intention, or which 
do not satisfy his ultimate aims to the fullest po ss ible extent. 
Therefore, it is not surp rising that much of mankind's time has 
3 
' been directed towards judging the outcomes of different actions. 
1 F . H. Knight: Ri s k, Uncertainty and Profit Houghton Mifflin 
Company, New York, 1922, p. 199. 
2 Ibid, p. 313. 
3 Cf. J. Dewey : The Quest for Certainty, G. P . Putnam's Sons , 
Ne w York, 1960, p . 137 c 
2 
Econo1nists an d economic decis ion makers a r e c ontinually 
wrestling with the p roblem. 
We a r e rar l y ab l to perfectly predict the c onsequences 
of any actiono Yet our exi s tence requires us to act at every point 
of tirne . In acting at a ny point of time , w e can only accept our 
imperfect state of knowledge even though w e can imp rove it over 
t ime . 
Changes in our state o f knowledg can a ffect the optimality 
of an a ct. An a c t which is optimal upon the bas is of the information 
which is availab l e at one pe r iod can appear to be l ess than optimal 
u pon the bas i s of the information av ailabl e at a later pe riod. /-i. 
difference between a realised act an d an alternative one which 
sub s e quently appears to be o ptimal can ari se because of the initial 
existence of uncertainty. If uncertainty surrounds the outcome of 
an act, the individual is liabl e to feel disappointed about his 
b ehaviou r when further information comes to hand. A variable is 
uncertain if its value cannot be predicted with zero probability of 
4 
error. The probability of this error may be imagina ry or real, 
i~ e . , it may be subj ectiv e or ob jective . Some of the intricacie s 
which are connected with the distinction between subjective and 
ob ject ive p robabilities will be discussed in Chapter II. F or the 
time b e ing , w e s u ppo s e that prob ability of the e rror to be real. 
Then, an ordina ry economic agent can make errors in 
predicting the value of a variable e . g . , a producer can make 
4 According to this definition, any v a riable which has a known 
probability distribution with positive probabilities attaching 
to m ore than one value i s uncertain. Unc e rta inty according 
to our definition includes risk and uncertainty in Knight's 
sense. See Knight, op. cit. 
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errors in predicting the value of price, 
(i) becau se he sees the variable as being dependent upon a n 
incorrect (gen r al } relationship; 
(ii) b ecause, even though his general relationship i s correct, 
he c annot obtain suffic ient information to specify all of 
the values which enter into it, 
(iii) becau se the value of the predicted variabl e depends upon 
random influences, i.e., at least one random variable. 
It is debatabl e whether (iii) should be considered as a 
separ at e possibility from (i) and (ii). It i s inc luded as a con-
cession to the view that non-deterministic ( random) factors can 
aris e in nature (in reality) . But i rrespective of whether they do, 
poss ib ilities (i) and (ii) do appear to be frequent cause s of errors . 
Economic theory can take account of uncertainty in two 
distinct senses. F irst, it can take account of the uncertainty of 
economic agents. Secondly, it can allow for p redictive inadequacies 
in the theory itselfo Thi s allowance may be nece ssary even when 
all econom i c agents are ac ting under certaintyc 
T his analysis only takes account of unc e rtainty in the first 
sense. It deal .. with the effect of p rice uncertainty upon production 
and p rofit under conditions of pure competition. Since the theory 
of the firm I s p roduction decisions under p rice uncertainty can be 
considered as a particular application of the gene ral theory of 
decision making under uncertainty, it seems best to consider this 
general theory before applying it to production. The general 
theory of deci s ion making under uncertainty is considered in 
Chapter Il. 
In Chapter III some of the criteria which are outlined 
in Chapter II are applied to the d e termination of optimal levels 
of output for the firm. In Chapter IV, we consider how these 
optima change as the firm changes its criterion and as its set 
of price possibilities change . 
In dealing with these matters , we introduce and 
apply shadow price vectors which reduce production behaviour 
to sim ulated maximisation behaviour. The bas is idea is that 
although the firm may not decide upon its output by consciously 
maximising anticipated profit upon the bas is of a price vector, 
its actual output maximises profit for some shadow price 
vector. As these shadow price vectors change, so also does 
the firm's output. The firm's shadow price vector can change 
because the firm changes its criterion or because it changes 
its predictions. For some criteria the relevant shadow prices 
can be specifically identified and changes of p roduction for 
changes of criteria and predictability can be described by using 
c, 
Hicka 1 production theorems • ., 
The maximun1 equivalence theorem is useful for 
generalising the effect of price uncertainty and instab ility 
upon average profit. It enables the influence of these factors 
to be considered under diverse conditions of b ehaviour and 
predictability. In dealing with the effect of price uncertainty 
and instability upon the firm's average profit in Chapter V, 
we first develop a model which relies upon a general cost 
function but assumes special p redictab ility assumptions. Then 
we introduce a model which relies upon the assumption of 
a linear marginal cost function but allows for a wider range 
5 J. R. Hicks: Value and Capital, Clarendon P ress, 
Oxford, 1939. 
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of relations be tvveen shadow and actual p rices. A similar 
procedure is followed in Chapter VI for discussing the effect 
of p rice uncertainty and instab ility u pon the diffe rence in 
average I r ofit from alternative techniques , and cons e quently, 
their possible impact u pon technique choice. In Chapter VII, 
the static decision n1aking assumption which is used in 
Chapters V and VI is r el axed. In d iscussing the to pics of 
C hapters V, VI and VII we take account of the views of 
Baumol, Hart, Oi, Marschak, Nelson and Stigler. 
As already pointed oi.:t, we sometimes assu me the 
existence of quadratic total cost functions in Chapters V, VI 
and VII. Given pure corn petition, the latter as sur:.'lption 
implies that any firm I s p rofit function is quadratic. Since 
the average value of a variable which is dependent u pon a 
quadratic function can b e expressed in tcn--:-13 of the me an, 
variance, and covariance values of the independe nt variables 
of the function, the assumption of quadraticity simplifies 
any analysis of the ave r age value of the dependent variabl e . 
Accordingly, it will sirnplify our analysis of changes in 
average profit. 
The analysis is restricted to the level of the firm 
until Chapter VIII is r e ached. In Chapter VIII, the effect 
upon industry p rofit of (i) divergence b etween average 
shadow price in the industry and equilibrium p rice, and 
(ii) changes in the dispersion of shadow p rice between 
firms is taken into account. Finally, in Chapter D{, the 
impact upon aggregate production of divergent shadow 
prices is specified for a simple multi- p roduct model, and 
5 
sor.ne influenc es of forward price policies upon aggregate 
production and consumption are noted. It is suggested that 
forward p rice policies can increase aggregate consumption. 
These last two chapters arc very sketchyo 
Hence, the analysis is developed b y proc eding from 
the firm to the industry lev el and fro rn the r e to the economy 
level. In turn w e deal with the influence of p rice uncertainty 
upon (i) the p roduction of the individual firm (ii) the firm's 
p rofit, (iii) the indus try' s profit, and (iv ) the " economy's" 
aggregate output. 
In these expl orations , we shall not cover (nor could 
we) the whol e terrain of the economic theory of uncertainty 
nor reach a pinnacle high enough to survey i t generally. Our 
path is only one of the many possible ones. Different p aths 
may lead us to sus pect that the general lay of the land is 
different. But every so rtie brings to light new information 
which enables us to push just a litt l e closer to the pinnacle. 
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CHAPTER II 
So me Theories of D ecision Making. 
A. A Rational Decision Theory. 
In order to cons t ruct a theory of rational choice under 
uncertainty, w e make the following assumptions: 
(i) At any point of tune , the individual knows of a set, AO , of 
all the possi l e acts open to him. If A. re - resents the set 
of alternative acts availabl e to the individual , A° C A . 
(ii) The individual ass ociates a set of possibl e outcornes , o0 , 
0 
with the set of possi le acts , A • W ith each act he 
associates a set of outcom e possib ilities. We represent 
the set of outcome poss ib ilities attaching to the i - th act 
0 b y O .• 
1 The elements of o
0
. m i ght consist of ordered 
1 
p airs which indicate the p rob a ility of the various levels 
0 of p rofit which the ind ividual associates with the act A .• 
1 
Where II repre sents p rofit and p r e p resents p rob ab ility, 
o
0 
i m i ght conta in the elements ( II 
1
, P 
1
), ( II 
2
, P 
2
), 
••• , ( II , p ) • V{ ith each act the individual associates 
m m 
a number of variabl es which, in his o pinion, hav e a posit ive 
p ro a ility of occurrence. For the act ii..0 these varia les 
1 
0 form a s et V . a nd for the set of acts , A , they form a set V , 
1 
0 (iii) The individual has a p reference ordering over the O . se ts 
1 
a n d these meet the usual consistency r equirements of 
transitivity a n d symmetry. 
An individual I s act ion is rational if he adop ts an act, 
0 . 0 
A k ' whose s t of possible out comes , 0 k ' is no less p referred 
by him than th s t for any act contained in 0 
• If there are 
0 i = 1, ••• , n:. alt r n ativ e acts contained in A. , the individual 
8 
0 
only acts rationally if he selects an act, A k ' such that 
0 0 ' 00 . 1 
k ,,-, . , 1 = , ••• , m . 
- l 
B . T he ~Ii aning of P ossible . 
This form ulation of decision theory raises the question 
of what is meant b y the set of possible outcon1es . The a ove 
poss ib ilities , 0° , are sub jective and express the individual ' s 
considered o p inion. Give n his existing knowledge , the individu al 
c onsiders it to b e correct (i. e ., to b e "rational") to entertain 
these poss i b ilities . 0 In specifying the pos sib ilities , 0 , the 
individual n1 ay attach w e ights (probab ilities ) to the el ements of 
the V sets . The individual's subjective formul ation of possi ilities 
need not accord with "the" objective set. There are two different 
conce ptions of what constitutes the obj ective set. These a r e (i ) 
the logical p rob ab ility and (ii} the rel ative frequency views. 
The logical p ro ab ility view is that given the knowl edge 
to which the p rob ab ility of a conclusion is to b e relate d , then it is 
rational to entertain a certain d e g ree of J>elief, and n o other degree 
of b elief, as to the truth of the conclusion. It i s held that the 
app ro priate rational degree of b elief and, therefore, the 
appro priate level of o jective p rob ab ility can , e deduced b y 
lo gical methodso This formul ation is hel d to b independent of 
l 
the individual and to b e true "to the outside world" . J. M . Keynes 
and R . Carnap2 hav e dev eloped this view. 
Th rel ativ e fre quency view is that the objectiv e 
prob ab ility of an event, under a giv en s et of conditions, is the 
l J . M . Keynes : 
London, 1921 . 
2 R . Carnap : Logical F oundations of P r ob abili!Y_, the 
University of Chicago P r ess , Chic a go , 1950. 
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r lative frequency of its occurrence as the numb r of repetitions 
of the given set of conditions tends to infinity. Von Mis s 3 and 
. 4 
Reichenbach are exponents of this view. Sinc e actual sequences 
are finite it is at m ost only possible to a?proxirnate this ob jective 
probability distribution mpirically. Unlike the logical probability 
concept, the r lativ e frequency concept of necessity attaches 
c ardinal weights (ie e. relative frequencies) to the poss i le values 
of the varia les . 
C . The Rel ationship between Criteria and the Rational Theory 
of Behaviour. 
Sometimes an individual I s p reference ordering indicates 
that his rational b ehaviour is in accordance with a simple r ule 
or criterion. A rule or criterion is in accordance with the 
individual ' s rational behaviour if it always leads to the selection 
of an act, A. , such that 0° > 0°., i = 1, • • • m . The rule as 
-K k - 1 
applied to the set o0 may ea rnulti- stage one. Fo r example , its 
0 
firs t stage may involve an operation on 0 to construct a new set, 
A A 
0°. Then an operation (also , a rule) may applied to the set o0 
to select the rational act. Some criteria which can ...., e applied to 
0 
the set 0 can also be a stag in other rules . Fo r instance, the 
rr <1Xmin criterion, which will e discussed later, can b e applied 
0 
to 0 to select an a ct. It is a second stage in the following criterion. 
"Maxm irl'upon the b asis of possibl e profit values which have a 
p ro ab ility greater than O. 001 . This rule involves the following 
two stages : 
3 R . von M ises : P robability, Statistics and T ruth, George 
All en and Unwin; 2nd ed., London, 1957 . 
I 
10 
(i) Select from the sets of poss i le p rofit values 2..ssociated w i th 
each act, thos -:'rofi i: v.:tlue-:; ·Nhich h.:-.ve ;::. ~.:.-ro~.:i.b ility of 
(Y "I ,._ ('> r '·h A O O i 1..,r '-~ 1. an"'• "• "' L.:.-t these values form a set TI • 
" (ii ) F rom the set TI solv for the maxmin lev 1 of p rofit. In 
introducin g some criteria, we shall suppose them to e 
0 
cornpl ete i . e., to a pply to the set O , and not to be a s tage 
in a inore general crite rion. 
It i s possi1 l e to d ivide the crit e ria into two b road g r oup s , 
Grou p (a ) i ncludes all c riteri a whi ch are dep ndent upo n car d in al 
p robabilit i es and group (b ) incl udes those whi ch are not . Group · 
(a ) encompasses all criteria whi ch are dependent upon some 
m oment of the choice variabl es . Group (a) includes 
(i) expected p rofit ma.,"{ i.m is ation; 
(ii ) expected utility rnaximisation; 
(iii) criteria relying upon a p reference ordering of first and 
second moments of choi ce v ariab l s , and even h igher 
moments ; 
(iv ) the rn axin,isation of a preference functional ov er the total 
s hape of the p ro ab ility functions a ttachi n g to the vari ables , 
and 
(v} som e probability of loss cri teria. 
Group (b ) includes 
(i ) Shackle ' s .:- sychol ogical theory , 
(ii) the m axn1i n , 
(iii) the Hurwi cz and 
(iv ) the Savage r g ret cri terion. 
L et us cons ider each o f these c riterion. 
5 
6 
11 
D. Criteria which are depend nt upon Cardinal Probabilities 
(i) The expected profit maximisation crit rion. If p . is the 
J 
j-th state of nature and, if a . . is the r{loney value attaching lJ 
to the outco1ne of the i-th act or strategy when the j-th 
state of nature prevail s , then the expected value of the i-th 
strategy i s 
E . = 
1 
n 
I: 
J = 1 
P. a .. J lJ ( i = 1, .•• , m ) 
The optim al act is the one hich maximises this expression. 
5 This criterion is sometimes referred to as B ayes , but 
6 
Thomas B ayes I expression of it is at 1nost implicit. This 
criterion attaches no importance to m oments other than the 
first. It also i mplies that utility varies l inearl y with the value 
of the money priz e . 
(ii) The xpected utility maximis ation criterion. s suming utility 
to b e cardinal, let u .. b e the utility attaching to the i-th act lJ 
when the j - th state of nature occurs . The expected utility 
of the i-th act is then 
n 
E (u.) = 
1 
I: 
j = 1 
P. u .. 
J lJ (i = 1, ••• , m) 
The o p tim al act i s the one yield ing the n1 axilnum level of 
exp ected utility. 
M arschak calls it ayes . See J . Niarschak : "Probability 
in the Social Sciences 11 , pp. 166 - 215 in M athemati cal 
ThinkinR in the Social Sciences , dited y P . L . Lazarsfel , 
The Free Pres s, Illinois, 1954. 
Thomas B ayes : " An Essay Towards Solving a Pro lem 
in the Doctrine of C hances " rep r inted in B i ometrika 
Vol. 4 5 , p arts 3 and 4 , pp. 293 - 315 . 
12 
7 
When Dani el Bernouilli advanced this criterion in 1733 , 
he assumed cardinality of utility . 8 Rams ey , von N eur.n ann 
9 
and Morgenstern have b een ab l e to show that cardinality of 
utility follows from the assu mpti on of a small numb er of 
simple axioms . Von Neumann and Mo r genste rn demonstrate 
h .f h . 10 t a t , 1 t ese axioms ar e fulfill ed the ~ utility is measurable 
u p to a linear transform. 11 12 ..:>av age and Markowitz have 
shown that if the individual accepts the Neumann and 
Morgenstern u t ility axioms then to b e consistent he m ust act 
so as to maximise expected u t ility. Logically expected utility 
maximisation is the only criterion consistent with these 
utility axiom s . In consequence a number of write rs re j ect 
such c riteri a as the maxmin gain, maxmin regret and Hurwicz 
upon the grounds of inconsistency. But this assumes that the 
utility axiom s are both relevant and adequate . Indeed, their 
7 Dani e l B e rnouilli: " S ... ec imen theoriae novae de mensura sorti s", 
Commentarii academiae imperialis Petropol ita,n:,.y , Vol. V , 17 38 , 
pp. 175 - 192. Trans l ated y Dr. L . Som.me r , Econometri ca, 
Vol. 22, 1954, pp . 23-36 . 
8 F . P . Rc.msey: " T ruth and P r obability" , 1926 , ess ay VII, 
p . 157 -198 in The Foundations of Mathemati cs and Other 
Logical Essays, edited y R . B rai thwaite , R outledge and 
Kegan Paul, Lon don, 1931 . 
9 J . von Neumann and O. Mo r genstern : Theory of Ga."nes and 
Economic B ehaviour,_Princeton Unive rsity P ress , P rinceton, 
1944, ed. ~ es p . pp.16- 29 . 
10 For a statement of these axioms see H. Markowitz : Portfolio 
Sel ection, John W iley and Sons , New Yo rk, 1959 , pp. 229-23~ 
or Appendix I of this thesis . 
11 L . J . Sav age : The F oundations of Statistics , John 'Wiley and 
Sons , New York, 1954, pp. 70- 76 and p. 105 . 
12 Markowitz: Op. c!;!. , p p. 235 - 242 
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adequacy i s questionab l e , In p articular, the utility axiom 
that there i s always some con'1bination of p ro uab ilitie s e ach 
~etween z ero and unity which will make an individual indiff-
erent about partici p ating in any lottery is open to ob j ection. 
The individual may ";:,e unprepared to participat e in a lottery 
in which a poss ib l e outcome could involve him in starvation, 
b ankruptcy or a trernendous fal l in social status. Therefore, 
13 
as I hav e argued el sewhere , ·minmax and other c r ite ria 
should not b e rejected just becau se they fail to satisfy the 
Neu mann and Morgens ern utility axioms . In those 
circumstances in which the rnaxmin gain criterion is incon-
sistent with the Neu, nann and Mo r genstern utility index, one 
mus t reject one or the other in orde r to p reserve consistency. 
The necessity for thi s choi ce will b ecome apparent when w e 
c onsider the maxmin criterion. 
(iii) P reference orderings over the moments of payoff. T h e se 
preference orderings may refer to any number of moments . 
They rnay refer to the mean alone, to the m ean and varianc e , 
or to all poss ible m ornents o From the set of moments 
available to him, the individual selects an act which g ives 
14 
him his most preferable moment combination. Marschak 
13 C . T isdell: " Decision M aking and t he P rob ability of L oss", 
Australian Econom ic Paper s1 Vol , I, p . 111. This paper is 
reproduced as Appendix I of this thesis. 
14 J . Marschak : (i) "Utilities and Prob a=i ilitie s in Human 
Choic e ", a n abstract in Repo rt of Third .Annual Research 
-~onference on Economics and Statistics, Col o rado Spring s, 
Cowles Cornmission for Research in Econom ic s , 1937, 
p p. 79-82, (ii) " Money .md the Theory of Assets", 
Econometrica , Vol.6 , 1938 , pp.3 11-325 . 
14 
has considered the firm as having a prefer nee ordering over 
all of the rnoments of the prob ability distribution of such var-
iates as p rofits and the value of assets. The firm is seen 
as atternpting to maximise its utility functional for these 
rnoments sub ject to its technical restrictions . 
(iv) The maxirn isation of a preference functional over the total 
shape of the prob ab ility functions attaching to the payoffs . 
(v ) 
15 
16 
17 
T . 15 1ntner has suggested this rul e . A drawback of this rul e 
is that it requires a g reat deal of knowledge about preference 
orderings. 
Probability of loss c riteria. Several economists have argued 
that n egative returns should enter specificall y into some 
criteria. These neg ative values have b een all owed for in 
several ways . 16 Demar and Musgrave have sugg ested that 
the most preferable policy m i ght be selected from a preference 
ordering over the expected total gains and expected losses of 
different policies . This approach ignores the dispers ion of 
the losses . 17 A. D. Roy argues that ' s afety first ' is the guiding 
p rinciple of the firm , and consequentl y , that it wishe s to 
minL--riise the pro a il i ty of a disaster level of incom e. I 
G . Tintner: 11 A Contri ution to the Nonstatic Theory o:£ 
Production" , pp. 92 - 109 i n Studies in Mathematical Economi cs 
and Econometrics , edited by O. Lange, F. McIntyre, 
T . O. Yntem a , The University of C h i cago P ress , Chicago, 
194 2. 
E . Domar and R . Musgrave : " P roportional Income 
Taxation and ... isk- Taking", Quarterly Journal of 
Economi c~ Vol. 58 , 1944, pp. 338-422. 
A. D. Roy : " Safety First and the Hol ding of Assets", 
Econometrica, Vol . 20 , 1952, pp. 43 1- 449 . 
15 
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hav e suggested that some firms may wish to maximise their 
expected profit sub ject to the condition that the prob a ility of their 
profit b eing b elow a p r e -set level b e not less than a satisfactory 
value. 
E . Criteria which do not rely on Cardinal P rob ab ilities 
Let us now deal with those criteria which do not require the 
formulation of cardinal p rob ab ilities for their application. 
(i) 
18 
19 
Shackle ' s psychological theor~. G . L. s. Shackle 19 criticises 
the application of cardinal prob ab ility estin1.ates to decision 
making under unce r tainty. He argues that it is impossib l e 
to calculate relative frequencies for many economic 
occurrences b ecause they are unique and non-repetitive. 
Although this is so, it may still b e the case that decision 
makers do assign weights to the possib le outcor11es . We 
may if we wish, call these weights cardinal probabilities . 
Shackle doub ts the widespread use of such weights . He 
suggests that the individual assesses the uncertainty of the 
possi le outcomes in terms of potential surprise. The 
potential surprise function represents ordinally the degree 
to which an individual would b e surprised b y various 
outcomes . By considering the potential surp r i se function 
along with a function representing the degree of 
" interestingness" , focus values and a ga...~bler indifference 
system, Shackle forr11ulates his rule for choice under 
uncertainty. The degree of interestingness funct ion depends 
C . Tisdell, op. cit. 
G . L . s. Shackle : (i ) Expecta tion in Economics , The 
Univers i ty Press , Cam ridge, 1949 . (i i) Uncertainty 
in Economics , The Univers ity Press , Camb r i dge , 1955 . 
(iii) Time in Economics , North- Holland Pu lishing 
Company, Amsterdam , 1958 . 
(ii) 
16 
ordinally on potenti.:i.l surprise and the value of the poss ibl e 
outcomes. The primary focus values for any scheme (act ) 
are determined from the points of tangency of the potential 
surprise function and the contours of the degree of interest-
ingness functiono These p rimary focus values are standard-
ised and are transferred to the gambler's indifference map. 
Fron-i this map the o ptimal schen'1.e (act) is determined. 
This scheme is the one having the most p referred set of 
standardised focus values in the set of attaina le values . 
Mostly Shackle ' s model yields two focus values. While 
it is agreed th at the individual may only give active consid-
eration to a r e stricted set of values, it seems unduly 
restrictive to suppose him to focus his attention upon two . 
While Shackle ' s model seerns to have a p sychological 
counterp art it is, nevertheless, fundamentally indeterminate 
for it does not ield uniqu~ standardised focus values. If 
both the degree of potential surprise and the degree of 
interestingnP; ss are taken as pure rankings , then the potential 
surprise function and the degree of inter e:~stingness function 
fail to take up unique positionso In consequence, the focus 
and standa rdised values are not unique. Shackle I s situation 
is analogous. to trying to maximise an ordinal function (in 
this case the degree oi interestingness) sub ject to an 
ordinal restriction (in this case the potential surprise 
20 
function} - the solution is indeterminate. 
The maxmin criterionff According to this criterion, the 
20 Cf. C . Carter : p . 53 in _pncertainty and Business Decisions, 
edited by C 0 F 0 Carter , G . P. Meredi th and G. L . S . Shackle, 
The University Press , 1954. 
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individual wishes to ensure himself o f a payoff which is no 
lesa than the maximum of the minimum pos sible p ayoffs for 
the acts in J...
0
• Let the p ayoffs b e in terms of money values. 
Then, if a .. represents the individual ' s money payoff for the 
lJ 
i-th act when the j-th s tate of nature p revails, the r.naxmin 
act is one wh ich corresponds 
Max 
l 
Min 
J 
a 
lJ 
The rule stated here is for pure and not mixed strategies. 
A s lightly d iffere n t rule is the maxmin expected g ain rule. 
The optimal act according to this rule is one which ensures 
the agent of at l east the maximum of the l:.=; :.. :::: t pos sible 
expected gains for different strategies. This criterion can 
involve m ixed strategies . If the fi rm adopts a mixed strategy 
it r uns the ri sk of ob taining less than the maxim u m of its 
leas t poss ib l e gains. Vv" ith m ixed strategies the rationale 
for a maxmin strategy i.e. to make sure of at least a certain 
m inimum gain, disappears . If any individual is prepared to 
run a risk b y adopting a mixed strategy, hen we would not 
be surprised if he really wished to maximise expected 
gain (or utility) b ecau s e the security aspect becomes almost 
insignificant in the m inmax expected gain approach. 
Sometimes an analogy is drawn between situations in 
which the m inmax expected gain criterion is a pplied and 
21 
situations involving zero ourr. two person game s. The 
economic agent (firm , statistician, etc . ) is assumed to 
e opposed by a fic t itious player, Nature. Nature has a 
21 A. Wald : Statistical Dec i s ion Function, John Wiley and 
Sons , New York, 1950, p . 26 - 27 . 
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number of strategies available to it and the economic agent 
has a number of acts open to it. The outcome for both 
p arties will be determined by their simultaneous strategies. 
The analogy cannot be p ressed very far because complete 
correspondence requires (i) the utility gains of the economic 
agent to b e equal to the utility losses of Nature and (ii) Nature 
to be an active opponent minimising its rl'l.aximum l ev el of 
expected loss. In addition, the economic agent must 
attempt to maximise its minimurl'l. level of expected gain. 
A stable solution for the game will either exist for unmixed 
or mixed strategies. In these circumstances there is no 
inconsistency between the utility axioms and the use of the 
maxmin criterion ecause, if Nature always adopts its 
r.1.inmax loss strategy, the firm will always maximise its 
expected utility y adopting its maxmin act. · One can object 
to the above formulation b ecause it assumes Nature to be 
an active opponent. If Nature is a passive opponent,use of 
the maxmin criterion can b e inconsistent with the Neuman 
and Morgenstern utility axioms . If the economic agent has 
some knowledge of the probabilities with which Nature " plays " 
its strategies , then its expected utility can be greatest for 
a non- maxmin act. Hence, a divergency arises between the 
maxmin rule and the expected utility maxim. If one i s 
going to apply the maxmin rule in such circumstances , it i s 
necessary to reject the applicab ili ty of the Neumann and 
Morgenstern utility axioms and the associated utility index. 
The :"~ :" ·:,:.-:in gain criterion (also call ed the Wald or 
19 
. l . . ) 22 L.ln;nax os s cr1ter1on is extremely conservative. It 
is consistent with the p reference ordering of an individual 
who is not prepared to take a risk. It is so security b iased 
that we rarely expect it to e applied to the set of po ssib ilities, 
oo. 
(iii) The maxmax crite riono The max.max stands at the o ppo site 
end of the gambling spectrum to the m inmax. The individual 
b ases his decision entirely upon the best possible payoff. 
(iv) 
22 
23 
The agent ' s optimal maxmax policy is the one for 
Max 
l 
Max 
J 
a .. lJ 
0 
Vv hen a pplied to the set O i t implies an extreme type of 
gambling b ehaviour. 
The Hurwic?J criterion. H . . . 23 b d The urw1cz cr1ter1on is ase 
upon a weighting of the greatest and least possib l e gain for 
each act. A fixe d num er, 13 , which reflects the agent ' s 
pe ssim ism , is attached to the least po ssibl e gain for each 
act and an optimism weight, 1 - 13 , is attached to the 
greatest po ssible gain for each act. Given that O s s 1 
an index 
H . = 13 M in a . . + ( 1 - 13 ) Max a . . 
1 ~ ~ J J 
is computed for each act. The optimal Hurwicz act is 
the one which maxim ises this index i.e., the one for which 
J . Milnor : " Games Against Nature", pp. 49 -59 in 
Decision P roces se2., edited by R. M. Thrall, C . H. Coomb s 
and R. L . D avis , J ohn Vl/ iley and Sons , New York, 1954. 
L . Hurwicz : " Optim ality Cri teria for Decision Making 
Under Ignorance" Cowles Commission Discussion Paper, 
No . 3 70, 195 O. Mimeographed. 
, 
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Max [/3 Min a .. + (1 -13) Max a .. ] 
l J lJ j lJ 
occurs. If t3 = 1 this criterion is equivalent to the Wald and if 
13 = 0, it is equivalent to the maxmax. The Hurwicz criterion 
focuses attention u pon the b est and worst poss ib le outcome for 
each act to the exclusion of all others. It is pos si:)le to develo p 
criteria which b es i des g iving special weights to the extremes 
also give w e i ghts to other v alues . 
{v)The Savage Regret Criterion. P rior to his p res e ntation of the 
personalis tic prob ab ility theory of exp e c t ed utility maximisation, 
24 
Savage suggested a regret criterion which allowed for the 
alternative which is possibly foregone by selecting one act in 
p reference to another . Orig inally this c riterion was in terms 
of utilities. Let u.. e the utility for the outcome of the i-th 
lJ 
act and the j-th state of nature. 
with the elements 
r .. 
lJ 
= Max 
J 
u .. - u lJ ij 
Th e n a regret matrix, r r ~j. 
L ij 
indicates the poss ible regrets. The firm's aim is to ensure that 
its regret does not exceed the m inimum of the maxim um possible 
re g ret values for the acts . Its optimal act corresponds to 
M in Max r .. 
1 J lJ 
It is by no means apparent that reg ret ought to e measured by 
differences in utility nor that it should vary linearly with such 
25 differences • Since the minmax reg ret criterion is inconsistent 
24 L. J. Savage : "The Theory of Statistical Decisions", 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 48, 
pp. 238 - 248. 
25 H. C hernoff: " Rational Selection of Decision Functions", 
Econom etric a , Vol. 22 , 1954 , pp. 442 - 443 . 
with the Neumann and Morgenstern utility index, we replace 
the u .. b y the money values , a .. • 
lJ lJ 
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Before discus sing Simon's criticism of mo st of the above 
criteria, w e make the following two points : 
(i) Since preference orderings differ b etween individuals, 
and differ for the same individu al in d ifferent circum-
stances, a wide range of criteria can be cons i stent with 
rational behaviour. 
(ii) In any s i tuation which is ob jectively the same , any two 
individuals using the so.1ne criterion may act differently 
even if they act rationally. This can occur if their set 
of known acts i.e., their A0 acts differ , or if their sets 
of possibl e ou tcomes , o0 ., differ. 
l 
F. Simon's Ob jections to "Orthodox" Decision Theory. 
. 26 Simon ob jects to all of the previous decision making 
theories (with the pos sible exception of Shackle 's} upon the 
grounds that they imply that (i) the individual is more rational 
that he actually is , and (ii) they require knowledge of him which 
is in excess of the capacity of the human mind. This is not only 
true of the traditional theories jus t examined but is also true 
of such criterion as the Wald since they require a knowledge 
of the outcomes for all possibl e acts and states of nature. "The 
capacity of the human m ind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is v ery small compare d with the size of the p roblems 
whose solution is required for objectively rational behaviour 
in the real world - or even for a reasonable approximation to 
26 H, .1. ~ . Sin1.on: (i) 11 .h.Bchavio r;;u Moclcl o f R~tional Choice", 
.Qu~r tcrly J'c~rncl o f Econ-:. -..n ico, Vol. 7C) , 1955, ? .. -• 99-118. 
{iiJModcls o f Man. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1957. 
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h b • . . al• II 27 sue o Jechve ration 1ty , 
Simon's ob jection seems to be applicable to those decision 
theories in which the individual is supposed to have sufficient 
information to calculate "the"set of objective outcomes and to 
discover all the alternative acts which are open to him. These 
theories assume that the individual by using h is thought processes 
does discover the objective set of possible outcomes and all of 
his possible acts. As a description of reality such theories appear 
unsound. The rational decision theory which was formulated at 
the beginning of this chapter makes more moclest assumptions. 
The individual is not a s sumed to discover " the" objective set of 
poss ible outcomes nor to know the set of all of his possible 
alternative acts . Nevertheless , one suspects that Simon would 
object to this modest rational decis ion theory. Some possible 
ob jections are: 
(i) The theory assumes that the individual acts after 
considering the whole of his preferenc e ordering. In 
p i:c.ctice, the individual may focus his attention upon 
only a small part of his ordering (for emotional reasons) 
and this may l ead him to act irrationally as p reviously 
defined. 
(ii) It assumes that the individual does have a consistent 
ordering over the poss ib l e outcomes. In fact, the 
individual m ay ::\Ct wHhout formulating that ordering. 
Simon seems to be very c ritical of criteria which are b ased 
upon extrema or some combination of extrema problems. He 
is of the o pinion that the solution of such problems exceeds 
27 Simon: Models of Man, p. 198. 
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the mental capacity of most " ordinary" individuals . This is an 
ernpi rical question, but it seems possible that a lot of ordinary 
people can consciously or subconsciously maximise variables . 
b: accepting this view, one need not reject Simon's satisfier 
approach. In some circumstances , the satisfier model is p rob-
ably a clooe description of actual behaviour. 
G. Simon 1 ,.., Satisfier Theory. 
According to Simon the individual divides outcomes into 
those which are satisfactory and into those which are unsatisfactory 
according to w hether they me this aspiration level or not, In 
attempting to attain his aspiration level, the individual at first 
considers a restricted sub set of acts , A 0 , of the total class of 
po ssible acts , A. If there is no act within the set AO which p ermits 
the individual to achieve his aspiration lev el , then depending upon 
his pe rsistence, he may adjoin new acts (this will involve effort 
and cost) or h e may reduce his aspiration level, Once the 
indiviclL1..al a ttc.ins his as piration level he is satisfied and does not 
wish to 2.tta in a minimum or maximum solution. 
Simon' s theory has consistency implications. If the 
individua_ does not select an act which meets his aspiration 
level then he acts inconsistently with the criterion. This theory 
is incomplete in so far as it does not indicate what determines the 
aspiration levelo While Simon rejects maximisation or minimisation 
criteria they are not inconsistent with a satisfier approach. As I 
have suggested lsewhere , the firm may wish to maximise one 
variable sub ject to satisfactory levels being achieved in others . 
28 Tisdell, Qp. cit. 
Such an approach differs from Simon's in s o far as it suppo se s 
maximisation or minimisation to b e important. Such maximisa-
tion or minimisation may take place for outcome values attached 
to a sub set of all possible acts. 
H. A Theory for Consistent but not Necessarily Rational Behaviour 
We can conceive of theories of b ehaviour which are different 
to the one outlined at the beginning of this Chapter but which, 
nevertheless, rely on some cons istency postulates. For instance, 
a theory satisfying the following assumptions does: 
(i) At any point of time, the individual knows of a set, A0 , 
of all the possib le acts, A, open to him. A° C A. 
(ii) The individual associates with (as signs to) the i-th 
act of the s e t A0 a set of variables. We represent this 
set by D . and assume all such sets assigned to A0 to 
1 
form a set D. The elements of the D. are called 
1 
decision variables and may include weights (probab ility) 
values. The D. sets may or may not accord with the 
l 
o0 . sets and may b e ob tained by operations on the o
0
. 
1 1 
sets. 
(iii) To the set of decision variables, the individual applies 
a rule or criterion , e. g . a minma.x, expected p rofit 
or max.max rule, to select the set from all the D . which 
1 
satisfies this rule. Let us represent this set by Dh. 
(iv) The individual adopts the act which corresponds to the 
D. set satisfying this rule or criterion. He adopts act h. 
1 
An act adopted in accordance with this theory need not 
accord with the rational act as defined in the earlier theory i.e. 
act h need not accord with the rational act k as p reviously defined. 
In special cases it will. 
By using the above theory, which is dependent upon "the" 
decision set of possibilities, we shall develop the formal 
conditions of production which must b e satisfied if the firm I s 
output decision is to be in accordance with some of the above 
criteria. In so doing, we must remember that the decision 
25 
set of possibilities need not b e identical with the set of 
0 possibilities, 0 , nor with "the" set of objective possibilities. 
Also criteria applied to D can result in acts which are security 
biased in one direction when referred to D and security biased 
in the opposite direction when referred to o0 • 
In suggesting the latter behaviour model, I do not wish 
to imply that all b ehaviour is in accordance with this theory. 
It is likely 
{i) that decision sets are not always specified, 
(ii) that the individual sometimes acts without a clearcut 
aim in mind, 
{iii) that, if he has a clearcut aim and decision set, he 
sometimes makes mistakes in selecting his act~ 
The above rational and consistent types of behaviour 
theory are in accordance with the view that behaviour is 
diverse, and that aims differ from individual to individual 
and for the same individual in different circumstances. But 
behaviour is even more diverse than may appear from these 
theories because individual's can act inconsistently with 
their aims. 
CHAPTER III 
Static P roduction Decisions 
A. Introduction 
We s hall deve lop s ome formal p roduction conditions which 
hold if the firm consistently a pplies different criteria to a decision 
set of p rice po ssib ilitie s o We shall as su me that the decis ion set of 
p rice pos s ib ilities (i ) contains more than one possib l e p rice and 
(ii) is independent of the criterion used b y the firmo Assumption 
(i) is made in order to retain an essential element of price uncer-
tainty viz; that no one p ric e a ppe ars certain. Assu mption (ii) is 
made for notational convenience. It e nab le s us to use the one set 
throughout the discussion ut it is not essential for a form al 
statement o f conditions. We c an form ally a pply criteria to different 
decision sets e ~ g . the m inm ax gain criterion can b e a pplied to 
some set D 1 and the m axmax to some set D". 
This chapter gives sub s tance to the following statements: 
(i) Given the p roduction model of this chapter, the firm 7 s actual 
production can always b e ob tained as the p roduction combination 
which maximises an imputed p rofit function which is b ased upon 
a shadow p rice vector. 
(ii) For some criteria these shadow p rice vectors can b e readily 
identified. The solution o f the appro p riate simulated 
m aximisation p rob lem for any criterion is identical to the 
production l ev el arising from the criterion' s consistent 
application. The shadow price vector o f the simulated 
maximisation p rob l em is called r simple' if it is an el ement 
of the firm's decision set. The conversion of the solution 
of a criterion p robl em to the solution of a simulated m aximi-
sation p roblem is called II simple" if a simpl e pric e vector 
occur s in the simulated probl em.. T he uc c of chajow _ rices 
effects a s implification (i} because it reduces s ome decision 
p roblems t o readily identified maximisation ones , and (ii) 
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because it enabl es us to treat differences in production as arising 
merely from differences in shadow prices (shadow price ratio s ). 
The shadow pri ces enab le us t o treat div e rs e behaviour within 
a manageable frarneworko 
Unless otherwise stated, it is assumed that p rice is the 
only variable which is subject to uncertainty. As far as the 
individual firm is concerned price is assumed not to vary with its 
output, and also the individual firm is assumed to make static 
plans. Once stati c plans are acted upo n , they are put into practice 
without revision. In s ome perio d , t -n, the firm plans to p roduce 
a specific quantity of output for t, and begins t o take steps to 
achieve this goal. If output is a controlled variab l e , then subse -
quently, and irrespective of what happens after t - n , the firm will 
produce the output int which is pl anned in t -n. W ith dynamic 
decision making the plan is subj ect to revision after o pe rations 
1 
hav e started. The assumption of static decision making drasti c ally 
simplifies the theory o f decis ion making under uncertainty since it 
eliminates the possib ility of variation of the controlled v ariable s 
after a dec ision is made., Whil e this assumption is retained for 
our first approximations, it is relaxed for l ater ones . 
B . ..i~o sum;:-tions 
B efore c ommencing detailed analysis, let us be specific 
about the assumptions. The following a ssumptions are m ade in 
rel ation to the individual firm I s pro duction: 
l T he above distinctions etween static and dynamic decision 
making a r e made by Theil. 
H. T h e il: Econom ic F orecasts and P olicy, North- Holland 
Publishing C ompany, 2nd ed; Amsterdam, 1961, Chapter VII 
11 Forecasts and P olicy : P robl ems and T ool s " . 
(i) P rices are sub ject t o uncertainty and the firm ' s action 
(decision) set of pri ces and probabilitieo can be t2.ken ao 
datum. 
(ii) The p roduction function is certain at t-n for production 
relating to the output of t . 
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(iii) The outputs fo r t and the inputs relating to the p roduction 
oft must be decided p rior to t in some period t -n. 
(iv) The decision of t-n is unalterable. 
(v) The decision of t-n is independent o f o ther decisions and 
the output o f t is solel_y dependent upon the de c ision made 
in t-n. 
(vi ) The discount rate is zero. This assumption is made as a 
simplification since interest rates a re not essential to the 
theme of the analysis. B o th inputs and outputs are 
2 
controlled variables. 
B efore beginning technical analysis , we ought to b e 
fazniliar with som e situations in which a decision of t-n exactly 
determines the output po ssibilities oft and the co mbination o f 
inputs which made it possible. Putting leg al and institutional 
factors temporarily to one side , l et us concentrate upon phys ical 
relationships. 
It is possibl e to conceive of a cas e in which the output 
of t is solel y dependent upo n the input o f t-n, and is independent 
of the inputs of o ther perio ds . In this case a unique lag between 
inputs and outputs o ccurs 2.nd cu~o titution i c only ~")()cGib l Clt t - n. 
The t ime po ints at which su stitution is ossib le can vary. In 
some industries the decisions will take place in all time intervals, 
2 H. Theil: Op. cit., pp. 3 7 3-374 . 
but in other industries su stitution is only possible at spaced 
intervals. For instance, in agriculture , decisions upon 
inputs might only b e m ade during the lanting season which 
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n1ay occur at s p aced intervals. In this theoretical exa.Inple, it 
is the lack of sub stitutab ility of factors and p roducts at times 
other than t-n which dictates that they b e decided u pon at t-n 
and that the factors b e applied at t-n with a view to the resultant 
output oft-
However, this supposes no factor hiring and no factor 
disposal lags. In the ab sence of these lags the prices of the 
factors hired and disposed of at t -n will norm ally b e certain. 
But frequently there are lags for institutional, technical and 
achninistrative reasons. B ecause of these lags input prices can 
be uncertain if a p rior d ecis ion m ust e reached for the employ-
m ent or disposal of factors at future m arket p rices. Allowing for 
these employment and dis po sal lags, it m ight b e m ore realistic 
to imagine a case in which the output of t is physically and solely 
dependent upon the inputs of t-o. The inputs of t-e are decided 
in t-n (n > e) b ecause of the existence of a lag of n-e. In this 
case, factors and products oft are not sub stitutable after t-n. 
There are other theoretical exan-1ples which accord 
with the ab ove set of assumptions. F or instance, the output of 
t may b e de pendent upon the inputs of several periods. Yet, if 
this is the case, all of these inputs must b e decided at t-n. 
This could b e done for a wide range of different reasons. 
Our requirement is that all of the values of the controlled 
variables which influence the output oft b e dediced in t-n. 
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C. A One Product Model 
Before de aling with the n-commod.ity production prob lem, 
it m ay b e b est to introduce a simpl e one goo d problemo The firm 
is assumed to produc e one p roduct, and the com· ination of factors 
which is required for that product is decided in t -no Although all 
the factors may not e applied at t-n our general a ssumptions 
require that their quantities and t ime of application b e dec i ded then. 
For this exampl e only, fa ctor prices a re assu med to be c e rtain. 
The firm 1 s decision probl em can be considered as one of 
choosing an o ptimal level of output for t if factors are optimally 
combined by the decision of t-n. In making its decision of t -n, the 
firm will be uncertain of its product's price in t. In making this 
decision, we suppose the firm to act upon some identifiable set of 
p rice possibilities. This decision set m ay or rnay not include all 
p ric e s which the firm anticipates as possible for its p roduct int. 
In terms of some current language1 each price of the firm's 
decision set rep resents a "possible" state of natureo Against these 
possible states of nature the firm has a numbe r of strategies. In 
this case, the firm ' s strategies a r e the levels of output which it can 
plan in t-n. The firm 's strategies and the dec ision set of prices 
(states of nature) de term ine the outcomes i. e, the II possible" 
p rofit values which are relevant for t he firm I s decision. Although 
the firm's actual p rofit outcome will de p end upon its strategy and 
the p revailing state of nature, this outc ome may not be included 
in the p receding set of decision possibilities . Despite this, we 
shall refer to price and profit values of the decision set as 
possib l e values. This m ethod of reference will e used until a 
different us ag e is specified. 
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Taking the set o f possib l e p rices as datum, let us derive 
the optimal product ion l evels for some different criteria, In the 
decision prob l em, the set of possib l e prices , p , may consist of 
a finite or infinite numbe r of p ric e values b ut these values are 
within finite b ounds . In addition, the firm has a numb er of possible 
level s of output, x . The set of possib l e p rices refer to the p rice 
possib ilities for the output oft and the output possib ilities are the 
values which can b e planned at t-n for period t . Vvhere the argu-
ments x and p signify the possible levels of output and p rice 
respectively, the possib le levels of profit can be r epre sented by 
the functional equation 
I> = /J (x , p) = px - C (x) 3. 1 
where C (x ) represents total cost. I£ the price possib ilities 
p ., J = 1 ••• m, and the outpu t po ssib ilitie s x. , i = i ••• n , are 
J 1 
finite in numb er, the po ss ible levels of profit can b e shown in 
matrix form , To the j- th possi' le p rice and the i-th level of 
output, there corresponds a profit outcome 
a .. = P . x. - C (x . . 
lJ J 1 1 
Hence, a matrix of p rofit outcomes 
A = (a .. l, lJ J 
can be c onstructed. 
3 , 2 
3.3 
The p roblem is t o determ ine the firm ' s o ptim al level 
of output tor period t if this m ust be decided in period t-n on the 
b asis of/> (x , p ). A solution only exists if the firm ' s aim is 
suitably specified fo r the pro l em. Assum ing that there is 
more than one value of p rice in th d cision set (this is a 
r asonable assumption if price uncertainty exists ), we notice 
im .mediatel y that the aim of profit maximisation cannot e used 
t o sel ect the o ptimal level of output. If m arginal cost is not 
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perfectly inelastic, different o ptimal values of output will attach 
to the different possi le _ rice values. In the ex- a nte situation at 
t-n, there is nothing in the p rofit maximisation criterion which 
enab les an optimal output to b e select d. Without going into 
details , let us c onsider the application of some other criteria 
to this decision p rob lem . 
(i) As generally used, the rnaxi m isation of anticipated p rofit 
criterion requires that the firm anticip ate the occurrence o f 
one particular p rice. If the m arginal cost function is 
differentiable, output is o p timal when the anticipated p rice 
equals rnarginal cost when marginal cos t is increasing and 
average variabl e cost is covered. Yet this criterion is 
inadequate for application to conditions of uncertainty. 
Under uncertainty, the firm will generally anticipate more 
than one p rice as possi --- le. If th firm does anticipate a 
numb er of p rice possib ilities, the anticipated profit criterion 
does not enab le us to p redict the firm I s action. The 
anticipated profit crit erion can only e used when the 
anticipated value of the p rice para.meter is certain. 
(ii) If the firm ado pts the Wald or maxmin criterion, it wishes 
to assure itself of a gain no less than the rnaximum of the 
rrdnimum gains for all acts . It shoul d p roduce the level of 
output for w hich 
Max M in I> (x , p ) 3 . 4 
X p 
occurs . In the m atrix case in which the l ements a .. lJ 
represent p rofit for the i-th act when the j-th state of 
nature p revails , the firm should s l ect the out ut level 
which gives the rnaximum of the m inimum profits in each 
row , 1 . e . it should sel ect the output value for 
M ax 
i 
M in 
J 
a . . • lJ 
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3.5 
T he Wald crit r ion, like those to b e s u sequently conside red, 
is cons is ten t with the fun d.amental condition fo r p rice uncer -
tainty, i . e . with the po ss ib ility of n 1ore than one p rice. 
(iii) If the fi rm ado pt s the m axrnax crite rion, it aims to m axirnise 
its r.naximum possi l e level of p rofit. It shoul d p roduce the 
ou tput for 
M ax M ax p (x , p) • 3. 6 
X p 
In the rnatrix c ase , the firm shoul d select the output level 
which g ives a m axim um of the row m axim a of p rofits , i . e . 
the output level for 
Max M ax 
j 
a .. • 
l 
lJ 
(iv) B o th the W ald and the M axmax are s pecial case s of the Hurwicz 
c rite rion. T he firm a dopting the Hurwicz c riterion aims to 
m aximise an index cons isting of the weighted sum of the 
maximum and m inimum poss i le p rofit for each output level. 
A fixed p e ss imism weight, f3 , is assign ed to the lowest 
profit outcom e for each level of p rofit a nd , an optimi sm 
weight, (1- f3 ) , i s as signed to the highest profit outcome 
for each out ut level. T he firm wishes to maximise the 
index 
f3 M in /J (x , p ) + ( 1 - f3 ) M ax p (x, p ). 
p p 
Its o ptimal l evel of output is the output value for 
M ax ( f3 M in <J (x , p ) + {l - f3 ) Max /> (x , p ) ). 3 • ., 
X p p 
The matrix optimal l ev el of output is the value in the r ow s 
for 
M ax ( (3 M in a .. + ( 1 - (3 ) Max 
l j lJ j 
a .. } • lJ 3 . " 
When (3 = 1 the Hurwicz solution i s the same a s the W ald 
and whe n 13 = 0 it i s the sam e a s th e M axm ax. 
(v) If the firm ado pts the B aye s crite rion i t wishes to p roduce 
an output to m axim ise its expected profit. Showing math-
ematical expec tation by E , the firm wishe s to p roduce the 
output for 
M ax E [ /) (x , p ) ). 
X 
But 
M ax E [ /) (x, p ) ) = M ax p {x, E (p ) ) 
X X 
= l\t1ax [ E (p ) x - C (x )] 3.9 
X 
s ince x is not sub ject to v a riation aft e r t-n. If the cost 
function is d iffe rentiab le, then ex pected p rofits will b e at 
a maxim um when 
E (p) = C ' (x ), 
C " (x) > 0, an d average variable cost is increasing. 
For a m aximum, p roduction m ust b e such that expecte d 
p rice is e qual to marginal cost when m arginal cost is 
incre asing. In addition a net surplus must b e realised on 
current p ro duction. 
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In the p revious example, the o ptirnal conditions for the 
d ifferent criteria have not b een stated in detail . We shall now 
consider an n-commodity model and state the solutions of some 
criteria in detail. In stating the solutions, one of our most 
important tasks will be to find the p ric e vectors and p roblems 
which give equivalent m axim um solutions . 
D. Conversions to Maxin 1a 
If the firm ' s production possib ilities form a convex 
set and if its p roduction is always such that it is impossible 
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for it to increase its output of any commodity without increasing 
the input or decreasing the output of another com rnodity, then 
there is at least one imputed price vector which ensures that 
the m aximum of its associated irnputed p rofit function occurs 
for the firm's production b undle. There is always at least one 
hyperplane which p asses through any point on the extremal 
(limits) of a convex set and which does not p ass through its 
convex hull. Any point upon the extr em al of a convex production 
set corresponds to the ex tremum of some imputed p rofit 
function because under pure competition the firm ' s imputed 
profit functions form families of hyperplanes in commodity 
space. The ab ove a ssumptions not only limit the firm ' s 
p roduction to values upon the extremal of its set of p roduction 
possibilities but further limit it to p articular values upon the 
extremal. All of these extremal values are associated with 
the maxima of imputed p rofit functions. The position can be 
m ade clearer by assuming that the firm's p roduction function 
is at least twice differentiable. 
Suppose that 
••• , x )=O q 
is the firm's production function for q commodities, and that 
q 36 
V = r. p X 
r = 1 r r 
io its profit function. We adopt the Hicksian convention of 
treating factors as negative p roducts . Assuming specific price 
values, the necessary conditions for a maximum of V sub j ect 
••• , x ) = 0 are q 
p = A, f 
r r 
1, o a• , q 
where 11. is a Lagrange multiplier. The necessary conditions 
can also b e expressed as 
= - ... ::: 
p p 
q-1 ::: _g 
f f 
q-1 q 
3. 10 
The sufficient condition is that the change of p rofit should e 
negative for all variations of output which satisfy the production 
function~ This , as w e shall show later, is sat isfied if d2 f is 
positive definite sub ject to df = f dx = o. 
r r 
Consider any commodity vector satisfying 
f (x 1, x 2 , ••• , xq) =0. Let us rep resentitas[x1>i'<, x 2*, • •• , xq:i:<]. 
Since the p values can be varied independently of one another , it 
is ob v ious that there is at least one combination of p values such 
that 
X *) q 
8 • • ' 
= 
J,) X ,, .. 
q 
p 
-oo,= . 3. 11 ____ ....._ __ ~
f q (x l *, • • • , X q>:C ) 
p 1 b e a set of p rice values which satisfies q~ 
the equ ations . Then, any scalar multiple of [p1, p2, ••• , P q] 
sati sfies them and~ .other sets of price values satisfy them. 
The values 
A A A 
al pl c1:z Pz a9. pg 
fl (x * . . . , X ,:c ) £ (x * . . . , X li'<) ... , f q (x 1 ,:: , . . . , X *) 1 ' q ' 2 1 ' q ' q 
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are only equal if a 1 ::: a 2 ••• ::: a ::: a • q-1 q 
T his in'lplies that there is only one hyperpla.ne in com.rnodity 
space which satisfies conditions 3. 11 . 
If we maximise imputed p rofit u pon the b asis of the 
shadow prices [a p1, ••• , a p l we should find hat the imouted q ~ ~ ... 
profit function reache s a maximum at (x
1
*, x
2 
*, ... , xq"~ ] , 
In view of equations 3 . 10 and 3, 11, the n e cessary conditions 
for an extremum are satisfied at [x 1:i.c , •• , , xq~< ]. The 
2 
assumption that d f is positive definite ensures that this is 
the only extremum comrr1odity bundle for any scalar multiple 
of [p1, , •• , p q ] , and that the extrenmm is in fact a maximun'l, 
E , Some Simple Shadow Prices for Criteria in a Multi-
gommodity Model. 
Let us now try to i dentify the simple shadow p rice 
vectors in simulated maximisation p ro len1 s for some criteria. 
Let X rep resent the poss ible commodity 1 undles or vectors 
one of which must e chosen at t-n. Let P re p resent the firm 1 s 
decision set of p rice v ctors which apply to its dete rmination of 
X for t in t-n. Individual p rice vectors will b e denoted b y 
sub scripts to P , eo g . p o::: { P 10' Pzo' • • • pqo }where p ro 
is the z ero-th possible p rice of the r -th comn.'lodity, and 
similarly, X ::: 
0 
• • • X } • qo In the forthcoming pro lem s , 
exce p t when s pecially ment ioned, the Y values may be continuous 
or discontinuous and their domain may e limited y inequalities 
or other restrictions. T he po ssib le level of profit is a function 
of the availab le input-output possi ilities at'"l.d h e p rice 
possib ilities , and can ..., e rep resented y 
/) = p (X, P) . 3 . 12 
Unless stated otherwise, j;he 1 ~lation will b e interpreted in a 
general w ay - discoutinuiti<>:3 ~ res~rictions can underlie it.' 
..  
Our cours e is now the following one: TakirnI a 
decision set of p ric e vecto r s, P , we obtain the o ptim al 
commodity vectors for the Wald , maxmax, Hurwicz and Bayes 
criteria. Also , we s pecifically identify som e price vectors 
which yield the Wald, m axrnax, Hurwicz and Bayes commodity 
optima as the solution of a maximum p roblem . Let us concen-
trate on each criterion in turn. 
The Wald Solution 
The o ptimal W ald solution is 
1'Aax 
X 
M in 
p 
I:, (X, r '). 3. 13 
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Suppose that an optimal W ald solution occurs for the commodity 
vector X = X and the price vector P = P i . e. 
0 0 
M ax 
X 
M in 
p 
/) (X , P) = /) (X , P ) • 3. 14 
0 0 
Our aim is to find the condition for 
M ax /) (X, P 0 ) = M ax X y .,: 
IV1in /J (X , P ) . 3 . 5 
An identical n1 aximum solution involving P ne e d not occur for 
0 
Max 
X 
p (X, P ) > /J (X , P ) • 
0 - 0 0 
3 . 16 
If a saddle point exists for function /) at (X , P ) then 
0 0 
the equali ty of expression 3. 15 will e satisfied and the ma.xinium 
solution will b e identical to the minimax one. Using von Neumann 
and Morgensternt s definition 3 (X , P ) is a saddle point of 6 i f 
0 0 
at the same time /) (X , P ) assumes its maximum at X = X and 
0 0 
I> (X , P ) assumes its m inimum at P = P • If a saddle point 
0 0 
3 J . von Neumann and O. Morgenstern~ Theory of Games and 
Economic Behaviour, Princeton University P ress , P rinceton, 
1944. 
exists at (X , P ), 
0 0 
Max p (X , P ) = Min /) (X , P ) • 
X o p o 
But 
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3. 17 
Min /> (X , P) = /> (X , P ) = M ax Min /) (X , P) . 3. ' 18 
p o o o X p 
Hence, from equation 3. 17 and 3. 18, the existence of a saddle 
point for /) at (X , P ) ensures that the m axmin solution can be 
0 0 
replaced by an identical one found by maxirnising p (X, P ) with 
0 
respect to X. The prices of the price vector P are treated as 
0 
constants. 
But going further than this - only if a saddle point exists 
at (X , P ) can the maxmin solution be converted to an equtvalent 
0 0 
maximum one of the specific form, Max /:> (X, P ) • P roof: If a 
X 0 
saddle point does not exist at (X , P ), then /:J (X , P ) is not 
0 0 0 0 
simultaneously the m inimum of /> (X , P) and the maximum of 
0 
p (X , P) o If p (X , P ) is the rninimum of/, (X , P) then, if 
o O O 0 
a saddle point does not exist at (X , P ), /J (X , P ) is not the 
0 0 0 0 -
maximum of I> (X, P ) • If a saddle point does not exist at 
0 
(X , P ) then Max I> (X , P ) occurs for some value other than 
0 0 0 
X
O
• This maximum point, say /, (X a' P
O
) cannot b e "'P.other 
saddle paint vcl,ue:, for if a nun1.ber of saddle points exist they 
. 4 have the same profit value. In other words, if (X a, P 
0
) and 
(X , P ) are both saddle points 
0 0 
3.19 
and, 
Max /J (X, P ) occurs for (;{,..., , P ) and (A , 
0 u. 0 0 
X 
p ). 
0 
Consequently, if a saddle point does not exist at (X , P ) then 
0 0 
4 Ibid, p. 95. 
4 0 
M ax /J (X , P ) = /) (X , P ) > /) (Y , P ) • 
X o o: o o o 
3.20 
Given the state P , the m aximising s trategy, X , give s g r e ater 
0 0: 
profit than does th e fi rm 1s W ald stra tegy. 
not a saddle point then o oviously 
Min /> (X , P ) < M in /> (X , P ) 
p 0: p 0 
But if (X a , P ) is 
0 
3.2 1 
and the firm does not achieve its maxmin strat egy by p roducing 
X a • If a saddle ~int exists for the pos s ib le profit function 
I> (X, P}, then, and only then, does the Wald solution convert 
to an identical n1aximisation one b ased upon one of the possib le 
states of nature. Of course, eve n though the solution nee d not 
b e simple, the Wald solution will always convert to a 
m aximisation one if the p roduction function satisfie e the required 
second order d ifferentiability conditions wh ich w e re m entioned 
in s ection D. 
A s a particular instance of the existence of a saddle 
point let us conside r dominanc e . V{here P 1 is one p rice vector 
and P 1 rep resen ts all othe r possible p rice vecto rs, the vector 
p t is dominant for th e Wald solution if 
/) (X, P ') < /> {X, P '). 3.22 
It immediately follows that 
Min M ax /J (X , P ) = M ax p ( : , P ') • 3. 23 
Also, 
b e c ause 
P X X 
M ax M in /> {X , P ) = M ax /> (X , pt) 
X P X 
Min /> {X, P) = /) {X, p r) 
p 
for any value of X . 
3. 24 
4 1 
H ence , g iven dorninance, 
Min Max /, (X , P) = l\.1ax M in /) (X , :?) 3. 26 
p X X P 
which implies that a saddle point exists . The dom inance case 
is a special one in which a saddie point always exists. 
Turning our attention to special dom inance cases , let 
p . b e the j - th possi le p rice for th e r -th factor if r < m , and, 
rJ 
fo r the r - th p roduct if rn + 1 < r < q . F o r the j-th price of the 
r -th c o nunodity the firrn I s net profit function is 
V= r 
r = 1 
p .x + 
r J r 
q 
) 
r = m+ l 
p . X • 
rJ r 
r.; 
3.27 
Here we are following the Hicksian convention and are treating 
facto rs as negative p roducts . 
The values of x are sub ject to the p roduction function 
f(x 1, X...,, • •o, X) = 0. C. q 3 . 28 
If p rl r e p resents the lowest possi le p rice for the r-th commodity 
and p the highest, then a don1.inance situation exists i f the 
rn 
vecto r ( p 1 , ?2 , • •• , p ; p 1 1, •• • , pq l }, is ossibl e . n n mn m+ , 
Profits for any co:r:n.modity vector ..({::<= ( x
1
*, x
2
::c , • •• , xq':c } 
and the p rice vector ( p ln' P2n' • • •, Pmn ; Pm+l , l ' • • • ' Pq l } 
are 
y:o,'< = 
r = 1 
p x*+ 
rn r 
q 
L p rl xr*• 
r = m + l 
3 . 29 
Profits are at a m aximum for every po ssi le output vector when 
the price vector" ( p , p
2 
, ••• , p ; p 
1 1
, ••• , p 
1
} occu rs 
ln n mn m+ , q 
b ecause x < 0 for r < m and x -~ 0 from m + 1 < r < q . If the 
r - r- - -
highest po Dsib le p rice of each factor can o ccur along with the 
5 J . Hicks : Value and C apitalJ C larendo n P ress , Oxfo rd, 
1939 , p. 319 . 
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lowest 2rice for each product, dominance exists for the vector 
of highest factor and lowest p ro duct prices . Considering this 
•ee-tor possib ility further by supposing that the production 
function is at least twice differentiable, let us pursue the 
equivalent Wald solution which io foun t.. • • • 
~-Y 11wnn1101ng 
m q 
V = I: p X 
r = 1 - xn r 
+ L. p X 
+l rl r r = m 
sub ject to the p roduction function 
The solution can De 
m 
z= L. p X + 
1 rn r r = 
found by maximising the function 
q 
I: p rl x r - A. f (x l ' x2 , • • ·' 
r = m +l 
3. 31 
X ) 3.3 2 q 
where A.is a Lagrange multi plier. To avoid double summations 
let 
r= 
p X 
ro r l 
= 
rn 
L, 
r = l 
p X + 
rn r 
Then, the necessary conditions for 
q 
r. 
r = n1+l 
P X • rl r 3. 33 
Max z = Max { i p x - A. f(x 1, x 2, , •• xq)} 3. 34 X X r = l ro r 
are 
and 
= A, f 
r 
. . . ' 
(r = l , ••• , q) 
X ) = 0 • q 
) 
) 
) 
) 
This gives q + 1 equations in q + 1 unknowns. 
3 .35 
The sufficient conditions for a maximum will be 
satisfied if d
2 
z is negative for all variations of output which 
satisfy the p roduction function. 
Now, 
2 
d2f 3 .36 dz= - A, 
and 
2 
d f = L, I: f dx dx 3. 3~ 
r s rs r fl 
' 
'. 
where s = 1 •• o q ~ 
Since "' > 0, d
2 
z wiJ.l be negative definite if d 2 f > 0 
for all variations of output which satisfy the pro duction 
function. 2 Therefore 1 if d f is posit ive definite subject to 
df = L f dx = Q D 
r r r 
d
2 
z will be n egativ e definite subject to the v ariations set by 
the production function, and the sufficient conditions for a 
m aximurn will be satisfied. 2 d f wLl be positive definite 
subject to the restriction of equ ation 3 . 38 if the following 
bordered p rincipal mino rs of theproduction function and its 
b orde red discriminant are all n egative: 
0 fl 0 f 
<O, fl f f < 01 ••• ' s <o 11 12 
fl fl l f f 
f2 f21 f 
r ·rs 
22 
where r = s = l O e O qo 
Denoting any t'No commodities b y the subscripts 
r and s, the marginal conditions of 3e 35 imply t!-iat 
dx 
s 
dx 
r 
= 
f 
r 
- = f 
s 
In this dominance ~ ' i:he; margin;i" . .:-es_uirements for a 
Wald o ptimum are that 
3,3() 
3. 40 
(a) the ratio of the lowes t poss i ble price s for any two 
pro ducts ( r >m and s >m ) be equal to the marginal rate 
of substitution between the products in p ro duction; 
(b ) the ratio of the highest prices for any two factors 
( r Sm and s ~ m) e equal to their marginal technical 
rate of sub stitution; 
43 
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(c) the ratio between the highest p rice for any factor (r:s:m) and 
the lowest price for any p roduct (s '> m) be equal to the technical 
rate of transformation b etween the factor and the p roduct. 
For a stab le solution t}_ c s econd order conditions must 
b e satisfied. These second order conditions imply that the firm 's 
production possib ilities form a strictly c onvex set. 6 The second 
order conditions will only be m e t if the icoquants are convex (to 
the origin) and, if production is sub ject to de creasing returns to 
scale. The fulfilment of these conditions is essential for the 
existence of a true extre.mum. 
But even if these marginal and second order conditions 
are satisfied, an ab solute maximum m ay not exist for the values 
which fulfil them~ If w only attend to these conditions , we shall 
sometimes fail to find the true Wald solution even though it exists 
for Max 
X 
P (X , p ) • 
0 
T his is solely b ecause the differential 
calculus does not dete r m ine the true rn aximum if an absolute 
m aximum exists a t the b ound a r y values of x = 0 (r = , • c., q). 
r 
T his is similar t o the perfect competition case in which marginal 
. 7 
conditions are m et b ut an o perating loss is incurred. For any 
comb ination satisfying the marginal and second order conditions , 
each product or group of p roducts must yield a surplus so that 
it does not p ay to ab andon t he production of any p roduct or group 
of products . It follows from the r elationship of average and 
marginal values that if any product or group of p roducts yields 
6 For a rel evant outline of convex sets : T . Koo pmans : Three 
Essays on the State and Significance of the Economic Science, 
McGraw-Hill Book Comp any, New York, 1957 , Essay 1, 
11 Allocation of Resources and the Price System", p . 24 . 
7 J. R . Hicks : Value and C api tal , pp. 87-88n 
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an o pe rating surplus and satisfies the marginal and second order 
conditions that average variable cost is increasing, Hence, if 
the marginal and second order conditions are satisfied for a 
comb ination in which average variable cost is increasing for 
each product and group of products , then a non- boundary 
maximum occurs. 
The dominance case in which 
( pln' Pzn' ••• pmn; p1ntl, l ' ••• , pql }canoccurhas 
been pursued at length b ecause the above conditions and p rocedures 
apply with minor m odification to other Wald situations. Similar 
marginal, second order and absolute value conditions apply 
mutatis mutandis to any Wald solution which can be converted 
into a m aximum one. T his is so provided that the production 
function satisfies the differentiability requirements. In dominance 
and non-dominance cases where a saddle point exists the first order 
conditions (of 3. 40) may be based upon a set of prices which 
contain some value s each of which is not the highest possible for 
a factor, or the lowest possible price of a product. 
If, as assumed previously, the firm produces only one 
good and this is subject to price uncertainty and if its costs 
are certain, this is a dominance case in which the highest possible 
price of the factors can occur along with the lowest possible price 
for the product. We have deduced that the Wald solution always 
converts to a simple maximum one in this case. Therefore, 
if p 1 is the lowest possible price for the p roduct and if the 
cost function is at least twice differentia leJ then the Wald 
optimum occurs for 
p = C 1 (x) 1 
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p r ovided that C" (x ) > 0 and av erage variable cost is incTeasing 
at this output l evel. 
T o conclud e : If a saddle point exists and p rofit is 
rnaximised u pon the .... asis of the price v e c t o r which corresponds 
to the saddle point, then the firm attains its max.m in solution. 
Only if a saddle point exists can a m axmin solutio n e attained 
y m axim ising u pon the 1- asis of one of the possi1 le states of 
nature. A saddle point exists if dominance i s possible. If the 
- ,__ 
highest possib l e p rice of factoi-s can o ccur along with the l owest 
possib l e p rice for p roduc ts , we h ave a special t ut neverthel e s s 
rel evant case of dom inance. In thi s case the maxmi n s olutio n 
can b e attained b y maximising p r o fit u pon the b asis of the p rice 
vector of the highest possib le price for facto rs and the lowest 
possi le p rices for products . Naturally , if the p rice of any 
commodity is certain, its l owest and highest possibl e p r ice 
coincide. 
T he M axrn ax Solution 
W here p (X, F ) r epresents the p rofit possi ilitie s of 
the firm , let the firm I s o p timal m axmax solutio n b e 
M ax 1\/i ax /J = /) (X 1' p 1 ) . 
X p 
Vtf e shall show that 
M ax Max /) (X, P) == Max p (X, p 1) • 
X p X 
Any two m axmax values commute since any two hav e the same 
characteristic pro perty of bein g a maximum of /J (X, P) . 
C o m mutativ ity implies that 
Max 
X 
Max /) (X, P ) = 
p 
M ax 
p 
Max /) {X, P ). 
X 
4 7 
F urther, if (-'c 1, P 1 ) y i el ds an a solute m axirau.m of the function 
I> which it does since /J (X 1, P 1) is a raaxmax value, then 
I> (X , P 1) assumes its maximum at X = x 1• 
Proof : 
Hence , 
Max Max /> (X , P ) = 
X p 
Max Max 
p X 
p = :Max /) (X , P l) = /> (X l ' P ) . 
X 
3. 43 
3. 44 
M ax Max /) (X , P ) = 
X p 
M ax /> (X , P 1) = /J (X 1, P 1) . X 
If (X
1
, P 1) is the only maxmax point for I> (X, P ) then the 
m aximum solution gives onl y one value in I . If there is .more 
than one maxmax value , they are equal. E ach m axmax value 
will h ave a corresponding maximum solution. Every m axmax 
solution has a sin-iple maximum equivalent in which profits are 
maximised u pon the b asis of one of the vectors of the set of 
possible p rice v ecto rs . 
If the lowest possible rice of each fac tor can occur 
simultaneously with the highest possi 1 price for each p roduc t 
then the o ptim al m axr.nax solution occurs for 
where 
The state P 
1 
is a dominant one s ince for any combinati on of 
commodities p rofits are highest for the vector P 1• In this 
dominance case, we can m aximise 
m 
V = ~ p rn xr 3. 45 
r = 1 
4 8 
sub ject to the production function 
f (x 1, x 2 , • •• , x q) = 0 3. 4 6 
and ob tain the maxmax solution. F or a maxmax solution in 
this dominance case: 
(a) The ratio of the highest possib le p rices for any two 
p ro ducts m ust equal the technical rate of su stitution 
between the p roducts . 
(b ) The ratio of the lowest possible p rices for any two 
factors must e equal to the technical rate of substituion 
of the factors . 
(c) The ratio between the lowest pric e for any factor and 
the highest price for any product must b e equal to the 
technical rate of transformation b etween the factor 
and the product. The second order conditions are once 
again applicable . Also , boundary values must be 
checked. 
If the max.max solution occurs for a vector other than 
p 1 = ( p 11 ' Pz 1 ' • • • ' p 1 ; p 1 ' • • • ' p } m rn+ , n qn 
(because this state is impossible) then, g iven the required 
differentiability conditions , a set of marginal conditions based 
upon the p rice vector for the maxmax solution can be stated 
by substituting the new set or p rices in the above expressions . 
If the firm p roduces one product and costs are certain, 
dominance always occurs for the n1axmax solution, and this 
dominance is of th type p revious l y discussed at length. 
Hence, if p is the highest possi le p rice for the product 
n 
then, the maxmax sol ution can e found y maximising 
P x - C (x) . If this function is at least twice differentia' l e , 
n 
the maxmax optir.num occurs for 
p :: C 1 (x) 
n 
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if C"(:c) > 0 and averase variab le cost is increasing at this 
output level. 
Unlike the minimax solution, the maxmax solution 
always converts into a simple and equivalent maximur.n solution 
in which one of the possibl e states of nature is treated as 
though it is certain. The Hurwicz solution does not always 
have a simple maximum equivalent. 
The Hurwicz Solution 
Let the Hurwicz solution b e 
Max} Min f, (X, P ) + ( l - f3) Max f, (X, P ) } 
X p p 
Then, 
because X is open on the left hand side of the expression. 
But if dor.ninance arises, the Hurwicz solution can b e 
converted to a maximum one such that 
Max{t, /J (X, P )+(1-t, )/J(X, P 1)} X o 
If 
and, 
P (X, P ) ~ b (X, P ) 
f, (X, P:) :? f, (X , P ) } 
then " Hurwicz" dominance occurs . Given relationship 
3. 50, 
M in /> (X , P ) 
p 
:: /) (X, p ) 
0 
3.47 
3. 48 
3. 49 
3."50 
3.51 
and M ax /) (X, P ) ::: /) {X, P 1) • p 3 . 52 
Therefore , 
Mr { ti m; {, (X , P ) + (1 - ti ) m;; {, (X, P ) } 
= M~ {ti (, {X, P) + ( 1 - ti ) {, (.A , P l) } 
::: f3 /) (Xi.c, F ) + ( 1 - f3 ) P (x,:, , P ) 3 . 5 3 
0 1 • 
As a particul ar case of " Hurwicz" dominance , suppose the 
v ectors 
and p 
n 
•.• ' p ; 
mn pm+ 1, 1 ' • • • p q , 1 ) 
p 
1 
, • • • p ) to 
m+ , n q, n 
b e possib le. Then the Hurwicz s olution can be found by maxi-
mising. 
m q 
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E ( f3 p rn + ( 1 +f3 ) pr 1 ) x r + I: 
r ::: 1 r ::: n1+ 1 
( f3p 1 + ( l - f3 ) p )x 3 , 5~ r rn r 
su ject to the p roduction function. If the differentiability 
conditions are satisfied the marginal conditions involve the 
p rice "indices" f3 p + ( 1 - f3 ) p for r ~ m and f3 p + 
rn rl r l 
(1 - f3 ) p for r :' m + 1. ·when f3 = 0 thes first order 
rn 
condi tions are the same as those for the Vl ald cri terion and 
when f3 = l they are th same as for the maxmax. As b efore, 
second order conditions and boundary requirements must be 
met. 
" Hurwicz dominance" alway s occurs in the one produc t 
case, if costs are certain. W e know from the ab ove theorem 
that the Hurwicz output can b e ob taine d b y maxim ising 
[ f3 P1 + (1 - f3 ) pn] x - C (x ). If this function is at l east 
twice differentiab l e , then a Hurwicz o ptimum occurs if 
C ' (x ) = f3 Pi + (1 - f3 ) pn , 
C " (x) > 0 
and if average variable cost is increasing a t the point of 
equality. 
'.fhe B ayes Solution 
The B ayes solution occurs for 
Max E /> (X, P ). 
Since X is not su ject to variation aft er t -n, this ecomes 
where 
M ax /> (X , E ( P ) ) 
X 
3.55 
3.56 
i.e.· E(P) is a vector consisting of the expected p rices of the 
q commodities. The Bayes solution is found by m aximising 
q 
V = ~ 
r = 1 
E (p ) x 
r r 
sub ject t o 
f (x 1, x 2 , ••• , x q) = O. 
If the p roduction function is differentiab le, we ob tain a set of 
marginal conditions in terms of expected p rices and rates of 
technical transform ation which are similar to the perfect 
competition ones. The previous s econd order and boundary 
statements are also relevant. 
It will be recalled that all of the previous analysis is 
b ased u pon the as sumption of an identifiable decision set. In 
postulating this decision set, we did not postulate its relation 
to actual prices or to ob jectively possible p rices. Neither did 
we postulate any s p ecial relationship b etween actual output and 
the o ptimal output under c ertainty, or b etween maximum 
equivalent prices under unce rtainty and actual p rices. 
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Obviously, the firm I s output under uncertainty is the joint 
result of its predictions and criterion, and from the point of 
view of its actual profit b o th factors have an influence . 
From the point of view of comparing profit under 
uncertainty and under certainty both the firm ' s criterion and 
the quality of its prediction are important. When we come to 
consider the firm ' s actual average profit in later chapters we 
must take account of both factors . 
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CHAPTER N 
Static P lan s and Diffe ren ces of P roduction 
Introduction 
Differen c s of p rodu ction can occur 
(i) b ecause o f d ifferen t criteria , 
(ii) ecause of different decision sets , and 
(iii) b ecause of different forms of "irrational" b ehaviour. 
If the firm makes static plans , d ifferent l evels of production 
can e c ompared y u t ilising the concept of imputed ' 'm aximum" 
p rices which was introduc e d in the lac t ~hapt r • ...., o ::1) w.r icons of 
production b oth unde r certainty and uncertainty can e r educed 
to comparisons of constr a ined " p rofit" r.n axirn a . Each 
roduction value can e conceiv e o f as a v alue which m aximises 
an impu ted p rofit funct ion and changes of p r oduc t ion can b e 
viewe d as resulting from changes in the shadow p rices when 
the impu ted p rofi t funct ion i s maxi m i sed s u j ect to the 
production function. B y treating d ifferences of p roduction in 
this way, w e are ab l e to re inte r p ret rnany of the mathematical 
theorems w h ich Hickti introduces for the perfect c ompetition 
model. While there is mathematical s im ilarity b etween the 
p resent p roduction theorem s an d some of those for p erfect 
competitio n , they are d iffe rent in their economic inter r e tation 
and gen e rality. 
In this chapt r , w e shall stat a few o f Hick o ' theo rems 
an th n show their relevance to the eff ct upon p roduction of 
(i) changes of c rite ria when the d ecision set is g iven and (ii) 
changes of the d c ision set when the cri terion is g iven. In 
con1paring these particular c hanges , w e s hould not los e sight 
of the g n r al idea that no m atter w hy p roduction changes we 
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can treat the change as a rising from a change in the oh adcw p rice 
v ector of an impu ted p rofit maximisation probl em. T his t reat-
m ent is pos si le if the second d erivative of the p roduction 
function is positiv e definite su j ct to the first derivative 
b Qin g zero. In imputine the maximi sation p rob l em, we do 
not i rnply that the firm actually determines its output y some 
maxi m isation process . 
B . The P r odu ctio,2: _§ffects of Price Vector C hanges in the 
Constrained Maxi m u m Prob lem 
Before dealing with differences in production levels 
under uncertainty , we can profita lyre - familiarise ourselves 
with the effects upon production of a change in the price vector 
if p rofit is maxi m ised su ject to a p rofit function. We shoul d 
re - familiarise ourselves with the effect u pon the m aximising 
output v ecto r of a change in the price vector when 
q 
V = 
is m aximised su ject to 
f (x l ' X , • • • 1 X ) = 0 • 2 q 
If the p roduction function is assumed to e d ifferentia l e , this 
will enab l e compari sons to b e made of fini' e differe nces in 
production if the results of the differential calculu s ar extended 
l by the theorem of the mean. M athematically, the p ro l em i s 
i dentical to the p rf ct comp tition one of finding the effect 
1 P . Samu elson : Foundations of E conom i c illalysis, 
Harvard Univ rsity Press , am ridge , 194 7 , pp. 46 - 52 . 
For an i ntroductory m athematical survey of the theorems 
of the mean -
R. C ourant : Di fferential and Integral C alculus , Vol. I, 
Interscience Puolishers , New York, 1937 , pp. 102 - 106 , 
and, 
G . B . Thomas : C alculus an Analyti cal Geom try, 
Addison- Wesl ey Publishine C ompany, Reading U. S. A. , 
3rd d ition, 196 0, pp. 136 - 141 , o r any eener al calculus text. · 
u pon production of a change in a certaix:i p rice v ector when 
p rofit is constra ined '-y the preceding p roduction function. 
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For the price vector , ( p , p
2
, ••• , pq} , the firm ' s 
constrained p rofit function is 
q 
z = I: p x - A f (x , x
2
, • o • , 
r = 1 r r 
X ) 
q 
where "' is the Lagrange mul tiplier. The necessary conditions 
for a maxi m u m of this function are 
p = A, f 
r r 
and 
(r = 1, ••• , q ) 
. . . , X ) = 0 
q 
4 . 1 
If the p rice v ector ( p
1
, p
2
, ••• , 
q 
} changes , ou r assumptions 
im ply that the firm will res pond by altering its comb i nation of 
re sources in such a way that the marginal conditions continue to 
be satisfied. Therefore , the p ro l em i s to d i scover the change 
in production w hen p r ices change and the m arginal conditions of 
expression 4. 1 continu e to , e r.net. To ob tain this chang e we 
differenti ate the mar ginal conditions totally, and o tain 
and 
dp -
r 
q 
s 
A, r: 
r = 1 
f - f d t,.,= 0 
rs r 
I: f dx = o. 
s s 
r = 
R earranging , 
and 
f 
r 
q 
d A + "' I: f 
q 
I: f 
r = 1 s 
r = 1 
dx = 0 . 
s 
rs 
dx 
s 
= dp 
r 
Equations 4 . 3 xpre s s d differently are 
(r=s= 1, • • • , q ) 
(r= s= 1, .•. , q) 
4. 2 
0 d }... + fl dxl + £2 dx2 + ••• + f dx = 0 q q 
f d }... +}... [ f dx 1 + f l . 11 dx 2 + ••• + £ dx ] = d; l 2 lq q 
" t 
., 
< 
f d "A. + t,. ( f dx + f dx2 + ••• + f dx ] = d p q ql 1 q2 qq q q 
or 
0 f d }... 0 
s 
= 4 . 4 
f ~ f X dp 
r rs r r 
-I 
where r = s = l , . . . , q . 
Let 
0 f 
G s I 4 , 5 = = I B-. lJ 
f }... f 
r rs 
w here r = s = l , ... , q 
and i = j = 1, . . . ' q + 1. 
Then, y C rainer ' s Rule, 
q 
I: dp G 
r = l 
r rs 
dx = 4.6 
s G 
where s = 1, . . . ' q and G is the cofacto r of e l ement g .. = JS ~ 
in the matrix, [ g .. ] • 
lJ 
If 
0 f 
F = 
f f 
s 
r rs 
4 . 7 
and, if F represents the cofactor off , then e quat ion 4 . 6 
rs rs 
reduc es to 
q 
I: F d p 
rs r 
dx r = 1 4 . 8 = • 
s }... F 
The c hang in the output (or input ) of the s -th commodity is 
found by surnmine the " technolog ical" cofactors, F fo r the 
rs 
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r cornmodi t ies , and then dividing b y the determ inant F ti·m - o 
the scalar m ultiple "' • 
In the absence of special knowledge it i s impossi le to 
pl ace a sign upon equation 4o 86 Howeve r , if the price o the 
r - th resource alone incr a ses then; if it i o a produ ct its supply 
inc reases and if it is a factor its input de creases. This can be 
shown as follow s : Let dp = 0 for all r f- sand dp >O for 
r r 
r = s . Then, 
q 
L'. F dp F dp 
1 rs r rr r dx r = = = • s "'F "'F 4. 9 
Therefore, 
ax F 
r rr 
oPr 
~ 
"'F 
4 . 10 
inc r + r is even, F is equal to the m inor of f with a 
r r rr 
positive sign attached. The minor of the q-th commoility must 
be negative if the stab ility condit ions are to be met" Since any 
commodity includ ing the r-th comn'lodity, can occupy the q - th 
pl ace in the bordered matrix, the m inor, 6 , must e 
rr 
negative if the stab ility condition of the last bordered princ i pal 
m inor is to 1 e satisfied. Hence , the cofactor, F = + ( 6 ) 
rr rr 
i s negative and F is negative b y the stab il ity conditions o Therefore , 
ox F 
r rr > o, 4 . 1 1 = 
d pr A, F 
ax 
b ecause A, o. Form + 1 $ < r > o, and, since > r - q , d p 
r 
factors are treated as negat iv e products. the chang in the input 
of a factor whose p rice alone ris es is of opposite sign. 
The effect upon the i n put and o tput of all 
commodities of a r is in th p rice of a singl e commodity~ all 
oth er pr i ces remaining unchanged, is 
dx = 
s 
F 
sr d p 
r 
(s = 1, ••• , q) 4. 12 
where the p ric e of the r-th commodit y increas es . From the 
prev ious argument it is known that dx > 0, but the effect u pon 
r 
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the in pu t or cutput of the other commodities is unknown., Only if 
all the cofactors F where s = 1, •• • , rn are negative and, if 
sr 
the cofactors F , s = m + 1, 
sr 
. . . ' q, are po sitive will an increase 
in the p rice of product r l ead to an increase in the employme nt 
of all factors and to an i ncrease in the output of all p roducts . In 
this case , complementarity is do m inant b oth on the product and 
2 factor side . Complementarity dominates if constant returns to 
scale exist3 ut, with decreasing returns , substitute and regressive 
rel ations b ecome more important. 
Let us now consider the e ffe ct of a rise in the p rice of 
a g roup of products . For simplicity suppose that all p roduct p r ices 
increas e . Then the change in the output or input of commodity s is 
dx = 
s 
q 
l 
r = m +l 
where s = 1, ••• , q. 
F dp 
sr r 
II, F 
, 4 . 13 
Unl ess all of the cofactors F < 0 for r $ m and all of the 
rs 
cofactors F > 0 for r = m + 1, ••• , q , a rise in the rice of 
rs 
one or mo re p roducts can l ead to a decrease in the output or 
input of some commodities . If the relativ e fre quency of negat ive 
produ ct cofactors is l ow , then there is a low pro ab ility of a r ise 
in the p rice of any p rodu ct caus i n g a decline in the ou t put of any 
other randoml y chosen product. However , in the ao sence o f 
further knowl edge , the e ffect upon the output of any p articul ar 
2 Hicks : Valu e and C apital, pp. 97 - 9 • 
3 Hicks : Op. cit., pp. 94 - 95 and pp. 322 - 323 . 
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p roduct is unknown. Si mil ar conclusions hold for factors 
relations. 
Comparisons o f optirnal aggregate output are compli-
cated b y the existenc of sut) stitute or regress ive relations. A. 
rise in the price of one or more pro ducts , and a fall in the p rice 
of one or m ore inputs can lead to an increase in the output of 
some p roducts and to a decrease in the output of others. In 
consequence, comparison of aggregate output involve an index 
problem which can o nly be avoided in s pecial instances. 
H aving considered some theorems for a change of a 
constrained maximum , we shall now apply them in two different 
ways. First, we shall apply them to the effects u pon production 
of a change in the set of decision pr ices when th e firm I s criterion 
remains unchanged. Secondly, we shall a pply them to the effects 
upon production of a change in cr iterion when the dec ision 
remains unchanged. For the purposes of this analysis, the 
assumptions of the p revious chapter will b e assumed to hold. 
This me ans that the foregoing analysis applie s to conditions of 
static decis ion making. 
C . The E ffect Upon Production of a Change of the Decision Price 
et. 
-
Turning to the first application, consider an initial set 
of p rice possibilities P anda sub sequent one P ', where the 
elements of both sets are price vectors. As efore, individual 
price vectors a re shown by sub scripts. B ginning with the 
minm ax criterion, let us compare the optimal minm ax 
production levels for both decision sets. Suppose that saddle 
points exist for (X , P ) and (X ', P '). Then for the first 
0 0 0 0 
decision set 
Max Min /> (X , P) = 
X p 
t> (X , ? ) = 
0 0 
and for the second decision set 
Max 
X 
/J (X, p ) 
0 
60 
Max Min /, (X , P 1 ) = /> (X 1, P ') = 
X p o o 
M ax 
X 
p (X, p I)• 
0 
T o comp are the two o ptimal levels of output X: and X 1 , we make 
0 
use of maximum equivalence. The d ifference in thes e two 
optimal output levels is equivalent to the chang e in production 
when profit is first maximised upon the p rice vector P and then 
0 
u pon the vector P '. 
0 
Given that the p roduction function is at least twice 
d ifferentiab le the previous maximisation theorems can :,e 
applied. If the minmax p rice vector, P ', contains one product 
0 
price which exceeds its corresponding value in the vector, P , 
0 
then, other vector p rices remaining constant, the output of 
the highe r p ric ed product will increase. Similarly, if the vector 
P ' contains one factor price which is lower than its corresponding 
0 
value in P , then a change to decision set P 1 will increase the 
0 
employm ent of the lower "priced" factor if all other imputed 
pri ces rem ain unchanged. If the v ector :"' ' is a scalar multiple 
0 
of P , optimal production will be the same for both decision sets. 
T he change in the input or output of e ach commodity for a change 
in the m i nmax p rice vector can b e found b y extending equation 
4 . 13 . vVhere the change of the p rice vector is finite the 
relevant partial derivatives which form the asis for this 
e quation must b e evaluated at an intermediate point so as to 
accord with the mean value theorem. There is no ne ed to state 
this result specifically ecause the qualitative conditions of 
equation 4 . 13 carry over the finite case since we have assumed 
the r e qu ired monotonicity c o nd ition. If P 1 > P because o n e 
0 0 
or mo r e p r oduct p rices a r e highe r in P 1 , th e ffect upon the 
0 
employr.ne n t of factors and the output of p roducts will depend 
u pon whethe r compleme ntarity i s dominant , the effect u pon 
aggregate produc tion o f a change in the m inm ax pri ce v ector 
from P to P 1 (where P 1 > P ) is not p r edictabl e in th 
0 0 0 0 
absen ce of further information. 
If the firm adopts o ther criteri a , such as th e Bay es 
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or maxmax crite rio n, then b y taking the relevant maximi s atio n 
price v ecto rs , w e c an o nc e m ore apply the preceding theo r erns 
mutatio rn.utandio. Since the application is o vious 
there i s no need to giv e an account o f i t . 
Index p rob l em s aris e in th e comparison of p roduction 
1n the m ulti - produ ct cas How ev e r, they do not a ris in the 
one p r odu ct case if factor p rice s are certain . In this o n e 
p roduct case , th e m inmax solut ion always c o nverts to a simpl e 
m aximum one . There fore , a ris in the l eas t pos si 1 price , 
w h ich is the basis of the max m in solut ion, leads to an increase 
i n optimal output if av rage variab l costs are co v ered and 
m arginal cost is not pe rfectly ine l as tic . Und r t he same 
p r oduction con di t ions , o u tput will e x p and for th Bay e s 
criteri o n a n d th e maxmax criterion if t h e expected p ric a n d 
the g reatest possib l e p rice re s pective ly increas e . Insofar 
a s unc e rta inty output solutions conve rt to m axim u m ones , the 
supply function for a c h ~ge in the maximum p ric component 
is iden t ic a l in form to the su ply function und r certain ty . 
D . T h e Effect Upon P r oduction of a Change of C r i t erion . 
T u r ning to the s co n d comparative p r obl em, viz ; the 
comparison o f optimal l e v e ls of o u tput for d ifferent crit rio n 
whe n the decisio n s t of pric s , F , remains co n stant, l et a 
saddl e point e xis t fo r (X , P ) • T h e n , the minm ax s olution i s 
0 0 
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Max M in 
X p 
/) (X , P ) = /J (X ' ? ) = 
0 0 
Max 
X 
/> (X , p ) • 
Also , suppos e the B ay s solut ion to e 
Max /J (E (F ), X ) = p (E (F ), XE ), 
X 
a n d the m axmax solut io n to b e 
M ax M a x /) {X, P ) = 
X p 
Our p roh l em i s to determi ne the re l ation s h i p ~,e tw en the 
commodi t y v ectors X , X , a n d X 
1
• T his will dep n d u pon 
o E 
t h e rel a tio nshi .., e tw en F , E (F ) a n d P . If fac tor - r ice s 
0 l 
a r e ce rta in an d if produ ct p r i ces are unce r t ain , a n d , if t h e 
0 
l ow e st p ri c o f a ny p r odu ct c an occur a l o ng wi t h t h e l ow est 
p ri ce o f e v e ry othe r , a n d if the highest p r i ce of a ll p r oduc ts 
c a n occur s im ultaneously , then th e v ector r e l a tio nships ar e 
P < E ( P ) < P • If th e ri ce fo r one p r odu ct o nly is high s t 
0 1 
in th e v ctor P 1, l ow er i n t h e v ecto r E (P ) and l ow es t in the 
v ecto r P , the optimal outpu t of th at p r odu ct will e high st 
0 
for t h e maxmax c ri t rio n , low e r for the Bay es crite rio n an d 
l ow st fo r t h e W al c rite rion. Thi s fo llows at once fo r th 
d is c u s sio n o f quatio n 4 . 10. How e v r , thi s r e sult doe s 
not indi cat e t h £feet o f th change u pon aggregate o u tput. 
Only if compl emen tari ty is domin a n t will the maxmax, B aye s 
a n d VI ald c rit e rio n l ea to agg r gat p r odu ct outp u t s whic h 
a r o f de sc e n d ing magnitud if P < E ( P ) < P • 
0 1 
F o r th e 
m ulti- good fir m , th o utpu t o f r oduc t s will not n ece ss a rily 
e g r e ate st fo r th m axmax c rit rion, n x t h i g h e st fo r the 
B ayes cri t rio n a n d 1 ast for the W al crit r i o n e caus e t h e 
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output o f som products will increas a n d th o u tput of others 
will dec r ease if su stituta ility is impo rtant. Similarly, the 
aggreeate empl oyment of fac tor s n eed not b e l east fo r the W ald 
criterion highe r fo r the Bayes criterion and hig h es t fo r the 
m axmax. But these amb i guities o f cornpa r is o n only arise in 
the m ulti- p roduct case. 
If the price of the ou tput o f a one p r oduct firm is 
unc e r t ain and if its costs are certain, the firrn I s output will 
e highest for the maxm ax crite rio n, l ow r for th e Bayes and .,_ VJ ~ 
l ow est for the Wald c riterion. This will be s o p rovided that 
mar g inal cost is not p e rfectly inelastic a n d average varia le 
cost is covered . To comp are t h e W ald m ax.max l e v e l of 
o ptimal output in this simple case , l et ( p
1
, p
2
, ••• , pn ) b 
the p r oduct decisio n set o f p rices and sup o s e that p > p 
1 
> 
n n -
• •• > p 1• T h firm has a p rofit function 
II = x - C(x) 
and, a supply functio n 
X = g (p)' 
where g (p ) is the inv rs e of the function C(x ) 1 = C 1 ( x ) and ( x ) 
B y the inver s e r ul e o f cliff r e ntiatio n, 
g ' (p ) dx 1 = = dp C " (x ) 
If O<C 11 (x ) < 00 dx the n - > O. 
' dp A change from th e W ald to 
th e rnaxmax crite rion involves a change from 
Max [ p x - C ( x) 1 to Max [ p x - C ( x ) ] • 1 ~ n 
X X 
This change results in a n incr as of p r oduction which is 
quival e n t to that o f a p ri c increas of 6 = - p 1n 
n 1 
the maximisation cas • Such a p ric chang leads to a 
> ... 
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change in production of .6 x = g (p } - g (p ) • B y the theorem 
n l 
of the mean , b. x = g ( p n ) - g( p 
1 
) = J .:, n g 1 ( p ) dp = g 1 ( 3 ) b. p 
P 1 
where 3 = p 1 + e (pn - p 1) a n d , 0 < 9 < l . If g '(p ) is positive 
everyw here in the interval p 1 ~ p ~ p n ' it will e positive for 
p = 3 • Since our ass u rnption is that C " (x ) > 0 ev erywhere 
within th e required interval, g ' ( 3 ) > O. Hence, if .6 p> 0, 
.6 x > O. Therefore , a change from the Wald to the m axmax 
criterion lead s to a n increas e o f output if the decision set 
consists of mo r e than one price value . Similarly, in the a ove 
case, the Bayes optimal l evel o f output can b e shown to lie 
b etween the W ald and maxmax level . 
From the a ' ov e analysis and under the static de cisio n 
assumptions the supply functions for the one p roduct fir rn with 
certain cos ts are as fo llow s : 
Unde r certainty, the supply function is 
X = S = g(p) 
{ X = S = 0 
For the Wald c rite rion, it is 
For the Bay es criterion, i t is 
{
x = S = g (E( p ]) 
X = S = 0 
for p ~ m in A. V . C. 
for p < m in v. c . 
for p 1 ~ m in A. V . C . 
for p 1 < Min A. V . C . 
for E (p ) .2: 
for E (p ) < 
n'lin A. V . C . 
m in V. C . 
Finall y , for the maxmax criterion i t is 
for 2 m in A. V . C . 
n 
for p < M in • V. C . 
n 
In this static d cision cas , all of the supply functions ar of 
identical form - supplies only d iffe r insofar as they depend 
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(or , can b e made to depend ) u pon different p rice values. 
E. Comparisons of Production Under Certainty and Uncertainty. 
Although levels of output for diff rent criteria under 
uncertainty have been compared, these l evels have not b een 
compared with output under certainty. Let us make a few 
tentative comments upon such con-1parisons. Consider the ab ove 
one product model and suppose that in an interval of time the 
prices p ., j = 1, ••• n, occur with the respective relative 
J 
frequencies P ., J = 1, ••• n. Then, the firm's average output 
J 
under certainty is 
n 
I: 
j = l 
p . g (p .) 
J J 
if it maximises profit. We suppose that each of these p rices 
exceed minimum average variab l e cost, and that marginal cost 
is not perfectly inelastic. 
Under uncertainty we suppose that the p rices p . occur 
J 
with the random prob ab ilities p . and that the probability 
J 
distribution does not change in time . Random p rice values 
are treated as b eing independent. Under these assumptions 
the average Wald optimal level of output for uncertainty is 
less than under certainty since 
n 
p g (p .) 
J J 
bec ause 
g' (p) = 1 C "{x ) > 0 
Similarly, the average maxmax level of output is higher than 
the average level under certainty. The situation is more 
complicated for Bayes criter ion. The av erage Bayesian level 
of o ptimal output und r uncertainty i s 
n 
g (E [ p] ) = g ( I: p P.) 
J :::: 1 j J 
Now , 
n 
> n g ( I: p P. ) I: p . g (p .) 
J = 1 J J < j = l J J 
accordingly as 4 
< g" (p ) - o. 
> 
Applying the inverse differentiation rule , 
< 
.... 0 
> , g" (p ) 
accordingly as 
c 1t1 S,; (x) > O. 
If marginal cost increases at an increasing rate, then, for the 
Bayes criterion, average output will b e less under uncertainty 
than under certainty. 
E. Conclusions 
The above relationship etween the decision set of 
p rices under uncertainty and actual prices is an extremel y 
special one. Nevertheless , similar relationships have b een 
assumed in economic analysis of this sorto However , the 
assumption appears so narrow that its use in the absence of 
positive empirical evide nce suggesting applicab ility should b e 
restricted. In practice, the - m inmax p rice value need 
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not b e equal to p 1, and could b ear a wide range of relationship s 
to actual price. Similarly, it may e possible to discover a 
wide range of relationships for the price values of other 
criteria. Therefore, the use of this p articul ar assumption 
will b e kept to a minimum and in the later part of the forth-
coming analysis will not b e used at all . 
4 G.H. Hardy, J.E. Littlewood, G. Polya: Inequalities , 
Cam ridge University Press , C am b ridg e , 1934, pp. 74 -75 . 
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On the whole, considerations of changes of p roduction 
and production optima have b een restricted to the minn1.ax, 
maxmax and Bayes criteria. It can b e said that these criteria 
respectively signify a security, gambling and average income 
bias on the part of the firm. However, I do not wish to suggest 
that these three criteria are the ones which are most frequently 
used under uncertainty. The frequency of the use of different 
criteria is an empirical question which is not to b e settled 
without ob servation. Indeed, one of my hypothesis is that 
b ehaviour is diverse under uncertainty and that it is unlikely 
that it can b e represented by a few finite criteria. However, 
even if it is diverse, it can ofte n b e reduced to some common 
index problem. 
In the ab ove analysis, it is the conversion of diverse 
b ehaviour results to equivalent maximisation results which 
make the effects of diverse b ehaviour readily comparable. 
This comparab ility is possib le for diverse criteria and for 
diverse p rice forecasts, and will enab le us to comprehend a 
numb er of general theorems. In considering the conversion 
of apparent non-extrem um prob lems into extremum ones, 
Samuelson concludes that "it is well to empha size that the 
conversion of a pro lem whose economic context does not 
suggest only human, purposive, m aximizing b ehaviour into a 
maximum p robl e m is to b e regarded as merely a technical 
device fo r the purpose of quickly developing the properties 
5 
of that equilib rium position". .Although the conversion is 
technical, at the same time it is not to b e dis p araged. The 
5 P.A. Samuelson: Op. cit., pp.52-53. 
conversion establishes a general ordering device for different 
types of behaviour under the static de cision making 
assumption. 
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Until there is strong empirical evidence to suggest that 
firm's adopt only a limited num er of criteria, it seems to b e 
the correct course for a p riori theories to em r ace as wide a 
set of possibilities as may feasibly exist. Similarly, until 
further empirical evidence is forthcoming, a wide range of 
possible relations b etween de cision p rices and actual prices 
6 
should be assumed. 
6 In developing the formal arguments of Chapters III and IV 
the following have b een some of the more useful references. 
{i) J. R. Hicks: Value and Capital, Chapters r.v and VII 
and their appendices. 
{ii) G. Tintner: " A Contribution to the Nonstatic Theory 
of Production", op. cit. 
(iii) P. A. Samuelson: Foundations of Economic Analysis, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1955. 
Chapter N, "A Comprehensive Restatement of the 
Theory of the Cost of Production". 
(iv) R. G, D. Allen, Mathematical Economics, pp. 613-618 
{v) J.M. Henderson and R. E. Quandt: Microeconomic 
Theory McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1958, 
Chapter 3. 
(vi) M. Nerlove: The Dynamics of Supply. The John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1958, Chapter L 
CHAPTER V 
P rice Instab ility and the Firm 's Average P rofit 
It h as b een asserted that increased price instab ility 
increases expected profit. I conten 1 that for some feasible 
error patterns increased price instability can lead to a <le cr0" a c 
of average profit. In order to support this contention I shall 
discuss two m odels. The fir st relies upon a general cost 
function but utilises s pecial assumptions about the distribution 
of actual prices and shadow p rices, and the second relies upon 
a quadratic cost function but involves general assumptions 
about the distribution of actual p rices and shadow prices. 
A. A Simple Model 
W. Oi claim s in Econometrica, Vol. 29, No. l (January 
1961) 1 that his analysis shows that " p rice instability is a virtue 
2 
and not a vice". A virtue in this sense means that expected 
profit is greater the greater is the degree of price instab ility. 
This conclusion is ased u pon two explicit assumptions: (a) 
that firm's maximise short run p rofit during each period, and 
(b ) that the marginal cost function is upward sloping over the 
relevant range. In addition, Oi implicitly assumes that I?r?-
duction can b e adjusted to price changes without any additional 
cost for error, Given the explicit assumptions and this implicit 
assumption, Oi' s thesis holds. Oi I s thesis also holds if instead 
1. W . Y. Oi: The Desirab ility of Price Instab ility Under 
P erfect Competition", Econometrica, Vol. 29, 1961, 
pp. 58-64. 
2, Oi: Ibid, p. 64 . 
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of assuming adjustment at no additional cost for errors, it is 
assumed that entrepreneurs always forecast price correctly. 
Neither the assumption of adjustment at no additional cost for 
errors nor the as surnption of perfect prediction seem very likely 
to b e satisfied in actual p ractice. In some cases - e.g., in the 
situation facing m ost agricultural producers under free competi-
tion - such assumptions seem inappropriate. Let us see if the 
non-fulfilment of these conditions could b e of any consequence 
for Oi' s generalisation. For this purpose let us u s e a simple 
model in which adjustrnent is ruled out for physical or cost 
reasons. 
The following assumptions are made: 
(i) T he firm wishes to maximise expected profit. 
(ii) The marginal cost curve increases over the relevant 
range and cost is certain. 
(iii) T he prices ( 1 + a) p and ( 1 - a) p each occur with a 
relative frequency of o. 5 under price certainty. 
(iv} Under uncertainty the possib le p rices have a p rob ab ility 
distribution which is the same as the relative frequency 
dis tribution of p rice unde r certainty. Under uncertainty, the 
p roducer know o that ( 1 + a) p and ( 1 - a) p each occur 
randomly, and that each has a probability of o. 5. 
(v} Output is planned in period t - n, n > 0, for period t 
and is unalterab l e for physical or cost reasons. 
We assume that expected price is stationary, that the 
cost function is the same through time, and that the decisions 
of each period are independent of those made in others. De -
cisions are independent but are unalterable once m ade in t - n. 
Given the above assu.mptions, a comparison can b e m ade b etween 
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the expected profit for a stab l e p ric e of p and that for a situation 
of price instab ility where ( 1 + a) p and ( 1 - a ) p are two prices 
each of which occurs with a I rob ab ility o. 5. From this compari-
son, p ro pos itions which conflict with Oi ' s judgment can be shown 
to hold. If II re presents p rofit , if C (x ) rep resents total cost 
and, if a and b are parameters such that O < a < 1 and O < b < l, 
the p rofit functions when p rice is ( l - a) P,P, and ( 1 + a) p are: 
II 1 = (1 - a) px - C (x) = f(x ). 
II 2 = px - C (x) = v (x). 
II 3 = (1 + a ) px - C (x) = h (x ) . 
s. l 
s. 2 
Vve assume the function f(x) to reach a maximum at x 1, v (x ) to 
reach a maximum a t x , and h (x) to reach a maximum at x • 
2 3 
Given that O < C 1 (x) < co for x 1 < x < x then x < x < x - - 3 l 2 3 
and II 
1 
< IIZ < II 3 • Using these relations and two others 
to b e s pecified later, i t is possib le to prov e a numb er of 
p ropositions a Qout expected p rofit. 
P roposition (l) . If price is uncertain and unstable, 
action to maximise o rofit at each instant l eads to a lower level 
of expected p rofit than when price is sta )l e at p. This w ill b e 
so if the firm m akes m istakes of a sufficient frequency and 
magnitude in its pric e forecasts . Suppose that with a p rob ab i -
lity of O. 25 the firm m istakenly p redicts ( 1 + a) p and that with 
the same p ro ab ility it m istakenly p redicts ( 1 - a) p. Then, 
if it acts on these p redictions , its ex pected p rofit 
O. 25 [f(x
1
) + f (x
3
) + h (x
1
) + h (x
3
) ], will b e less than that for 
the stable p rice, p , i.e., 
O. 25 [ f (x 1 ) + f(x 3 ) + h (x 1 ) + h (x 3 ) ] < v (x 2 ). 5 . 4 
Proof : From equations 5. 1, 5 . 2 and 5. 3, 
L. H. S. of expression 5. 4 = O. 25 [ (1 - a) px1 - C(x1 ) + 
(1 - a) px3 - C (x 3 ) + (1 + a) px1 
- C (x 1 ) + (1 + a) px3 - C(x3 }] 
= 0.5 [ px1 .. C(x 1 ) + px3 - C (x 3 )] 
J 
= O. 5 [ v(x 1 } + v(x2 ) } • 5. 5 
But v(x) reaches a unique maximum at x
2
• Hence, 
Q . E. D. 
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If the firm is just as likely to be right as wrong in forecasting 
the actual price oft, and, if it adjusts to its forecasts in the 
hope of maximising p rofit, an increase in the range of possible 
price will decrease expected profit. The firm I s expected profit 
will be at a maximum when price is stable at p, 
Proposition (ii). As the range of price variation 
increases expected profit declines, if the firm attempts to 
n'laximise profit at each instant, and, if its distribution of pre-
diction errors is of the same form as the previous one. 
Although this pro position can be deduced from the previous 
argument, it can b e easily supported by supposing that the 
prices (1- a-b )p and ( l+a+b }p each occur with a probability of 
o. 5. The relevant profit functions are 
II = ( 1 - a - b} px - C (x) = e (x} 5.7 
0 
and, 
n = ( 1 + a + b ) px - C (x) = m (x ) 4 5.8 
Let these functions reach a maximum at x
0 
and at x 4 , respect-
ively. If the firm mistakenly acts upon ( 1 - a - b ) p with a 
probability of O. 25 and mistakenly acts upon (1 + a+ b ) p with 
the same probability, its expected profit, 
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0, 25 [ e (x ) + c: (x ) + r...i(x ) + .r~1. (,t ) ] io l :)DC tr..2..n in the tw o 
0 4 0 4 
p r t:viou o circumstances, i. e , 
0, 25 [e (x
0
) + e (x 4 ) + m (x 0 ) + m (x4 ) ] 
, 
< 0, 25 [ f(x 1 + f(x3 ) + h(x 1) + h(x3 )] < v(x2 ). 5,9 
Proof: 
0, 25 [ e (x ) + e(x4 ) + m (x ) + m (x ) )= 0, 5 [ px - C (x ) 0 o 4 O O 
, 
+ px4 - C (x 4 ) ) = 0, 5 [ v(x0 ) + v(x4 )]. 5, 10 
Now, v(x) reaches a m aximum at x 2 and v' (x) > o for o < x < x 2 
and v'(x)< o for x> x 2• 
v(x 4 ) < v(x3 ) < v(x2 ). 
Therefore , v(x ) < v(x ) < v(x ) and 
0 1 2 
Hence, 
0, 5 [ v(x ) + v(x
4
) ] < 0, 5 [ v(x 1 ) + v(x ) ] < v(x ) • o 3 4 s. 11 
Reference to equation 5, 6 confirms that expression 5, 11 is 
equivalent to expression 5 , 9, and the above proposition is 
confirmed, 
Q , E. D, 
Proposition (iii). If the firm constantly produces the 
output, x
2
, which m aximises profit for the average price, p, 
then its expected profit will be greater than if it adjusts to its 
_.E__rice forecasts, This is supposing that expected price is 
stationary, and that the firm's forecast errors have a siinilar 
distribution to the one mentioned previously. Expected profit 
from producing x 2 is 0, 5 [ f(x2 ) + h {~2 ) ] and the r.., r position 
asserts that 
Proof: 
0,5 [ f(x
2
) + h(x
2
)] = 0,5 [ ( l -a) px
2 
- C (x 2 ) + ( l+a)px2 - C (x 2 )] 
= px2 - C (x 2 ) = v (x 2 ) • 
From expression 5. 9, 
v(x2 ) > O. 25 [ f(x 1 ) + f(x ) + h(x ) + h(x ) ] • 3 1 3 
Q . E. D. 
It follows as a corollary of expre ssion 5. 12 that there a re a 
number of output levels in the neighbourhood of x which, 
2 
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although second best, yield an expected profit in excess of that 
which is earned by adjusting t o forecasts with the above prob-
ab ility distribution of errors. Briefly, this is so b ecause 
o. 5 [ f(x
2
) + h(x
2
) ] ::: v(x
2
) and this value exceeds 
. . 
and v(x) i s co ntinuous. 
Proposition (iv). If th e firm constantly prod4ces the 
output, x 2 , which maximises profit for the average price, p, 
its expected profit will be at a maximum. Where x is any (l 
level of output, the expected profit associated with it is 
O. 5 [ f(x ) + h(x ) 1 and the above proposition asserts that 
0: 0: • 
s. 13 
Proof: 
o. 5 [f("a ) + h(x o: ) ] ::: O. 5 [ (1-a) pxo: - C(x a) + (l+a) px o: -C(xo: ) ] 
::: px o: - C (x o: ) ::: v(x a ) • 5.14 
Since v(x) re aches a maxim um at x .... , v(x o:) reaches a 
'-
maxim um at x o: ::: x 2 • 
Q . E. D. 
If expected price is stationary in time , exp e c ted profit will b e 
maximised by holding output constant at the level which maximises 
profit for the ave rage p rice. Even if the prob ab ility of forecast 
error is lower than o. 25 for each price, it can still b e more 
profitable for the firm to hold its production constant at an 
intermediate level rather than to adjust its output marginally in 
' 
,. 
accordance with its price forecasts, This follows from 
expression 4 . 4 . i . e ., 
O. 25 [ f (x 
1
} + f (x
3
) + h (x 
1 
} + h (x
3
} ] < v (x
2
). 
Proposition (v.). The expected profit to be earned by 
constantly pro ducing any level of output, xa -1, is e qual to the 
p rofit when price is stabl e at p because 
O. 5 [ f (x a ) + h (x a } ] = v(x a ) • 
Proposition (vi). If production is hel d constant and 
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if the mean price is stationary, expected profit does not decline 
as the range of price variation increases. In fact , expected 
profit remains constant. This p roposition is contrary to Oi1 s 
generalisation and contrasts with the forecast adjustment case , 
i.e. proposition (i) . Proposition {vi) asserts that 
o. 5 [ f(x a ) + h(x a ) ] = o. 5 [ e (x a } + m (xa ) ] • s. 15 
Proof : 
O. 5 [ f(x a ) + h (x a ) ] = o. 5 [ { 1- a ) px a - C{x a ) + ( l+ a ) p~ 
5 . 16 
0.5 (e(x a ) + m (x a)]= 0.5 [ ( 1-a-b ) px a - C (xa ) + ( l + a+b ) px a 
- C (x a ) ] s. 17 
Q . E . D. 
Proposition (iv) to (vi) inclusive can b e generalised for any 
probability distribution of p rice with a stationary value of 
expected price. Let E (p) be the expected pri ce of such a 
probability istribution. Then, under uncertainty, expected 
profit is 
E ( II } = E ( px - C (x ) ] 
= E (p )x - C {x ) 5 . 18 
because the output of t - n is unalterab le. L t the maximu m of 
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this func t ion occur for x = x. Now, if price is stable at p = E (p), 
profit will be 
Il =px-C (x). 5. 19 
But since p = E (p ) exp ression 5 . 19 equals express ion 5 . 18. 
Hence , 
Max E ( n ) = p ~ - c (~ ) 
X 
= Max [px - C(x)] • s .20 
X 
In this p articular model certainty e quivalence exists , and, if 
expecte d pric e is constant, changes in the prob ab ility dis tribution 
of price do not affect the l ev e l of maximum expected profit and 
the level of optim al output. If expected pric e remains constant 
and if p ro duc t ion is held constant a t any level, increased p rice 
instab ility will leave expected p rofit uncha nged. T he expected 
profit from any leve l of output, x a , is 
E ( Il) = E (p ) X a - C (xa)· . 
If both E (p) and x are constant while the p rice variance 
a 
increases, E ( Il) i s constant. 
s. 21 
From the above m odel it is clear that Oi1 s hypothesis 
that increased price instab ility leads to an increase in expected 
profit requires qualification. If forecast errors a re of 
sufficient frequency and magnitude Oi ' s generalisation is false . 
Under the conditions of this m odel, increased p ric e instability 
does not lead to a great er l e vel of expected profit than is 
earnable with a s t ab l e price, and to maximise expected profit, 
it is nece ssary to hold production c onstant if expected price 
is constant. The r e a r e also a numbe r of constant outputs in 
the neighb ourhoo d of the o ptimum for maximising expected 
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profit whic h, although I second bes t ', enab l e higher expected 
profit to be earned than b y v arying produ ction in accordance with 
o ne ' s imperfect forecasts . The des irab ility of cons tancy arises 
from the constancy of expected price and the fact that expected 
profits will be decreased b y attempting to forecast and adjust 
to random movements. 
It seems then, that Oi I s conclusion for the pe rfectly 
competitive case , viz; that "instab ility is a virtue, and not a 
vice", is sub ject to severe limitation in the purely competive 
case. Oi is c orrect that price instability l e ads to greater 
expected profit than stability, given either an assumption of 
perfect knowle dge or that errors can be corrected without 
additional cost. When prediction er rors are of sufficient 
frequency and when planne d output can only e changed at 
considerab l e cost, Oi' s hypothesis does not hold. 
A n assumption underlying th e above analysis is that 
3 
the firm at le ast knows the ob jective level of expected p rice, 
In practice , the firm will b e forced to act upon a subjective 
estimate of expected p rice which may or may not accord with 
the ob j ective level. If the sub jec tive e stima te remains stationary 
and the firm acts upon it to maximis e sub jective expected p rofit, 
then its level of o ptimal outpu t will remain stationary, but its 
ob jective level of expected p rofit will inc rease, decrease or 
remain stationary accordingly as the ob jec tive level of expected 
price increases, de creases or rem ains stati.:: n::i.ry. It is obvious 
then that the underlying as sumption of non-divergence between 
the subjective and ob jective l evel of expected p rice can limit 
3 This a ssumption is relaxed to obtain proposition (ii). 
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the practical application of the above expected profit theorems. 
In the c oncluding model of thi9 chapt e r, we shall drop this 
assumptio n. 
B . A Measure of Price Uncertainty. 
Before dealing with the next production m odel, let 
us discuss some possible measures of p ric e uncertainty. 
There seem s to be no agreed unique measure of this phenomenon 
b ut let us consider the following me asures as possibilities: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
- Cov (p, p) == - E { (p - E (p )] [p - E (p) ] ) • 
_ R ::: _ CO V ( P, p) 
(J (J ,.... • 
p p 
1 - R 2 • 
E { (p - p) 2 ) • 
5.22 
5.23 
5.24 
5. 25 
E represents expected or average values, R is the correlation 
coefficient, p represents actual price and p shadow p rice, and 
cr and Cov represent the standard deviation and covariance 
respectively. 
- C ov (p, p) is v ariable fo r p roportional changes of 
price. If the p values increase by the fraction "' and the p 
increase by the fraction e, - Cov (p , p) changes to - "' 9 Cov (p, p). 
JJso, the vuluc o f - C ov (p , p) can be c1r b itr::i.rily 
influenced by the units of measurement. These defects can 
be corrected b y expres sing Cov (p, p) in standard deviation 
units. If we do this, our measure of uncertainty becomes 
- R = 
Cov (p, p) 
(J (J A 
p p 
" which is invaria l e for p roportional changes of p and p values. 
The measure 1 - R2 is invariab le for p roportional 
p rice changes but i t is unsatisfactory as a general measure of 
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price uncertainty because it implies that price uncertainty is the 
sanie for positive and neg ative R values of equal ab solute magni-
tude. It implies that uncertainty is zero if R = - l but differences 
between shadow and actual p rices certainly occur in this case. 
The m easure E (p - p) 2 is the mean of the square of the 
deviations of shadow p rice from actual p rice. More fully, 
M = E [ (p - p) 2 ) 
= [ E (p ) - E (p ) ] 2 + cr 2 - 2 Cov (p, p) + cr ,.._ 2 5. 26 p p 
= (. E ( p ) - E ( p )f + cr ,.., 2 
p - p 5.27 
2 
whe re cr is the variance of p - p. A. p- p T his measure is not 
inde pendent of proportional changes of p rice nor of changes 1n 
the units of m easurem ent. The mean square of relative deviations 
of actual p rice from shadow p rice, 
E L [p; p} 2J = E l l -~ + ~ } 
4 J J A -4 A 
= 1-E [ 2 p ] E [ _!_ ] - 2 C ov ( p, ,l) + E ( .E ] 2 + var [ .E ] 
p p p p s. 28 
is, in this respect, a m ore satisfactory measure, but unlike M , 
it is algeb raically difficult to a pply i t to profit analysis. 4 
4 In some formulations_.., uncertainty is measured by the entropy 
formula. If p . is the p robability of the price,. P ., j = 1, ••• , n 
J J 
and if r. . P. = 1, then the entropy value is 
J J 
H ( P l ' p ) = -
n 
n 
L, 
j = 1 
p. lg 
J 
P •• 
J 
Increases in H ( p1, p , ••• , _ P ) indicate increases in un-2 n 
certainty. Some implications of the form ula are outlined b y 
A. I. Khinchin: M athematical Foundations of Inform ation 
Theory, Dover Pub licat ions, New York, 1959. The form ula 
has been applied to economic decision making y J. Marschak 
in "Remarks on the Economics of Information", Cowles, 
Foundation Discussion P aper, No. 7 0, 1959. 
C. An Ave r ag e P rofit Model which allows more generality in 
the Distribution of Actual and Shadow Pric e Values. 
Our assumptions for this rnodel a re ,;. 
(i) The firm ' s output of t equals its output planned for t in 
t-n. 
(ii) The output of any pe riod is independent of that of any 
other. 
(iii) C osts are certain and stationary. 
( . ) C d · 5 1v osts are qua ratic. 
The firm ' s p rofit function is of the quadratic form 
2 
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IT= px -{ax + x+ c ) r 5.29 
Its quadraticity ensure s that average p rofit is dependent upon 
only the first and second moment s o f actu al and shadow p rices . 
Since 
x* = X = 
p - b 
2a 5.3 0 
J A A 
IT = p ( p ; ab ) - [ a ( P 2-a b ) 2 + b ( p 2-a b ) + c ] 5 • 3 l 
where x>:< represents planned outpu t and p >b. Consequently, 
average p rofit, i.e . p rofit averaged over several periods, is 
E ( IT ) E (p ) E(p) + Cov (p, p) - b E (p) = 2a - C 
J A ,.._z A '\ 2 
_ b [ E(p) - b ] _ E (p ) + v ar p - 2 b E(pj + b 
2a 4 a 
= 2 E (p ) E (p ) + 2 C ov (p, p) - 2 bE(p ) - E (p ) 2 - var p + b 2 -c. 
4 a 
5. 32 
5 T h e forthcoming m odel includes Nel son's as a special case. 
R. R. Nel son : "Uncertainty, P rediction and C ompetitive 
Equalib rium", T he Quar terly Journal of E conomics, 
Vol. 7 5 , 1961 , pp. 4 1-6 2. 
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H the average value of actual price is constant, 
t,, E ( ll ) = 4 ~ { [ 2 E(p) - 2 E (p) ) t,, E(p') + 2 6 Cov (p, p) - 6 var !') } 
= - -t { [ -2 E(p) + ZE (P) ) t,, E (P) - 2 6 Cov (p, P) + 6 cr / } 5 . 3 3 
If E(p) is constant, 
6 M = [ - 2E(p ) + 2 E(p) ] AE(p) + 6 cr 2 - 2 6 Cov (p, p) p 
2 
+ 6 cr'P • 
2 C onsequently, if E (p ) and cr are constant, p 
1 
6E ( II ) = - - 6 M . 
4 a 
5.34 
5. 35 
(1) If the average value and variance of actual price are constant, 
an increase in the mean square of deviations of shadow price from 
actual decreases average profit by the reciprocal of twice the rate 
of change of marginal cost times the change of M . If E(p) and 
are constant, 
as 
6E (II)\ o 
> 
6 M < O. 
a p 
Now consider the effect upon average profit of an increase 
in the variance of actual p rice if E(p) and M remain constant. By 
assumption, 
6 M = [ - 2 E (p ) + 2 E (p ) ) 6E(p) + 6 cr 2 p 
2 
- 2 6 C ov (p, p) + 6 cr"' 2 = o. 5.36 p 
Therefore, 
(-2E(p ) + 2E (p ) ] 6 E (p) - 2 6 C ov (p , p) + 2 6 (J,-. = -p 6 cr 2 • p 5. 37 
H ence, if 6 E (p ) = 0 and if 6M = O, 
1 2 
6 E(rr ) = - 6 cr 4a p • 5.38 
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(2 ) If average price and the mean square o f deviations o f shadow 
price fro m actual are c onstant, an increase in the price variance 
increases average profit by the reciprocal of twice the rate of 
change of marginal cost times the change of the variance o f price. 
If E (p ) a n d M are constant, 
?: 
as 
6E( TI ) <0 
2 ?: 
a < o. p 
D. A Note Upo n Oi ' s Revised Assertion 
In .. d 6 E . 1 7 6 a reJ01n er to my conometr1ca artic e of April 19 3, 
Oi b riefly mentions the possib ility of relating a ctual and predicted 
prices ( in our case shadow prices] by means of regression analysis . 
He concl udes : 11 If the explained variance [ of actual p rice] is 
positive, then it can be shown that greater systematic fluctuations 
in prices m ust increase expected profits . Space p recl udes a full 
proof of this pro po sition • • • So l ong as p rice instability contains 
a systematic component, greater price instab ility w ill l e ad to higher 
expected profits". 
8 
Since Oi states that the expl ained represents 
the systematic component his concl usion re - stated is : So l ong as 
price instab ility contains a po sitive explained variance , g r eater 
price instab ility will lead to higher expected profit. 
Given even the most liberal interpretatio n , this conclusion 
appears to b e incorrec t . T o see this , suppo se 
6 W . Oi : " Rejo inder", Eco nometrica, Vol. 31 , 1963 , p. 248 . 
7 C . Tisdell : "Uncertainty, Instability and Expected Pro fit", 
Ec onometrica, Vol . 31 , 1963 , pp. 243-247 . 
8 w. Oi: "Rejoinder", Eco nometrica, Vol.31 , 1963 , p. 248 . 
z = y + 
0 
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s. 39 
to be the leas t squares r egre s s ion o f p on p. Th e n, the " ex plaine d" 
variance of p i s 
2 2 2 
a = y a "' 
z 1 p 5. 40 
Also, 
(J 2 R2 a 2 
= • z p 5. 41 
C onsequently, 
R2 2 2 
0,....2 
a a p z 
= = 2 2 • p y y 5. 4 2 
1 1 
C ov (p , p) = R a (J "' p p 
R2 
a 2 
= R (J p y 2 p 
1 
R2 2 0 2 (J 
p z 
= = • 
y 1 yl 
5. 43 
If we substitute e quat ions 5 . 4 2 a n d s. 43 into the average p rofit 
function, w e find , if E (p ), E (p ) and 2 0 are positive and do 
z 
not chang e with changes of the variance of actual p rice, that 
average p rofit r emains constant a s the p ric e varianc e increases. 
B ut let us suppos e that Oi m eant to imply that, if R is positive 
and constant, inc rease d p rice instab ility leads to an inc r ease 
of average p rofit if the r eg ression line is maintained unchanged. 
Then, even this p roposition is false 
This c an be shown as follows: 
2 
Assume that d R = 0, d E(p ) = O, and d E(p ) = O. Then, using 
equations 5 . 42 and S. 43 , 
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dE(IT) 
d er 2 
p 
= 
4 r 2 
5.44 
2 a Y 
l a l 
2 
R ( 2 Y1 - l ) 
= • 
4a Y 2 
l 
If R 2 > 0, 
d E ( IT ) c 0 
der 2 < 
p 
C ov {p, p) ~ l 
as rl = < • 
er " 
2 2 
p 
Since 
er 
rl R 
'E 
= a , 
" p 
equation 5 . 4 5 can be rewritten as 
dE (IT) 
der 2 
p 
= 
5.45 
5.46 
• 5.47 
Hence, if d R = 0, if d E (p ) = 0, and if d E(p) = 0, 
d E( IT) c 0 
2 < d er 
p 
as 
< 
er > 2 R er • p 
(3) If the correlation coefficient, average actual p rice and 
average shadow price are constant, ave r age p rofit is decreased 
by an increase of the standard deviation of p rice if the standard 
deviation of shadow price exceeds the standard deviation of 
actual price times twice the correlation coefficient. Even if 
R> O, it is possible for ½ er" >R p o and for average p rofit p 
to decrease as the variance of price increases. 
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If average p ric e and average shadow price are constant 
and if p rice is certain, it is true {except if mar ginal cost is 
completely inelastic) that increased price instability increases 
average profit. However, it is incorrect to suggest that increased 
p rice instab ility always increases average p rofit or never dec re ase s 
it. If price is uncertain, increased price insta ility can reduce 
average p rofit even if the c o rrelation betw een " p r edicted" and 
actual price is positive and constant. 
E . Restrictions Upon the Relationship etween the Moments 
of the Average Profit Function. 
It is possible to place various res tri ctions upon the 
relationship b etween the moments of e quat ion 5. 32, i.e. the 
g eneral average profit equation. m section D , we restricted 
this relationship by assuming a constant regression o f p or p of 
Given this restriction, equation 5 . 32 b ecomes 
2R2 2E(p ) E(p) + - 2 2 R
2 
a - 2bE(p) - E (p ) -r-z 
E { JI) = y l p 1 
4a 
- c. 
We note the following theorems : 
{i) If E {p ), E (p ) and 
dE( II ) 
dR2 
= 
2 
a are constant, p 
2 1 
y 1 Y12 
4a 
and if a 2 > 0 and 2 a < 00 p 
dE( JI ) 
d R 2 
0 as 
a 
p 
2 
5. 48 
5.49 
y l = 
C ov ( p , p ) ? 1 
0 2 < 2 • 
A p 
But, given these conditions, an increaa e of R 2 does not imply 
a decrease of M . Under these conditions 
dM ( 2 l ) 2 - = -- + 0 a dR2 y l • l p 
If 2 dM $ 0 as ? l a > o, 2 > \ < 2• p dR 
Theorem (i) implies that, if Y 
1 
<½, the firm 
increases its average p rofit by reducing R 2 to zero if 
E (p ) , E (p ) and <J 2 are constant. Even if R > 0, it can be p 
more p rofitabl e for the firm not to attempt to nredict 
variations of p rice but to rieidly p redict the same p rice or 
p r o duce the same quantity of output over a stretch of time. 
(ii) If E (p), E (p ) and R2 is constant, 
dE ( IT ) 
2 d CJ 
= 
2 1 
- - --z 
y l y 1 
4a 
. 2 
and 1f R > 0 and if 2 a < 00 , 
dE( IT) 
d (J 2 
p 
::2- l 
as Y 1 < I• 
.:? 
< 0 
Given these condit ions, an increase of 2 <J r a rel y leave s p 
86 
M = [E(p ) - E (o ) ]2 + 2 (J 
p 
0 2 + 
p y 2 
1 
s. 50 
unchanged. 
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F. Nelson's Model as a Special Case. 
9 " If w e suppose, as Nelson has done , that p is an 
unb iased estimate of p , the regression of p on p .:- ecome s 
z = p , s. 51 
E (p ) = E (p ), and equation 5 . 4 9 s pecialises to Nelson's b asic 
. 10 
equation. 
E { IT ) = 
2 2 . 2 
R a + [ E (p) - b ] 
4 a - c. 5 . 52 
From this equation we obtain Nelson's following theorems: 
(i) If E (p) 2 and cr are constant, p 
dE ( rr ) = 1 er 2 • 
dR2 4a p 
If 2 a < oo and if 
this special case, 
2 dE ( IT ) > O d dM a > 0, 2 , an 2 < 0. 
p dR dR z 
M increases with increases of 1-R • 
In 
(ii) If E (p) 2 and R are constant, 
dE (Il ) 1 2 
= R. 
d er 2 4a 
p 
If R 2 >O and if 2a < 00 dE { IT) > o. In this case , , 2 d (1 
p 
dM 
> 
2 dM 
1 - Rz . 0 as R < O. = 
dcr 2 d a 2 p p 
9 R.R. Nelson: "Uncertainty, Prediction and Competitive 
Equilib rium", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 75 
1961, pp. 4 1-62. Also, T . Marschak and R. Nelson: 
"Flexib ility, Uncertainty, and Economic Theory", 
Metroeconomica, Vol. 14 , 1962, pp. 4 2-58. 
10 Equation 5. 5 2 corresponds to equation (3. 7a) of 
Marschak and Nelson: op. cit., p. 52. 
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In Nelson' s mod 1, an increase in the p rice variance 
2 inc reases average p rofit if both R and average p rice are 
c onstant, but in the gene ral linear regression m odel an 
increase in the price variance can decrease average profit 
e v e n if R > O. We should also bear in m ind that l - R 2 
seems to b e only of special significance as a measure of p ric e 
uncertainty in Nelson ' s p articular model. 
APPENDDC TO CHAPTER V. 
Average P rofit and a General Coat 1'11odel 
A conflict arises in dealing with the effect of price 
instability and uncertainty upon average profit. T he r.no re 
general is the cost function the more difficult it is to analyse 
the effect u pon the firm I s average profit of changes in the 
distribution of actual and shadow p rices. How ever, under 
general cost conditions it is possible to derive the effect u pon 
average profit of special changes 1n the distribution of actual 
and shadow p rices. In order to ob tain the effect of a special 
change, we shall use the relationship b etween maximum p rofit 
and price. 
Let \jr (p ) represent profit as a function of price when 
output is adjusted to price so that a global maximum of p rofit 
exists. The function 'V (p ) is obtained in the following way: 
If 
Il = px - C (x ) 1 
represents the firm's general profit function and, if its 
production ceases when average variable cost is not covered, 
its supply function is 
X:; g (p) 
x=O 
for p ? min A. V. C . ( 
for p < m in A. V. • j 
Expression 2 is the inverse of 
p = C '(x) 
0 ::: X 
for p ? min A. V. c.J 
for p < min A. V. C . 
2 
3 
Substituting expression 2 into 1, maximum p rofit as a function 
of price is 
'V (p ) = pg (p ) - C (g (p) ) 
'V (p) = - K 
for p :? min A. V. C. { 
for p < min A. V. C. j 4 
where K represents fixed cost. The rate of change of 'V (p ) 
for p > rnin A. V. C. is 
.£1... 
dp 
= p dg + g (p) 
dp 
dC 
dg 
21L 
dp 
- _£g_ 
- dp ( p - ~~ ) + g (p) 
= g (p) 
because profit maximisation requires that 
dC dC p = 
cbc = dg (p). 
5 
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By the inverse rule of differentiation the slope of the maximum 
profit function is 
d 'V 
dp = g(p) 
= 0 
= 
1 
C 1(x) for p > min A. V. C . ( 
for p < min A. V. C . ) 
The II curvature" of the profit function is 
d2 'V 
= g '(p ) 1 ' = for p > min A. V. C. 
J dp2 C" (x) = 0 for p < min A. V.C. 
Since C" (x) > 0 for all output values in excess of minimum 
d2 'V 
average variable cost 2 > 0 for p > min A. V. C. For dp 
price values in excess of minimum average variable cost, 
6 
7 
the maximum p rofit function increases at an increasing rate. 
Because the function, 'V (p), is convex for p > min 
A. V.C., then, if p >min A. V.C. and if all values of pare 
1 
not equal, 
1 See theorem 90, G. H. Hardy, J.E. Littlewood and 
G. P olya: Inequalities, Cambridge University Press , 
Camb ridge, 1934, p. 74 . 
'V (~ P . P.) < ~ 
J J J J p. "' (p. ) J J 
where p represents the relative frequency of p values. 
Expression 8 implies (i) that if a firm has price 
certainty, its average profit is less for a stable price than 
8 
for unstable prices having an average value equal to the stable 
price and (ii) if the firm's shadow prices are equal to the 
average of actual price values, its average profit, if prices 
are not all of the same value, is l es s than if it is certain of 
actual prices. This assumes that the production conditions of 
Chapter V apply mutatis mutandis. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Flexibility, Average Profit and Technique Choice 
A. Introduction 
It is commonly asserted that increased price uncertainty 
encourages the adoption of more flexible techniques . While there 
seems to be little need to doub t this hypothesis if flexib ility is 
defined so as to accord with Hart's 
1 
usage, this is not so if 
flexib ility is defined so as to accord with the Baumol' s 2 
apparent us age. 
3 
For Hart, flexib ility refers to the ab ility to m odify 
plans in time. A plan is flexible if it is possible t o diverge from 
the planned values at a date subsequent to their acceptance. I! 
the firm plans a particular value of output (a point value) its 
plan is flexible if it can subsequently produc e an output different 
to the planned. In Theil ' s terminology, 
4 
inflexible plans involve 
static decision making and flexible plans involve dynamic 
decision making. 
l A.G. Hart: " Risk, Uncertainty and the Unprofitab ility of 
Compounding P rob abilities", pp. 110-118 in Studies in 
Mathematical Economics and Econometric s e dited by 
O. Lange, F. Mc Intyre and F . Yntema; The University 
of C hicago P ress, C hicago, 1942. 
2 W. J. Baumol: Economic Dynamics, 2nd edition, The 
Macmillan Company, New York, 1959, pp. 92 and 93. 
3 Hart: op. cit. 
4 H . Theil: Economic Forecasts and Policy, 2nd revised 
edition, North-Holland Publishing Company, A.rnsterdam, 
1961, p. 3 7 2. 
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It seems that for both Stigler and B aumol :flexibility 
refers to the rate of change of marginal cost when static 
decision making is assumed. Under this condition, a technique 
is considered to be more inflexible the larger is its second 
derivative of total cost. 
5 
B. Baumol's Approach to Changes in Technique Choice. 
B aumol argues that "the existence of uncertainty will 
lead to the (increased) use of equipment whose scale of opera-
tion is :flexible". 6 His argument is based upon a figure which 
is identical to figure 6. 1. In this figure, the average cost 
function of Baumol' s inflexible technique is shown by AC 1 and 
that of the flexible is shown by ACF. Figure 6. 1 is identical 
to the one which J. G. Stigler uses in putting forward his 
hypothesis that under certainty increased price instability 
increases the likelihood of the firm adopting the flexible 
. 7 technique. In figure 6. l the second derivative of average cost 
Figure 6. 1 
Average 
Cost 
0 m q 
Output 
5 T. Marschak and R. Nelson: "Flexibility, Uncertainty, 
and Economic Theory", Metroeconomica7 Vol. 14, 1962, p. 49 
6 Baumol: op. cita 
7 J. G. Stigler: 11 Production and Distribution in the Short 
Run", Journal of Political Economy, Vc l. 4 7, 1939, 
pp. 305-28. 
of technique I exceeds that of technique F for all values of 
output. 
Baumol' s argument goes as follows: Given complete 
price certainty, suppose that the firm finds an output between 
Om and Oq to be optimal. Then it will minimise its cost by 
adopting technique I. If the firm becomes unc e r t ain of 
its price, then it is possible for an output greater than Oq to 
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be optimal, and, in that event, technique F will minimise the 
firm's costs. Upon this basis, Baumol concludes that "the 
existence of uncertainty will lead to the use of equipment whose 
scale of operation is flexib le". 
Baumol1 s argument is insufficient to support his con--
clusion. Using what appears to be Baumol and Stigler ' s 
essential condition i.e., differences of the rate of change of 
marginal cost, we shall present two models for which (i) 
Baumol' s hypothesis does not hold, and (ii) Stigler ' s hypothesis 
does hold. For these 1."Wo models {i) ''increased p rice uncertainty'' 
increases the likelihood of the firm's adopting the technique 
with the greatest rate of change of marginal cost, i.e. the 
inflexible technique in B aumol' s apparent us age and (ii) if 
" price uncertainty" is constant, increased price instability 
increases the probability of the firm 1 s adopting the technique 
with the least rate of change of marginal cost. Under certainty 
increased price instab ility increases the probab ility of the 
firm's adopting the technique with the least rate of change of 
marginal cost i.e., the flexible technique according to 
Stigler' s apparent usage. 
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The first model is an introductory one which is put 
forward because it relies upon a general cost relationship and 
not a quadratic one. The second model relies u pon the assump-
tion of a linear marginal cost function but enables us to treat the 
uncertainty aspect o f the problem more generally. 
C. M o del I - A Simple Mo del. 
In model I we consider how the difference in the 
comparative profitab ility of two techniques changes as price 
changes from certain to probable. We attempt to isolate under 
general cost conditions a cost factor which has an important 
bearing upon the direction of technique choice as price changes 
from certain to probable. 
The following assumptions are made for model I: 
(i) Under unc~rtainty the ~·r ~~::, <?.::- ility .liotri~)ution :; f p rice is 
the same as the relative frequency distribution of price 
under certainty. The probability distribution is 
stationary in time. 
(ii) The firm wishes to maximise expected p rofit. 
(iii) Under uncertainty, the firm has perfect predictability 
of expected price. 
(iv) The two techniques to be considered have the same 
length of life of n periods. 
(v) Only one technique can be chosen for the n periods. 
(vi) All of the n periods are of equal length. 
(vii ) The marginal cost functions o f every p eriod are equal 
for each technique. This is also the case for the 
average cost functions. 
(viii) After reaching their minimum, th m<1r :3 inal co st functions 
increase m onotonically. 
Also, the static decision making assumption s of previous 
chapters .::i.re m c.intained: 
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(ix) Output decisions for each period must b e made prior to 
that period, and once made are unalterable. 
(v ) The output decisions which are made at different points 
of time are independent. 
The analysis of the importance of the rate of change 
of marginal cost for the choice of t echnique as price changes 
from certain to p robable will be facilitated if we derive the 
function which expresses the difference in the maximum profit-
ability of the two techniques as a function of price. From the 
a ppendix of the p revious chapter, various properties of m aximum 
profit as a function of price are already known. For both 
techniques these functions are constant u p to the level of 
minimurn average variable cost and then increase at an 
increasing rate. Using the subscripts 1 and 2 to indicate 
techniques one and two, technique one's maximum profit function 
. 8 
16 
'¥ l (p) = pg 1 (p) - C (g l (p ) ) for p ? min A. V. C. 1 
6. 1 
= - K 1 for p < min A. V. C. 1 
and 
'¥ 1 '(p) 1 = cl t (x) for p > min A. V. C. 1, 
and 
'ljr ft (p) 1 = C "(x) 2 
> 0 for p > min A. V. c. 1 6. 2 
8 The same symbols are used for the maximum profit function 
as were used in the appendix to the previous chapter. 
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The function w (p) is convex and is at least twice differentiable 
for all values of price in excess of r.ninimum average variable 
cost. If K1 > 0 and if C~ (x) > 0 for all output values in excess 
of minimum average variable cost, then the function can b e 
illustrated as in figure 6. z. Similar conditions hold for the 
maximum profit function of technique two. 
Maxfrnum 
Profit 
f igure 6. 2 
"'l (p) 
The difference between these two maximum profit 
functions is 
W(p) = \jrl (p) - "'2 (p) 6.3 
To keep to the essentials of the analysis, let us only consider 
the properties of this function for price values in excess of the 
greatest of the minima of the average costs of the two techniques 
i. e, for 
p > Max ( min AVC 1, min AVC 2 } • 
For these values of p , 
W" (p) = "' II - "' If l 2 
1 
= C 11 (x) 
l 
1 
C " (x) 2 
• 6.4 
Since stab ility requires that c 1
11 (x) > 0 and c
2
11 (x) > 0, 
vV"(p ) ~ 0 
< 
accordingly as 
Under certainty, the difference in the expected 
profitability of two techniques is 
~ r. W(p.) ::l: r. 'V 1 (p. ) -~ r. 'V 2 (p .) J J J J J J J J J 
and, under price unce rtainty the difference is 
6.5 
6.6 
6.7 
W t r . p . ) = 'V 1 ( ~ r . p . ) - 'V2 ( LJ. rJ. p3• ) 6. 8 J J J J J J 
where r. re pr e sents the relative frequency of the j-th price. 
J ~ 
If (i) p > max [min AVC 1, min AVC 2 ], if (ii) all p rices are 
not equal, and if (iii) the s ame inequality relationship between 
c 1
11 (x) andC 2
11 (x) holds for all relevant values of output, 
L'. 
J 
~ 
r. W (p .) < W ( r, r. p .) 
J J j J J 
accordingly as 9 
6.9 
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6. 10 
This is because vV "(p ) ~ 0 , accordingly as c 111 (x) ~ c 2 11 (x) 
If no p rice less than m ax (min AVC 1, min AVC 2 ] can occur, 
then the excess p rofitab ility of technique one under certainty is 
greater than, equal to, or les s than that under uncertainty 
accordingly as the rate of change of marginal cost for technique 
one is less than, equal to, or, greater than the rate of change 
of technique two's marginal cost. The relationship between 
expression 6. 9 and 6. 10 implies that uncertainty increases the 
9 For a proof of the relevant theorem concerning the expectation 
of values defined on a convex function see G. H. Hardy, J.E. 
Littlewood, G. Poly a: Inequalities, Cambridge University 
P ress, 1934, pp. 74 -75, theorem 90. 
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excess profitab ility of the technique with the greatest rate of 
change of n1.arginal cost. Given the ab ove conditions, if 
there is a change from one technique to another a s a result of 
the occurrence of price unce rtainty, it can only b e away from 
the technique with the least rate of change of marginal cost and 
in favour of the technique with greatest rate of change of marginal 
cost. 
This point can b e illustrated by the example shown in 
figure 6.3. The function W{p) is shown for p >max [min AVC 1, 
m in AVC 2 ]. Two prices, p 1 and p2 are assur.ned to b e the only 
possible ones, and c 1
11 (x) is assum ed to b e less than c2
11 (x) 
for all the relevant values of output . Hence , W" (p} > 0 for 
the relevant domain of p values. Th e difference function is a 
convex one. The excess expected p rofit of technique one is 
2 
E r. W( p .) under cert ainty and, W ( ~ r. P .) under 
J J j=lJJ j = l 
uncertainty. From an inspection of figure 6. 3 it is obvious that 
where p 1 and p2 differ and where r 1 and r 2 are positive, 
2 2 
z: r. W(p.) > W ( E r. p .). 
j=l J J j=l J J 
Figure 6. 3 
w /,\ 
2 
r r.W(p.) 
1 J J 
2 
W( fr _p.} 
J J 
.. ........................... , .. , ....... ,, ..... , ............. - ..... - .... -. 
0 
W(p) 
price 
Arbitrary values of p. and r. are used in figure 6. 3 to illustrate 
J J 
a case in which technique one is chosen under certainty and 
technique two (the technique with the greatest rate of change of 
marginal cost) is chosen under uncertainty. 
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The main point of the model is that if there is no price 
which makes a shutdown of production optimal, then uncertainty 
increases the probab ility of the adoption of the technique with the 
greatest rate of change of margin al cost. This result is not in 
accordance with Baumol 1 s hypothesis. Also the rate of change 
of marginal cost and not the absolute level of marginal cost, i.e. 
the rate of change of total cost, is the significant factor deter-
mining changes in the direction of technique choice as uncertainty 
changes. This is because the rate of change of total cost has no 
influence upon the curvature of the difference function, V{ (p ). 
This can b e seen from equation 6. 4 . The curvature of W(p ) is 
of crucial importance for determining the direction of the change 
of technique choice as price uncertainty changes . This curvature 
is dependent upon the rate of change of marginal cost. 
It also follows from inequalities 6. 9 and 6. 10 that under 
certainty the firm is mo re likely to adopt the technique with the 
least rate of change of marginal cost as price instab ility 
increases. The II excess II expected profit of the technique which 
has the least rate of change of marginal cost is greater for a 
series of unstable prices than for a stable price equal to the 
average of the unstable prices. This result is in accordance 
with Stigler' s hypothesis. 
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D. Model II - A More General Allowance for P rice Uncertainty. 
Assumption (i), (ii), aJ1d (iii) limit the generality of 
the preceding model. To relax them, we shall, as in the second 
model of Chapter V, m ake the following assumptions: 
(i) The firm's output oft equals its output planned for t in 
t-n. 
(ii) The output of any pe r iod i s independent of that of any other. 
(iii) Costs are certain and stationary. 
(iv) Total cost is quadratic. 
In addition, we suppose assuraptions {iv), (v), (vi) 
and {vii) of the last model to hold. 
10 We do not suppose as Marschak and Nelson do that 
{i) the firm aims to maximise expected profit for each of 
n 
the sub periods of the techniques' length of life T = r, t, 
t = 1 
and to m aximise average profit for T, 
(ii) knows at the date of choosing its technique the relative 
frequency distribution of the "true" expected price values, 
and 
(iii) knows at each production decision point the true expected 
price of the output dependent on that decision. 
We shall suppos e (i) that the firm may adopt any combination of 
criteria or b ehaviour pattern f r the nub pcric Jc o f T :- ut for its 
actual pattern for T it wishes to adopt the technique which yields 
the greatest average profit, and (ii) that at its technique decision 
date it holds an anticipated relative frequency distribution of 
actual prices and its shadow prices for T. 
10 T. M arschak and R. Nelson: " Flexib ility, Uncertainty and 
Economic Theory" , M etroeconomica, Vol. 14 , 1962, April-
August-Decemb er. 
Suppose th 2.t the firm io unc e rta in ') f the relative 
frequency distribution of p and p values which it will realise 
for T. If E ( II) represents the average profit which the 
e 
firm anticipates for T and if E( II } rep resents average profit 
A 
given the actual p and p values of T , 
Pr { I Ee ( IT ) - E( IT ) I > 0 } > 0, 
The firm at its technique decis ion date acts upon E ( II ) in 
e 
choosing its technique. For any technique which has a cost 
function C = ax.2 + b + c anticipated average profit is 
Ee ( IT ) = 4! { 2 Ee (p ) Ee (P) + 2 Cove (p, P) - 2 bE e (p) 
- E (p) 2 - var p + b 2 } - c • 
e e 
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Obviously the theorems for the l a st model of Chapter V can b e 
reinterpreted m utatis mutandis so as to apply only to anticipated 
values. 
However, in this Chapter, we shall further develop the 
last model of Chapter V. We shall develop theorems which 
take account of changes in the average profit of techniques 
A 
given the actual p and p values. In order to apply these 
theorems to technique choice, it is supposed that there is a 
positive relationship between anticipated and actual average 
profit values and anticipated and actual differences of average 
profit values for the techniques. 
The res pective profit functions for technique one and 
two are 
6. 11 
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and 
2 
II 2 = px - ( a2 x + b 2 x + c 2 ) • 6. 12 
Each of these functions can b e ex pressed in term s of actual and 
shadow prices. C onseque ntly, the average profit from the 
techniques is 
E (p ) E(p) + C ov (p, p) - b 1 E (p) E(II 1)= - C 1 
E{p) - b 
1 
( ") 2 " ( ") 2 E p + var p - 2b E p + b 1 l 
and 
- b 1 
E(p) E(p) + Cov (p, p) - b2 E(p ) E ( II 
2
) = 
- C 2 
E{p) - b 
2 
A 2 /'< A 2 
E(p) + var p - 2b2 E(p) + b2 
- b 2 -------------. 6. 14 4 a2 
The "excess" avera ge profit from technique one is 
E (W ] = E( II l ) - E ( II 2 ) • 6. 15 
From the argum ent surrounding the derivation of equation 5. 35, 
it is obvious that, if E(p) and var p are constant, 
• . 1 
6 [W] = - [ ;_-- -
... al 
where M re p resents the m ean of the squared deviations of actual 
price from shadow p rice. ' Hence, if E(p ) and var p are const~--it 
and if .6 M > O, 
.6 E[W]~ 0 
accordingly as 
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(1) If the average value and variance of actual price a.re constant, 
an incre ase in the m e an of squared deviations of shadow price 
from actual leads to an increas e in the "excess" average profit 
of the technique with the greatest rate of change of marginal cost.· 
Consequently, under the above conditions, an increase in the 
mean of the squared deviations of shadow price from actual 
increases the prob ab ility of the firm adopting the technique which 
has the greatest rate of change of marginal cost. · This conclusion 
does not accord with Baumol 1 s. 
Now con s ide r the e ffe ct upon technique choice of an 
increas e in the varianc e of p rice if the mean square of deviations 
of shadow from actual price is constant and if average actual p rice 
is constant. If t::.E( p ) = 0 and if 6 M = O, then by extension of 
the argument used for deriving equation Se 38, 
J J 1 
t::. E (vV] = (-
4a1 
1 ] t::. 
4 a 2 
2 
<J • p 
Hence, if E(p ) and M are constant, and if 6 var p >o, 
J 
I'::. E [W] ~ 0 
accordingly as 
(2) If the average value of price and the mean square of 
deviations of shadow price from actual are constant., an 
6. 17 
increase in the price variance increases the "excess" average 
profit of the technique which has the least rate of change of 
marginal cost. Consequently, under the above conditions, an 
increase in the variance of price increases the probab ility of 
the firm's adopting the technique with the least rate of change 
of marginal cost. Under price certainty, E(p) and M = 0 are 
constant. Hence, proposition (2) is in accordance with Stigl er's 
hypothesis. 
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In a recent article Marschak and Nelson, 11 by consid-
ering Nelson' s m odel which implies that 
2 
E( II ) = 
~ 2 
+ [E (p) - b ] 
4 a 
- C 
' 
come to th e conclusion that "the relative desirab ility of the 
flexib le plant increases as: 
(a) the variation in market price (as m easured by variance) 
increases, 
(b ) the ab ility to p redict market p rice b efore making an 
d . . . II 12 outpu t ec1s1on increases • 
Since they u ne Nelson's p rofit model, they fail to support their 
hypothes i s by a gene r al model. Furthermore, they fail to 
point out that R 2 need not b e a reasonable measure of the 
ab ility to p r e dict if p redicted p rice is not an unb iased 
es t imat e of th e m arket p rice, p. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid: p. 50. I had independently reached similar conclusions 
b y early 1962. 
CHAPTER VII 
Dynamic Decision M aking, Average P rofit and 
Technique Choice. 
A. Introduction 
The firrn has been assumed to m ake static and point 
output plans. Such plans can arise b ecaus e great additional 
cost attaches to a divergence from planned outputa It is 
desirable to relax this assumption which implies co1npl ete 
inflexibility in Hart's sens e . We shall relax this assumption 
and show that (i) my hypothesis that increased price instability 
can . decrease average profit if R > 0 is not completely 
dependent upon the assumption that output plans are completely 
inflexib le, (ii) other things equal, "increased price uncertainty" 
increases the probability of the firms rd -~ t in3 ~l1~ t .::.,~.,., iqu e with 
the least rate of change of marginal cost of divergence of actual 
output from planned i.e., possibly the flexible plant in Hart's 
usage, and (iii) Stigler's hypothesis that uncertainty increased 
price instability increases the prob ab ility of the firm's adopting 
the technique with the least rate of change of marginal cost 
still holds. 
B, Average Profit. 
In order to simplify the analysis, it is nec e ssary to 
restrict our attention to quadratic cost functions and to make 
some special dependence assumptions. The following assumptions 
are made: 
(i) The firm makes only two decisions upon its output for 
any period, t. The first is made in period t-n, n ~ 1, 
and the second is made in period t., · For any given 
output, costs can be increased by a difference b etween 
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the first and second decision. 
(ii) The planned outputs of different pe riods are independent 
and so also are the actual outputs of different periods. 
(iii) The coct function is stationary and is known. 
(iv) This function is the quadratic 
2 2 
r. 
1 = 0 
l 
a.x + 
l ~ 
i::::: 0 
where b = 0 if x - x>'.c = O, and b ~ 0 if I x - x* I > O, 
0 0 
and where X '·~ re p resents · l.:lnne; _: out .u t , x r c?r scnts 
2.ctunl output, a > 0 and > o. 
2 2-
In order to reduce the algebra we suppose that 
a 1 = O, b = 0 an.db = O. Consequently, the cost function 0 1 
s irn plifie s to 
C (x, x*) 2 2 = a 
O 
+ a 1 x + a 2 
(x - x>'.c) • 
The firm's profit function is 
7. 1 
7 • . 2 
JI = px - { a O + a 1 x 
2 
+ a 2 x 
2 
- 2 a 2 xx* + a 2
x*
2 } .1. 3 
Since 
7.,4 
and 
p +2 a x* 
2 
X = 2a + 2 a 2 1 
2a 
p + 2 i 2 al ::::: 
I 
2 a + 2 a 
1 2 
7.5 
2a 2 " 
{ 
P + 2 a P 
E ( JI ) ::::: E p ( 1 ) -
2 a 
1 
+2 a
2 
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p + 
2 a
2 
"' 2 a "' za p 
"' } 2 ( 2 1 ) - ( p ) 2 7.6 + 2 a p a 1 + 2 a 2 ~ 2a 1 1 
2 a J 2a J 
2 2 "' "' 2 ,,.._ z " E (p ) + var p + 2 d (2E(p ) E {p ) + 2 C ov (p, p )] - za [E(p ) + var p ] 
= 
l l 
1 . 
Hence, 1£ E (p ) and var p are constant, 
1 To derive equation 7 . 7 we exp ress e quation 7 . 6 as 
E ( Il ) = 
2 a J 
E (p ) 2 + var p + 2 
2 [ E(p ) E (p) + ov (p, p)] 
a l 
2 
- a 
0 
7.7 
4 a J 4 a J 
E (]>)
2 
+ var p + Za 
2 (E( p )E(P) + Gov (p, !')] + 1 a 
22 (E(P) 2 + var P] 
1 1 
4 a 2 2 a J 
2 2 [ E (p )E (p ) + C ov (p, p) J + 4 a 22 ( " ) 2 " [E p + var p] 
al l +-----------------------2al + 2a2 
a 2 [E(p )
2 
+ var p ] 
2 4 a 1 
(i) 
2 4 a 2 J 4 a 2 2 J 
E (p ) + var p + 2 a [E (p )E (p ) + Cov (p , p)] + 2 [E(p )
2 + var pJ 
1 4 a1 
= 
"'2 "' 
a 2 [E(p) + v ar p ] 
4 a 1 
2 - a 0 
1 
Multiplying the last term of (ii) by ( - + 
al 
and collecting term s , we ob tain equation 7. 7. 
(ii) 
2 a 
2 
/', E ( JI)= 1 a 
2 
: : a { (2 E (p ) - 2E(; )] 6E (; ) 
1 2 
+ 2 /',Cov (p, P) - /', v ar P } 
2 a
2 
2 a l 
- - ------~ 2 (2 a 1 + 2 a 2 ) 
6 1\1 
l ] 6 M 
2 
where 6 M repre sents the change of the mean of squared 
2 The coefficient of equation 7. l O is obtained as follows : 
2a 
2 
2a a l 2 
a 1 +4 
= 4 a 1 + 4 
a 2 • 4 a2 a2 l 
2 al 
1 + 2 a a l + a 2 2 
= 2 2 (2 a 1 + 2 a2) 4 a a + 4 a 2 l 1 
1 
= • 4 a 1 
Therefore , 
2 a 
2 
2 al 1 al 
1 + 4 a 
= a ( a a ) 4 a 4 a 4 l + 2 1 1 2 
1 1 
= 4 a 1 2 (2 a 1 + 2 a 2 ) • 
109 
7 . 8 
7. 9 
7 . 10 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
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deviations of shadow fro m actual price. If average p rice and 
the variance of p rice are constant, an increase in M decreases 
average p rofit by 6M times the reciprocal of twic e the rate 
of change of the marginal cost of output less the reciprocal of 
twice the rate of change of the mar ginal cost of optim ally planned 
output. The decrease is greater the greater is the rate of change 
of the marginal cost of the divergence of actual output from plan 
i.e., the greater is 2 a 2• If E (p) and var p are constant, if 
2 a 2 > O, and if 2 a 1 < 
00 
1 
6 E ( II ) ~ 0 
< 
as 
If average p rice and M are constant, the change of 
average profit for a change of the variance of price is 
Za 
1 + 2 
6 E( IT) 
2 a 1 
= 2 (2 a 1 + 2 a 2 ) 
6 var p 
1 
= 4 a 1 
6 var p 
because, if 6 M = 0 and 6 E (p ) = 0, 
7. 11 
7. 12 
[-2E(p) + 2E(p)] 6 E (p) - 2 6 Cov (p , p) + 6 var p = - 6 var p. 
If average price and the mean of squared deviations of shadow 
from actual price are constant, an increase in the variance of 
price increases average profit by the reciprocal of twice the 
rate of change of the marginal cost of optiraally planned output 
times the increase of the variance. If b.E(p ) = O, if 6 M = O, 
and if 2 a 1 < 
00 
, 
6E(Il ) ~ 0 
< 
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as 
> 6 var p < O. 
C . A Further Note Upon Oi I s Re joinder . 
Even if the correlation coefficient between shadow and 
actual price is positive, an increase in the variance of price 
can still decrease average profit under dynamic decision making 
conditions. To see this , assume as in Chapter V , that the 
A 
regression of p on p is 
A 
z = 
and that thi s regression is maintained. Then, as before , 
R2 
(J ,....2 
= p a 
and 
Cov (p, p) = 
(J 
1 
2 
E 
2 
2 (J 
p 
• 
Substituting these values into equ ation 7 . 7, and differentiating 
it with respect to 2 cr while hol d ing E (p ) and E (pj constant, p 
the change of average profit for a change of the variance of p rice 
is 
l + 
== 
dE( II ) 
d (J 2 
p 
2 (2 a 1 + 2 a 2 ) 
Becaus e 
y 
1 
equation 7. 13 reduces to 
= 
R cr 
E 
(J A 
p 
, 
• 7. 13 
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2 a A (J' A 
2 E (J' E 1 + [ 2 R - ] 2 a a (J' 
1 p dE ( II ) 
dcr 2 
p 
= 2 (2 a + 2 a ) p 7. 14 • 
A 
~ If (J' > 2 R , 
p 
is large enough, 
i.e. if 0 
dE{ II ) 
do 2 
1 2 
za 
A 
> 2 R p (J' J p and if 
2 
2 a 
l 
p 
(J' 
p 
can b e negative even if R > O. 
is more likely to b e negative, the greate r is the ratio of the 
rate of change of marginal cost o f divergence to the rate of 
It 
change of marginal cost of optimally planned output, i.e. the 
2 a 
2 greater is --- • 2 a 
1 
Of course, if 2 a 2 = 0 an increase in the 
variance of p rice increases average p rofit if 2a 
1 
< oo . In 
fact, the change of average profit is the same as occurs under 
ce r tainty. However, if 2 a 
2 
> 0, it is poss ible for an increase 
in the price variance to lead to a decre a se of average p rofit 
even if R > O. 3 In his rejoinder , Oi claims that there is short 
run res ponsiveness of supply in agriculture and implies that 
m y earlier conclusion is inapplicable 1 ecause it is b ased u pon 
a static decision making assumption. But as just demonstrated, 
an increase in p rice instab ility can dec r e ase average p rofit 
even if the firm makes dynamic p roduction decisions and if 
the correlation etween shadow and actual price is positiv e 
and constant. It seems that Oi ' s revised conclusion is 
misleading in both the flexible and infl exib l e ( dynamic and static ) 
decision cases . 
3 W. Oi: " Rejoinder" Econometrica, Vol . 31 , 1963, p. 248 . 
D . A Special Model . 
Let us suppose a regression of p on p of 
A. 
z = a: + a: p. 
0 l 
Then, equation 7 . 7 b ecomes 
E ( II) = 
and 
2 2 a: 2 . 2R 2 
E (p) + var p + 2 a: [ 2E(p) E (p ) + a: 
2 a: 2 
2 a: l 
1 1 
. "' 2 R 2 
[E (p) + ~2 
1 
cr 
2 
l p .. 
- a: I 
0 
M = [E (p ) - E (p) ] 2 + a 
p 
2 
a: 
2 
a + 
p l 
a p 
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7. 15 
2 
cr l p .. 
7. 16 
2 
• 7. 17 
Let us specialise this relationship further b y supposing 
that the shadow prices are unb iased estim ates of actual price. 
This implies that 
"' z = p ' 
v = 0 and .y = 1. It also implies that E (p ) = E (p). 
• 0 1 There-
fore, in this s p ecial case, 
E ( Il)= 
= 
2 zo: 2 2 0:2 
E (p) + 2 a: 
2 E (p) + var p + 
2 
d 
l l 
--------------------- - a: 7. 18 4 0: + 4 0: 0 
1 
4 a: 1 
l 2 
E (p ) 2 + l ( 1 - R 2) cr 2 
2 (2 a: l + 2 a: 2 ) p 
2 
R a p 
2 
• 7. 19 
4 
For this special case , we ob tain the following theorerns : 
(i) If E( p ) an d 2 a are constant, p 
dE( II) [ 1 1 2 d ( 1 - R 2 ) == a 2 ) ] a 2 (2 a 1 + 2 ~ a p • 
If the rate of chang of rnarginal cost of divergence from 
plan, 2 a 2 , exceeds zero, and if a 
2 > o, 
·~ 
< o. If 2 a
2 
== o, d E ( II J = o. 
d( 1 - R ) 
2 1 2 
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7.20 
(ii )If E (p ) and R 2 are constant, 
dE ( II) == 
d O 2 2 (2 a 1 + 2 a 2 ) 
(1 - R ) + 4 a R • 7 . 21 
p 1 
If 2 a 
1 
~ -
d a > o. 
p 
D , Technique Choice. 
The p revious analysis p rovides an opportunity to extend 
our discussion to the effect of p r ice uncertainty u pon the choice 
of technique. In the analysis of Chapter VI, it was assumed 
that the fir.rn rs actual output d id not diverge from its pl anned. 
Now it is possib le to allow for flexib ility in Hart ' s sense. We 
2 
4 We o b tain the coefficients of a in equation 7 . 19 as follows : p 
The coeffici nt of 2 cr in equation 7 . 18 is p 
2 a 
2 R2 
2a 
2 1 + ? 
2 a ~ a 1 
== 1 1 
2 (2 a 1 + 2 a 2) 2 (2 a + 2a 2 ) 4 a + 4 a 1 1 2 
== 1 l 1 
2 (2 a 
1 + 2 a 2) 2 (2 a l + 2 a ) 
R2 + 4a 
2 
2 1 2 ; (1 - R ) + R 2(2 a 1 + 2 a 2 ) 4 a 
. 
1 
To obtain {ii), we use the results of footnote 2 of thi s 
Cha ter . 
2 (i ) 
R 
R 
2 {ii ) 
1 
(iii ) 
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suppose that (i) the firm has a choice of technique A or B for a 
p eriod T consisting of n sub - pe riods, (ii) the techniques have 
equal resale (scra p ) value at the end of T , and (iii) the pro-
duction conditions which we re previously outlined in this chapter 
hold. 
The excess average rofit of technique A is 
E(W] = E ( II ) - E ( 11 ) 
A B 
where E ( II A) and E( II B ) are similar in forr.n to equation 
7. 6. 
7.22 
It follows from equation 7. 9, that if the average value 
and variance of price are constant, an increase in the r.nean 
square of deviations of shadow p rice from actual changes the 
"excess" average profit of t echnique A by 
2 a 
2, A 
6£( W] { 
2 a l B 
= - 2 (2 a 1, A + 2 a 2, A ) 
2 a 
2, B 
2 a 2 B 
+ 2 (2 al B + 2 
' 
This can also b e expressed in terms of the simplific ation of 
equation7.10. Consequently, if 6E(p ) = 0, i£ 6 var p = 0 
and if 6 M > O, then 
(i) if 2 a Z, A = 2 a z, B ' 
6 E (W] ~O 
as 
za ~ 2 a 
1 A < 1 B ' 
' ' 
and (ii) if 2 a = 2 a 1 B ' 1, A , 
6 E[W] fo 
7.23 
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< 
-
> 
2 a • 
2 , B 
V,T e suppose that for i ts anticipated production b ehaviour, the 
firm chooses the technique which maxi.mises its anticipated 
average p rofit , and that its anticipated average profit rises as 
A. 
the average profit for its actual p and p value s rises. Also, 
assume average price and the variance of p rice to be constant. 
Then (i) if the rate of change marginal cost of divergence from 
planned output i s the same fo:r oth techniques , an increase in 
M increases the !ike. ihood of the firrn t s ado pting the technique 
which has the g:reatest r2.te of change of marginal cost of 
optim a..~ly pJ.anned outp..1t, and (ii) if the rate of change of the 
rnargi~al cost of o ptimally planned output is the same for both 
techn:i.ques , an inc:r.ease in M inc reases the probability of the 
firm ' s adopting t_~e ~echnique which has the least rate of change 
of marginal. cos t of ~ive rgence from plan. If average price and 
the variance of price are constant, an increase in M increases 
the prob a ility of the firm t s adopting a technique which has the 
great est rate of change of marginal cost of o ptirnally planned 
output and the lo•.1vest rate of change of m arginal cost of 
divergenc e of output from plan. Other things equal , an increas e 
in M inc reases the probability of the firm ' s ado pting the mo st 
flexib l e plant in Hart s (poss ible) us age . 
If average pric e a n d M are constant, the change of 
the " excess " average profit of technique A for a change of the 
price variance is 
6 E [ W] 
as 
= [ l 
4 ex 1, A 
6 E [ W] ~o 
< 
l 
ex l B 
1 
2 ex ~ 2 ex 
l,A > l , B 
] 6 var p. 
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7.24 
If E (p ) and M are constant, an increase in the p rice variance 
increases the p rob ab ility of the firm ' s ado pting the technique 
with the greatest rate of change o f marginal cost of o ptimally 
planned output. 
Suppo se that at the date of choosing its technique the 
firm knows its distrib ution p values for T and that each of these 
is an unb iased estim ate of p. Then, e quation 7. 19 is applicable. 
We note the following points for this case : 
(i) If E (p ) and 2 a are constant, p 
is less negative the greater is 2 ex 
1 
and 
the smaller is 2 ex 2• In these circumstances, an increase 
2 . 
1n l - R increases the p ro ab ility of the firm ' s adopting 
any technique which has the greatest rate of change of 
r.narginal cost of o ptimally planned output and the lowest 
rate of chan ge of n1.arginal cost of divergence of output 
from plan. 
2 (ii) If E (p ) and R are constant d E ( II ) 
dcr 2 
p 
is m ore positiv 
the s m aller is 2 ex 
1 
an d 2 ex 
2
• In this case, an increase 
in the price v arianc e increases the probability of the firm ' s 
ado pting the technique which has both the least rate of 
change of m arginal cost of optim ally planned output and the 
least rate of chang e of marginal cost of divergence. 
C HAPTER VIII 
P rice Uncertainty and Indu s t r y Profit. 
It is commonly believed that p ric e uncertainty m ust 
decrease the p rofit of a c losed industry. In other words , it 
is b elieved that the existenc e of forecasting err ors in a closed 
indust r y implies that the aggregate rofit of that industry is 
less than under certainty. B ut this postulate i s false . Given 
that plans are not compl etel y flexib l e , g roup {industry) errors 
can inc rease the p rofit of the industry. While the p rofit of an 
ind ividual fir r.n decreas e s if i ts errors increas e relative to a 
g iven grou p position, the p rofits of the indus try do not necessarily 
dec rease if the er rors of the g rou p increase. 
T o sub stantiate this hypothes is, l et us consider the 
p rofit effects of po ssi l e errors at a point of t im e. It will e 
taken for granted that firms in an industry can a do pt different 
criteria, that some firms rnay ado p t no cons c ious criterion 
at all, that some may act inconsistently and without deli eration, 
and their forecasts may differ. The immedi ate a i m is to 
compare industry p rofit under certainty with the po ssib l e l evel 
of p rofit under unc e r t ainty by assuming that actual demand and 
cost functions are the saine in oth cas e s. The position will 
only b e considered for the case in which plans involve short 
term inflexi ility. Su ch a rnodel is a simpl e first a pproxim a-
tion for the qualitativ effects of errors when additional costs 
m ust e ass ign e d to their elim ina tion. 
Comparisons are n-1 ade under the following 
assumptions: 
1. Every firn1 makes its output decis ion for t in t-n and 
this output decision is unalterable. 
ii. The only dependence in p roduction occurs etween the 
decision of t-n and the output n periods later. · 
iii. The marginal cost functions of all firms are linear and 
identical. 
iv. Each firm produces only one good. 
v. Demand is a monotonically dec reasing function of price 
and marginal cost is an increasing function of planned 
( equals actual ) output. 
The assumption of linear marginal cost functions 1s 
made so as to resolve the effect of the dispersion of output 
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b etween firms into the effect of the variance alone. However, 
this assurnption is a simplification which does not alter the 
essentials of the analysis. 
Let 
p = f (X ) 
D 
be the industry demand function where X represents industry 
2 
output, and let the costs of the i-th firm be ax . + bx. + c 
1 1 
where x. represents the i - th firmT s output. Then, if there 
1 
are k firms in the industry, industry p rofit is 
k 2 
'1f = f (X ) X - ~ (ax. + bx . + c) • 
i = 1 1 1 
Where E indicates that the industry value is averaged over 
all firms, 
2 
= f (X ) X - k ( E (ax. + bx . + c ) ) 
1 1 
8. 1 
8. 2 
= f (X ) X - k ( aE (x.) 2 + a var x . + bE (x. ) + c ) 
1 1 1 
X2 X 
= f (X ) X - k ( a ( k ) + a var x + b (k ) + c ) 
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a 2 
= f (X) X - ( - X + k a var x + bX + kc } • 8. 3 k 
Using expression 8. 3 it can be shown that profit can be greater 
under uncertainty than under certainty. 
Proof: 
Under certainty demand and supply are in equilibrium. 
Let 
f (X) = 2: X+b 8. 4 
for X • Then industry p rofit unde r certainty is 
"' "' "' a "' 2 "' 
r (X ) = f(X) X - ( k X + b X + kc } • 8.5 
It can be shown that the maximum of r (X ) occurs for a value 
"' 
of output which is leas than the equilib rium value of output, X. 1 
l The above statement can be shown to hold in the following 
way: 
a 2 
Let C = - X + bX + kc. Then for a maximum of r (X) k 
the following marginal and second order conditions 
must b e satisfied: 
and 
d r 
dX 
df 
= f (X) + dX 
d
2 
r 
2 
dX 
_ dC = O 
dX 
< 0 . 
Since the industry demand function is assumed to decrease 
monotonically,! is negative for all values of X, and so 
the marginal revenue function is less than the average 
df 
revenue function for X > 0 because f (X) > f(X) + dX 
for X > O. Since the industry marginal cost function is 
assumed to increase at less than an infinite rate, 
dC = f (X) + X ~ befo re 
dX dX 
dC = f (X ) dX • 
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If the m aximum of r (X) occurs for X , then r (X ) > r (X ) 
0 0 
where X < Y . 
0 
If we suppose r (Y ) to 2 e concave u ward , 
then r (X) > I' (X ) f Or .LC < X < Y • 
o- If r (X ) is concav e 
upward, then there are a number of output l evels in the neigh-
b ourhood of X for which industry p rofit is g r eate r than unde r 
0 
certainty. Industry p rofit under unce r tainty is 
and 
'V = r (X ) - ka var x 
Max 'V 
X 
= r (X ) 
0 
- k a var x . 
8.6 
8. 7 
S inc e r (X ) increases continuously to i ts n1axin-1ur.n, and then 
decreases continuously, 
rv 
r (x + 11 ) - o > r (x ) 0 8. 8 
where T} lies between sufficiently small neg ative and positive 
values and o is sufficiently s m all. The re are values of out put 
in the neighb ourhood of X fo r which p rofit is greate r than under 
0 
certainty even if the variance of output b etween firm s is pos itive. 
H ence , uncertainty ~ lead to an inc rease in industry rofit if 
it leads to a restriction of output. There is no good a priori 
reason for exclud ing this cas e as an empirical po ssib ility. 
Nev erthel ess , if v a r x is l arge e nough o r if aggregate output is 
high e nough or low enough p rofit can b e lower under uncertainty 
2 d
2 r Where R represents total revenue, 
2 
d2R dX 
values of output if < 0, because 2 
clX 
2 
d R 
dX2 
is negative for all 
will b e negative if the el asticity of 
the demand function decreases with increases of out put. 
than under certainty. For instance,i.f industry output under 
uncertainty is g reater than Y , or if industry output is just 
less than X and var x is large, industry output will e l ess 
than under certainty. C, 'V T his is bec ause ~ ---
c, var x 
and < 0 for X > X • 
0 
=-ka<O 
Given a closed industry it is not imposs i le for 
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industry p rofit to b e higher under uncertainty than under 
certainty. Due to their mistakes, firm s n'l ay b ring ab out a 
monopoly~ike restriction of output. Over time, such restric-
tions may alternate with overp roduction. It is clearly possible 
for average profit to be l ess than, or greater than under certainty 
depending u pon whether there is tendency to p roduce monopoly 
like levels of output or to overp roduce. 
Frorn the ab ove analysis it can be seen that the difference 
between industry p rofit under uncertainty and under certainty 
depends upon 
(a) the spread of output between firms , and, 
{b ) the difference b etween aggregate output un er uncertainty 
and equilib rium output under certainty. 
Profit can also b e expressed in terms of maximum equivalent 
( shadow) p rices. If b < oo and if O < 2a < oo , there is always 
some value of p such that the i-th firn'1 rs actual output x. equals 
P - b . 
1 
2a • 
1 
Let this value be P., and l et us describe it as the 
1 
"shadow" price. Then industry p rofit as a function of the 
firms' shadow p rices is found y sub stituting 
"' P. - b 
1 
, 1 = 1, ••• , k, 
into exp ression 8. 2. This gives 
... 123 
P. -
'V = p DX - k ( E [ a ( _1_2a-) 2 + b ( 
P . - b 
1 ) l 2a + C ~ } 
{ 
( " )2 " " 
_ p X _ k E p + var p - 2 E (p) 
- D 4 a 
2 b E(p) - b2 L 
+ 2a + C j8. 9 
E ( ") b 
where X ::: k ( p - ) and var p is the varianc e of shadow 2a 
p rice b etween firms in the industry. If the average shadow 
p rice in the industry is constant, an increase in the variance 
of the shadow p rice leads to a decrease in industry p rofit of 
::: 
k 
4 a 6 var p 
In this case, an increase in the varianc e of shadow prices 
b etween firms decreases industry p rofit b y k tin 1es the 
recip rocal of twice the slop e of any firm 1 s marginal cost 
' " function tLnes the chang e of the variance. Vv hile var p 2!. 0 
" under uncertainty, var p = 0 under certainty. P rofit under 
uncertainty is less than or equal to that under certainty i f 
the average shadow p rice is the same in oth situations. 
But if average shadow p r ice differs , industry _ rofit can b e 
g reate r under uncertainty than under certainty. 
8. 10 
As the p redictive ab ility of firms as a g roup increases, 
industry p rofit need not increas • As the group a ility of firms 
to p redict inc reases , the average p redicted p rice for the group 
will app roach the equili rium rice value, and industry output 
will approach, I . If p rior to the general increase in p redictive 
ability, the industry had b een p roducing the neighbourhood of 
X and, if var x remains unchanged, an increase in industry 
0 
output which b rings i t clos er to X will decrease industry p rofit. 
While an increase in the p red ictive ability of a firm , the 
predictive ab ility of other firms unchanged, increases its 
profit, p rofit fo:r the whole industry can decrease if there is 
a general increase in predictive ab ility. Many fail to see 
this possib ility because they equate individual and group 
experience. 
The above analysis g ives some ground for doubting 
an assertion made by Nelson. 3 Nelson asserts that : 
" Since a rise in p rofits will draw new firms into the 
industry, a general increase in skill in predicting 
will, by increasing p ::-ofit, tend to shift the long-
run supply curve to the right and cause a fall in 
average quantity p roduced" o 4 
Nelson also states that the economic logic of the probl em 
indicates that relaxing the assumptions of his rnodel will not 
change this qualitative conclusion. 5 My disagreement is with 
Nelson's premise that a general increase in skill in predicting 
will (always) increase industry p rofit. As previously argued, 
an increase in group predictive ability can decrease industry 
profit if uncertainty has led to a restriction of industry output. 
If the aggregate profit of the industry is greater 
under uncertainty than under certainty, it is still possible 
for the profits of some firms with inferior predictive ability 
to be less than under certainty. If output is l ess than X , 
3 
4 
5 
R.R. Nelson: 
Equili rium". 
Vol.75, 1961. 
Ibid, p. 62 
D) id. 
"Uncertainty, P rediction and Competitive 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
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and if industry profit is less than under certainty, the profits 
of some firms with supe rior p redictive ab ility can b e greater 
than under certaintyo But if industry output exceeds the 
e quilibrium level, X, then it is certain that the profits of all 
firms will be less than under certainty. 
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It is important to realise that it is fallacious to assume 
that for the same set of dernand and cost functions (neither of 
which is completely elastic) that the p rices of uncertainty can 
occur under perfect knowledge. To each supply and demand 
situation there is only one possib le certainty rice, i.e., the 
equilibrium p ricea · If a p rice different to this equilibriun1. 
level occurs under uncertainty, then it cannot occur under 
certainty. A rguments of the form "if the p rices which occur 
under uncertainty are certain , then ••• " can b e misleading in 
the group context b ecause the uncertainty prices may not e 
compatible with certainty, If we suppose that the prices of 
uncertainty can always occur under certainty inconsistency 
occurs at the asis of our argument for we irnply that it is 
possibl e for non-equilib rium price s to occur under conditions 
in which all firms have perfect knowledee. In an uncontrolled 
market and under certainty this is imposs ible. 
The analysis has b een concerned with the possible 
industry profit situation at a point of time. Over time, profit 
may sometimes b e above its certainty leve l and sometimes 
b elow it. My hypothesis is that (in a closed industry) there 
are some situations in which average profit under uncertainty 
is above that under certainty. The former situation may e 
a long run one due to the continuous effects of uncertainty. 
There seems to b e no theoretical justification for excluding 
the possibility of p rice uncertainty causing a rise in industry 
p rofit. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII 
Upon the Relationship b etween the Preceding 
Theory and Knisht ' s Theory of Profit. 
Knight argues that profit is zero under conditions of 
certainty and that " p rofit arises from the fact that entrepreneurs 
co ntract for p roductive services in adv ance at fixed rates, and 
realize upon the i r use by the sale of the p roduct in the market 
after it is made . Thus the competition for productive services 
is based upon anticipations . The p rices of the p roductive 
services b eing the costs of p roduction, changes in conditions 
give rise to p rofit by upsetting anticipations and p roducing a 
d ivergence b etween costs and selling price, which would other-
1 
wise be equalised by competition". Thus Knight has foreseen 
the possibility of profit being g reater under price uncertainty 
than under certainty. 
H e also puts forward the following propo sitions : 
" The condition, then, under which entrep reneurs as a group 
will realize a p rofit is that they underestimate the p rospects 
of their business relatively to their d is positions to venture. 
If, on the contrary, they overestimate their p rospects 
(considering the degree of conviction necessary to move 
their wills), they will in aggregate suffer loss, and if they 
estimate correctly on the whole neither will occur. If the 
estimates are a matter of pure chance it woul d seem that 
the variations in the two directions woul d be equal, the 
average correct, and the general level of pure profit zero" . 2 
1 F . H. Knight: Ris½, Uncertainty, and Profit, Houghton 
Mifflin Con-ipany, New York, 1921 , pp. 197-198. 
2 Ibid. , pp. 363-364 . 
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When a pplied to industry p rofit sorne of these proposi-
tions are untrue. · At least this is so if the analysis of Chapter 
VIII is a pplicable. .Although the underestimation of p rice is 
necessary for an increase of industry p rofit above its certainty 
level, it is not sufficient for it. Again, if marginal cost 
increases with increases of output, errors of estimation do 
not cancel out. · If marginal cost is linear and increasing, 
industry profit decreases as the v ariance of "predicted" 
(shadow) p rices in the industry increases and so, if the 
industry's mean shadow price is equal to the equilibrium price 
and if all firms do not p redict the rnean p rice, industry p rofit 
is less than under certainty. 
I 
CHAPTER DC 
Errors and Aggregate Output 
In order to satisfactorily consider social questions, it 
is necessary to have some way of comprehending the economy 
as a whole. It should also b e possible to make this way explicit 
by a model the implications of which can be specifically derived 
and checked against actualities. The model used in this 
analysis overlooks many as pects of aggregate production, 1 
and one can only hope that excluded factors are not so important 
as to ma!ce the conclusions misleadingg 
A. Errors and Ag_,g_reg~te Output. 
The simple matter which I wish to consider first is 
the effect upon aggregate output of the occurrence of different 
shadow price ratios for the same period. C onsider the effect 
under the following as surnptions : 
(i) The economy produces two (o r more ) p roducts. 
(ii) Each firm must decide upon its output n pe riods 1n 
advance of its actual output . n > O. The decis ion for 
any period is inflexible and independent of other 
decisions to be made in the future . 
(iii) The distribution of inputs b etween firms is fixed and 
the aggregate level of these inputs is constant. 
(iv) Each firm ' s technical transformation function 
(production possibility frontier ) for its fixed amount 
of inputs is convex. 
The above assumptions do not imply that all factors 
are fully employed, and in developing our thoughts we need not 
1 For instance, it does not allow for external economies . 
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suppose that the input and distribution of factors is actually fixed. 
Let us consider the economy ' s p roduction possib ilities with any 
given employed quantity of factors . For any given quantity of 
these factors and distribution of them, the economy has a convex 
production possibility frontier for its products . For any given 
distribution of inputs betw een firms , this frontier is comprised 
of only those bundles of products such that it is ir.npossible to 
increase the output of one product without decreasing the output 
of any othero However, if the technical transformation functions 
of all firms are onvex, it is well known th _t for its employed 
resourc es the economy 's aggregate p roduction falls below its 
attainable l evel unless the rates of technical su stitution between 
. 2 products are equal for all firms . If these rates are unequal , 
it is possible to inc:rease the output of one or more pro ducts 
without decreasing the output of any other and without employing 
a greater quanEty o f factors than is already employed. If 
firms " predict" different price ratios , and if their beh aviour 
is equi.--ralent to profit maximisation upon the b asis of these 
3 
price ratios , then aggTegate production will fall below the 
frontier which io attainable with the economy's employed 
ratios 
resources o If the shadow price:/ of firms are different 
production falls below the economy ' s frontier. 
The extent to which output falls below the economy ' s 
produ ction frontier depends upon the form of firms I technical 
2 This proposition is discussed by O. Lange in II The F oundations 
o f Welfare Economics", Eco nometrica, Vol. 10, 1942, 
pp. 215 - 228 . Footnote 14, p . 225 i s particularly relevant. 
3 The principl e of maximum equ ivalence was discussed in 
Chapters III and N . 
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substitution functions and the relative frequency distribution of 
their shadow p rice ratios. Since the technical sub stitution 
functions of firm s are convex, and so can b e a pproximated by 
quadratic functions with negative second derivatives, there is 
a tendency for aggregate output to decrease as the variance of 
price ratio predictions increase. In the special case illustrated 
in the a ppendix, aggregate output de pends functionally upon the 
average of shadow p rice ratios i n the industry and their 
variance at any point of tim e, and decreases as this variance 
decreases. 
If the rates of t echnical substitution are not equal 
everywhere, there are a numb er of equalised rates which for 
the same employment of factors increase the output of at least 
one p roduct without decreasing the output of any other. The 
range of such rates increases with the variance of shadow p rice 
ratios. However, every e qualised rate of technical substitution 
does not increase aggregate output. Consider the possibilities 
in term s of figure 9. 1. In that figure, we suppose the economy 
to p roduce two p roducts, X and Y. For som e distri ution and 
employrnent of resources , and given relative frequency distri-
bution of (unequal) shadow price ratios, we ob serve that the 
aggregate output (X 1, Y 1) occurs. For this distribution of 
resources, {X 1, Y 1 ) falls below the economy's technical 
transformation frontier, Y = F (X) . Any equalised transforma--
. dF(X) . . 
tion rate, dX , will increase the output of at least one 
product without decreasing that of another if X
1 
~ X ~ x
2
• 
If the equalised rate of transformation can be represented 
by the slope of a tangent at F (X 1 ) , F (X2 ) or at any intermediate 
point on the function, then aggregate output is unequivocally 
increased by the equalisation. However, if the equalised rate 
dY 
dX occurs for X < x
1 or X > x 2 then the output of at 
least one p roduct is decreased. 
y 
y 
2 
Figure 9 . l 
Y = F (X } 
y l ... ... ... ..... 1 ____ _ 
0 X 
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Nevertheless, if d ifferent rates of transformation occur at the 
one tim e, there is a "rang e" potential for increasing the output 
of one p roduct without decre asing the output of any other, and 
without employing any more factors than are already in employ-
ment. In a free m arke t, shadow p rice ratios will normally differ, 
and hence, a potential arises for increasing the economy ' s 
aggregate output without increasing its usage of factors . Let 
us b riefly conside r the possib ility of realising it. 
B. Forward Price Schemes 
The government m ay be able to realise this potential 
if it sets forward p rices. 
4 
Consider the case in which the 
economy ' s p roducts are perishabl e (or not stored}. Under 
4 For a definition of forward p rices see D. G. Johnson, 
Forward Prices fo r A&riculture, The University of Chicago 
Press , Chicago, Illinois , 1947 , pp. 10-12. The two main 
aspects of forward prices are that they are certain and are 
set sufficiently far in advance fo r producers to adjust to them. 
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these circumstances , what conditions m ust be satisfied if the 
government ' s forward price policy is to increase the aggregate 
consumption of the community? 
vVe can ob tain an approximate answer y supposing 
that the p receding assumptions appl y and that the consumption 
of the economy' s p roducts is a function of real aggregate income 
5 
and the pro ducts' price ratios. If this is so , then for any 
p articular level of aggregate real income and set of price 
ratios , there is just one bundle of products which is demanded. 
The government is able to regulate consumption by its taxation 
and forward p rice policies~ Since, in this case , the consumption 
of any produ ct cannot exceed its current output, the government ' s 
forward price ratios must b e such as to increase the output of 
at least one product without decreasing that of any o ther. In 
figure 9 . 2 aggregate output under free market conditio ns is 
shown as(X , Y ). In this case, the government' s forward price 
0 0 
ratio of Y to X must b e such that the marginal rate of t r ansforma-
tion occurs for X
O 
$. X .$. X 1. But this is only a necessary 
condition for an increase in the consumption of at least one 
product without a decrease in the consumption of any other. 
At the government ' s forward p rice ratios , income 
may be such that the demand for at least one product exceeds 
its suppl y . In figure 9. 2, we suppose the forward p rice ratio 
OA OB t o be set. At this p rice ratio, aggregate output is 
(X , Y ) and aggregate income in terms of one product is OA. 1 1 
5 This dependence is o viously a special case. The economy ' s 
aggregate consumption can also depend upon the distribution 
of incon'le. 
I I 
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At this pri c r a t io and incon'1 e l e v e l, the aggregate income 
c onsumption func t ion may no t p ass through the point, (X 
1
, y · 
1
). 
If i t do es not, then the p rice ratio and income conditions are 
such that the demand for at l east one p roduct exceeds its 
supply. 
If the income consurnptio n line at the set forward 
price ratio passes through the area in which the output of one 
p roduct is inc reased and none decreased (at the set forward 
p rice) , then the government will be a l e t o regul ate income 
so that all der.nands can e m e- ~ out of current s u pplies and s o 
that the c onsumption of at least one p roduct is h igher without 
that of any other b eing lower. In figure 9. 2 , we enquire if the 
income c o nsumption line p asses through the rectangle 
[(X , Y ) , (X , Y 1 ), (A:1, Y 1 ), (X 1, Y ) l . 
6 If it does not 
0 0 0 0 ~ 
OA 
then fe r the p ric e rc::-..tio O> , tho g ove rnment is u nable to regulate 
inco.me so a s t o assur e a n increase in the c onsumption o f at 
l east one pro duct without a dec reas e in the consum ption of any 
other. But if the inco me co nsu mption line passes through the 
rectangle at points o ther than (X , Y ) such an increase is 
0 0 
possi le~ In figure 9. 2 the income c onsumption line , WZ , for 
6 Strictly, w e require the income consump t ion line to p ass 
through th re ctangle at points other than( X , Y ). Also, 
in the lim it in which the p rice ratios are eqRivafent to 
dF(X ) 
0 
dX a nd 
dF(X
2
) 
dX the inc ome c onsurnption line 
must pass through the int ervals ( (X , Y ) , (X , Y
2
)] 
0 0 0 
and [ (X , Y ) , (X , Y )] at points other than (X , Y ). 
0 0 2 O O 0 
A 
A' 
y 
0 
0 
Fi_gure 9.2. 
X 
0 
X B11 X 1 2 
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B1 B X 
h . . OA h h t e p ric e ratio OB passes t r oug the r equired rectangle. .Any 
tax greater than AA' and le ss than AA" will ensure that at the 
price ratio ~: all demands can e m et from availab le supplies 
and that the quantity consumed will exceed (X , Y ) in the 
0 0 
vectorial sens e . After imposing any of these tax rates, the 
government will hav e a surplus in at least one of the p roducts. 
This quantity may b e de stroyed or donated to separate e conom ies. 
The existence of surpluses which are destroyed or donated is not 
p roof that aggregate income o r consumption is lower than it 
would be in the absence of forward prices. 
It is similarly possible to increase aggregate consump-
tion by forward prices if pro ducts are storable or enter into 
international trade. E v en when p roducts are stora le , 
different shadow price ratios can arise under free market 
conditions. By eliminating these through forward p rices , it 
is po ssible to increase aggregate output, and if required, 
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increase the quantity of stocks. Even after increased taxation 
and storage, consumption can be greater than under free 
market conditions. The existence of buffer stocks increases 
the area over which the government' s taxation and forward price 
policy can increase aggregate consumption. Similarly, if the 
products enter into external trade, home producer s may hold 
different shadow price ratios. If the government controls the 
country's international trade and fixes forward price ratios at 
home, and sells surplus production on the overseas market, and 
buys as required to meet internal demand, it m ay use its over-
seas funds (instead of buffer stocks) to increase domestic 
consumption. By setting forward price ratios, the country 
can increase the aggregate quantity of products which it has 
7 for exchange. 
C. Forward Prices and Welfare Implications. 
In the above analysis I have not tried to ohow that 
forward price schemes can improve the welfare of society. 
Since it seems likely that there are at least as many social 
8 welfare functions in existence as there are people, and 
since these functions may all be in a process of change, and 
7 Buffer stock and forward price schemes involving inter-
national trade are discussed at further length in a forth-
coming article of mine in the Economic Record. This 
article is entitled " Pric e Uncertainty and Pareto 
Optimality''. 
8 Given Bergson's general formulation of welfare functions, 
we cannot exclude the above possibility. A Bergson: 
"A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics", 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 52, 1937-1938, 
pp. 310-334. P . A. Samuelson, The Foundations of Economic 
Analysis, Chapter VIII "Welfare Economics", pp. 203-253. 
Harvard University Press , Cambridge, 1955 . 
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since some of these involve intertemporal and interpe rsonal 
conflict, it is unlikely that a unique social welfare function can 
b e defined. Yet the economy through compromises and coercion 
may work to some particular ordering of its poss ib ilities. 
According to some orderings, changes in p roduction which 
decrease the output o f one or more products and increase the 
output of others can b e preferable to some change s which 
increase the output of all produ cts. The more II substitutability" 
do these orderings allow b etween p roducts, the greater is the 
range of forward price policies which can place the e conomy 
in a " p refe rred " po sition. 
It is also possib l e for forward p ric e schemes to have 
an income dist r i ution effect. They will equalise the p rofit of 
firms operating unde r identical cost conditions. Under forwar d 
price schem es no additional profit will arise from superior 
p redictive ability of the near future. The income r edistri ution 
effect may have social w elfare implications. Other factors m ay 
also be effected which are impo rtant for social welfare functions, 
e.g. the amount of government control is increased by forward 
p rice schemes . 
Howeve r, fro m the above model, we obtain the following 
information for feeding into social welfare functions: Forward 
price schemes can lead to a level of ag g regat e consumption 
which exceeds that under free market conditions. T h e y can do 
this even when they involve the de struction of some production 
or an increase in the level of stocks. But the total change in any 
social w elfare functio n as a r e sult of a forwar d p rice scheme 
is unlikely to depend just u pon the scheme ' s 
effect on aggregate consumptio n. The scheme ' s effec t on 
other fac to rs m ay also influence the change so that it cannot 
be gauged from the change in consumption alone. While 
this analysis does not imply that any forward p rice scheme 
will increase the l ev el of aggregate consumption, it does 
suggest that there is some e l astic i ty in the matter. 
138 
~ P ENDDC TO CHAPTER IX. 
This appendix p rovides a simple illustration of the 
effect at any point of time of different shadow p rice ratios on 
the economy's level of aggregate output. We make the follow-
ing assumptions in addition to those rn ade at the beginning of 
the Chapter : 
(a) Every firm's production pos sibility frontier for the pro-
ducts X and Y is the same. 
(b ) The i-th firm• s production possibility frontier is quadrat ic 
and c an be written explicitly as 
yi = 13 0 _:: 131 xi· 13 2 x/ { (x, y) J x;:: 0, y;:: O} 1 
where y and x respectively represent the firm's output of 
Y and X and t3 > 0, t3 > 0 and t3 > o. 
o l - 2 
I£ there are k firms in the econom y, the output of 
commodity Y for the whole economy at any point of time is 
y = 
k 
}.: 
i = 1 
k 
- 1: Y. - . 1 l l = { /3 + f3 X -o - 1 i 
This output averaged over k firms in the industry is 
Y/k 1 = E(y) = 
k 
2 
= /3 
0 
+ f3 1 E(x) - f3 2 E(x) - f3 2 var x, 
where E represents values averaged for all firms and var x 
is the variance of the outputs of individual firms from the 
average output of 1C in the industry, i.e. the variance from 
2 
3 
4 
X 1 
ik = k 
k 
r: 
. 1 x .• 
l = l 
Given exp ression 4 , the economy's aggregate 
6utput of Y is 
Y = k E {y ) = k { 13a + !3 1 E (x ) - 132 E (x) 
2 
- f3 
2 
var x } 
= k {f3 o + f3 l ! -
= k /3 + 0 M /3 y -1 
13 2 var x -
/32 
k x2 - k 13 2 var x 5 
where X = r. x. . Unde r certainty var x = 0 and the econom y's l 
technical transformation function is 
Y=k/3 + 
o - /3 X -1 k 
~ .... 2 
A • 6 
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If var x > 0, as w e expect it to do under p rice uncertainty, then 
from equation 5 , the output of Y for any g iven value of X is 
reduced and the econom y's aggregate output falls elow its 
p roduction pos sib ility fronti e r which is g iven y function 6 . 
T his occur s bec ause the coefficient of v a r x in equat ion 5 i s 
negative. This 1s negative b ecause 
2 d y . 
l 
dx .2 
l 
= - 25 
. 2 
i.e. because increasing costs occur. We note that for any given 
level of X and given value of var x, that the r e duction of output 
b rought about by a pos itive variance value is g reater the s peedier 
is increasing cost, Al so if var x is constant and pos itive w 
ob tain a "transformation function" which lies below the economy' s 
p roduction possib ility frontier. 
So far w e have de·scribed what happens to the level o f 
aggregate output if the variance of x increases. This does not 
explicitly indic a te what happens to output if the v ariance of 
shadow price r a tios is positive. Let us explicitly consider this 
matte r. If the p roduction pos sib ility function is cliff r entiable, 
A. p 
and if ( .;..:i.. ) is the i-th firm's shadow p ric e rat io, 
PX 
-- -
p 
dy. 
1 
dx . 
1 
Letting Q . rep res ent ~) ., 
1 p 1 and differenti ating e qua tion 1, 
X 
e quation 7 beco m es 
+ f3 - 2 f3 X = - Q . 
- 1 2 i 1 
Therefo re , the i-th firm 's output of X is 
X. = (Q. + f31 ) / 2 f32 1 1-
T h i-th firm 's output of product Y is 
Hence, the aggregate output of Y at any point of time is 
k 
Y = ~ y = k E (y ) 
i = 1 i 
=k f3 +k/3 
o- 1 
E(Q ]± f3 l 
2 f3 2 
k f3 2 var Q 
2 f3 2 
where the l ast term reduces to - ½ k var Q . inc e 
X = k E (x) = k 
14 1 
7 
8 
9 
11 
12. 
the aggregate output of X is constant if the average shadow p rice 
ratio, E (Q ], is constant. C onsequently, for any g iven value 
of E (Q ] and hence, X , it can b e seen from equation 11 that the 
output of Y will decrease a s the variance of shadow p rice ratios, 
var Q , increases. If var Q is positive, the econon1y' s outpu t 
falls b elow its p roduction pos sibility frontie r arid if v ar is 
positive and constant, we obtain a "technical transform ation 
function" for uncertainty which lie s below the corrununity' s 
attainable frontier. 
APPENDJX I 
Decision Maki~ and the P robab ility of Loss. 
In this appendix, while it is realised that var ious 
decision criteria a r e admissible in the determination of a 
firm's product- rnix , a criterion i s developed in terms of the 
maximisation of expect ed income subject to the satisfaction 
of a security restriction . Throu gh the development of a new 
inequality this criterion is m ade to depend, for its operational 
content, upon the mean and the semi-variance. It is argued 
that for our purpose£. this inequality is m o re relevant than 
Cherbyshev' s inequality which has been used by A. D,. Roy 1 
to illustrate the principle of "safety-first". Instead of 
assum ing , as does Roy, that the firm attempts to minimise 
the probability of a disaster level of income, we see the firm 
as attempting to maximise its expected incom e s ub ject to a 
restriction that the p rob ability of its income b eing equal to, 
or below, some pre-set level be les s than, or equal to, a 
specified probability. This security restriction is of the 
. f' k ' d 2 satis 1cer 1n • 
I 
While the variance is a well-known measure of 
variability., the semi-variance is not. T he variance is a 
measure of the absolute disper sion of value s of the variabl e 
,:< Except for minor changes, this appendix has b een 
pub lished in Australian Economic Papersi Vol. I, 
1962, pp. 109 - 118. 
1 A. D. Roy, "Safety F irst and the Holding of As sets", 
Econometrica, Vol. 2 0, 1952, pp.431-449 . 
2 H.A. Simon, " A Behavioral Model for R ational Choice", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIX, No. 1, 
February 1955, p p. 99-118. 
'· 
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on both sides of its mean. It is a weighted average of squared 
deviations from the mean, with each deviation weighted by its 
relative frequency or prob ability of occurrence. On the other 
hand, the semi-variance is a one-sided ~ easure of variab ility -
it may be upper or l ower and can b e calculated about any 
value, ao In the special c ase where a is equal to the rnean, 
the upper sem i-variance is the expected value of squared 
positive deviations from the mean1 while the lower semi-
variance is the expected value of squared negative deviations 
from the mean. We shall be concerned with the lower semi-
variance about the mean. T his we shall designate by S and, 
unless qualified, use the term "semi-variance" to apply to s. 
Hence, where x represents the random variable; µ 
1 
the m ean 
and ( r- indicates that only negative devi2tions are to be taken, 
the semi-variance is: 
S = £ [ [ (x - µ ) - i1, 
It is only when the p robability distribution is symmetrical 
about the mean that the semi-variance is equal to one half 
of the variance. 
The two measures are distinct. If loss is of 
particular concern to the firm, e.g. as it is in Roy 1 s analysis, 
then the semi-variance is more pertinent than the variance 
for allocation decisions~ Thi s is so since the semi-variance 
concentrates on neg ative deviations alone, whereas the 
variance incorporates both positive and negative deviations. 
.... 
·--
14-~ 
In his recent work, Markowitz 3 attaches s pecial 
significance to the mean, variance, and semi-variance in order 
4 
to justify his efficient-set analysis . He shows that if the firm 
is to act consistently with the set of plausibl e axioms which he 
,: 
lists, -:.J then it m ust act to maximise its expected utility. 
Markowitz suggests that if the firm wishes t o r_:.aximise 
expected utility, and if it expe riences diminishing ri.1 arginal 
utility fror.n inc reasing levels of returns , i.e. has a conc av e 
utility function when viewed from the returns I axis , then, the 
mean and the variance or the r.ne an and the serni-variance are 
3 H. M. Markowitz, P ortfolio Selection - Effic ient Divers ifi-
cation of Investments (Cowl es Foundation Monograph 16, 
New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1959.) 
4 This analysis is in terms of the mean and variance (or sem i-
variance ). From the pos sible mean-variance values it 
involves the selection of the effici ent values. Efficient 
values are all those possible values which cannot be dom-
inated. In other wo rds , the efficien t set i s comprised of 
me an and v arianc e values for each of which there is no 
possibl e value with a low er v ariance for the aame m ean or 
a higher mean fo r the same variance. · 
5 Markowitz, op. cit. , pp. 229 -234 . These axioms can b e 
stated s y mbolically where 11 > 11 designates " preferred to" 
and "=" designates "indiffe rent to "., 
Axiom Ia: If P and Q are two p rob ab ility distributions of 
outcomes than e ithe r P > Q , or Q >P , or _- = ,, 
("comparability"). 
Axiom Th : If .P~ Q and Q ~R, then P ~ R ("transitivity"). 
Axion-1 II: If P > Q and R i s a p robability di stri ution of 
a n outcome then, aP + (1 - a) R >aQ + (1 - a ) R, g iven 
that a > o. 
Axiom III: If P > Q , and Q > R then there i s a number c 
such that cP + (1 - c) R = Q , where O < c < l . 
These axioms imply the r.neasurability of utility up to a 
line a r transform. T h ey do not imply that utility can e 
added for different individuals, b ut merely p rovide the 
individual with a numerical ordering syste:._1. 
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relevant to the firm ' s diversification decision. 6 But Markowitz 
goes beyond this - '' P ortfolios sel ected on the as is of expected 
lo ss, expected absolute devi ation, or pro' ability of loss are not 
7 to be trusted" . 
Markowitz ' s defence of the varianc e and semi- variance 
as measu res of variab ility depends upon the existenc e of a 
measurabl e utility function which is concave and, furthermore , 
upon the possib ility of approximating the function by a quadratic 
. d t· 8 f t· or semi-qua ra 1c unc ion. If the utility function exists and 
is concave and continuous then, by the application of Taylor's 
Theoren1., 
9 
it can be approximated by a quadratic utility function. 
Once a quadratic utility function is derived, it can be exp ressed 
d . f 10 in terms of the mean an varianc e o returns alone . Similarly, 
a semi-quadratic function (a better approximation than the 
quad r a tic to Markowitz's utility function ) can b e de rived and 
expressed in term s of the mean and the sen1i-variance alone. 
We rnust not conclude from thi s argument that the serni -
variance and the variance are always the most pe r t inent measures 
of variability for the fi rm. The universal proposition i s un-
acceptable. F irst, the firm ' s utility function may not e 
6 Ibid., pp. 279 -29 7 
7 Ibid. , p. 297 
8 A semi-quadratic function is quadratic for the lower portion 
o f its domain and is linear for the remainde r . 
9 In general, by using Taylor 's Theo r em a continuous and 
d ifferentiabl e function can be app roxim ate d by a poly-
nom ial. For an outline of the i-nethod, see R . G. D, /Jl en, 
Mathematical Analysis fo r Economics (lVIacrrdllan, London, 
1947,) pp. 449 - 456. 
10 Markowitz, ..2,.'".), cit., p. 122 for an explanation. 
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an adequate approximation. Secondly, even when a quadratic 
or serni-quadratic approxirnates to a concave utility func tion, 
it generally does so only ov er some finite ranee. In order to 
obtain closer approximations , polynomials of h i ghe r degree 
should b e taken. If polynomials of a higher degree are taken, 
utility will be affected by moments of a h ighe r order than that 
of the variance (or semi-variance ). 
So far we have assumed the utility function to exist 
and have ob jected that it need not have the forn'1 which Markowitz 
ascribes to it. Upon this b asis and the second ground above, we 
conclude that the utility function cannot always be expressed in 
term s of the m ean and variance (or sem i-variance ) alone. But 
we may go further than this, and doubt whether £inns are always 
willing to accept Markowitz ' s utility axioms. In p articular, 
11 
axiom ID may not be accepted. There are some situations , 
e ven if rare , in which P is p referred to and O is p referred 
to R (i. e . P > Q >R) but there is no probability, c , greater 
than zero but less than unity for which the firrn would be 
indifferent b etween Q and a p rob ab ility of P and R. There inay 
be no value of c such that O < c <l and Q = cP + (l - c) P . The 
12 firm will always p refer Q to taking any chance of :?. In 
consequence, the utility of Q cannot be calcul ated by the 
Markowitz method. F urtherm ore, if axiom III is not satisfied, 
Markowitz ' s re jection of the m aximum loss rule loses its 
force since the re jection is b ased u 1~on an inconsistency 
between the rule and the utility axioms . 
11 See footnote 4 abov • 
12 For instance the outcome P rnight involve the poss ib ility of 
b ankruptcy, starvation, or a tre.mendou s fall in soc ial status . 
M a rkowitz presses the normative implications of his 
analysis . If the firm accepts his axioms , then it ought to act 
in accordance with his efficient-set analysis which involves 
the mean and variance (or semi-variance) . But as has b een 
pointed out, this does not follow precisely since it involves 
14 7 
special restrictions upon the utility function and as sum es that 
quadratic or serni-quadratic functions are adequate approximations 
to the utility functions. Again, the utility axioms may not b e 
acceptable to the firm. In these circumstances, M a rkowitz ' s 
analysis los es its normative force . Of course, whether or 
not Markowitz' s expected utility maxim and efficient- set 
analysis is of descriptive rel e vance is an empirical question, 
Although this question is outside the sco pe of this p a per, the 
universal relevance of the analysis is doub tful . 
II 
Let us consider an approach which, although it differs 
from that of Markowitz , depends upon the mean and the variance, 
or upon the mean and the semi-variance, to g ive it operational 
content. Let us suppose that the firm wishes to m aximise its 
expected profit subject to the restriction that the prob ab ility of 
income being below, or equal to , some particular amount be 
less than, or equal to, some specified prob ab ility. If the firm 
knows only the mean, variance and semi-variance of income, 
then it is i r.npossible for it to dett:rmine the p recise p rob ab ility 
of income below any pre-set level. All that it can do is place 
an u pper bound on this probability. This can e done by using 
inequalities such as Ch rbyshev 1 s . Cher y shev 1 s inequality is 
14 8 
13 
as follows : let x be a random variable with a mean, µ = E (x} , 
and a variance , 2 
a = var (x) . Then, for any value oft > 0, 
l 
i . e o the p rob ability that a random variable deviates from its 
mean by t , or great r, is less than, or equal to , its varianc 
divided by t
2
• This p robab ility depends both upon the mean and 
the variance of the variable and the inequality holds under quite 
general conditions. In fact , the ine quality holds p rovided that 
a probability distri ution of the random variable exists at all. 
Applying this theorem to income and treating income 
as a random variable , we obtain, by straightforward substitution 
in equation ( l) , the p robability that income will deviate from 
its m ean by an amount t = µ - x 1 or greater, given that x 1 
is 
less than µ • We obtain that 
a2 
x - µ I? ( µ - xl t S ( µ - x 
1 
2 
io e . the p ro a ility that income will be less than, or equal to , 
x 1 or greater than, or e qual toµ + ( µ - x 1 ) is less than, or 
2 
equal to the variance divided by ( µ - x
1
) • This expression 
is de pendent upon deviations both elow and above the mean. 
However, it may not e appropriate b ecause the firm may 
not wish to reduce variab ility in both directions . Its prime 
concern may be with deviations below the me an and with the 
risk of income falling to , or bel ow , a p articul ar level , x
1
• 
13 A proof of this inequality is given by William F ller, 
An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications , 
Vol. 1, (New York, John Vi' il ey & Sons , 1950) , pp, 183 - 184 . 
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At first, it might seem that a s atisfactory exp ression 
for the upper b ound of this p robab ility coul d o e ob tained from 
expression 2. Whilst an u pper-bound prob ab ility can b e o b tained 
from equation 2 it is not as satisfactory as the u pper - b ound 
p rob ab ility whi c h can b e ob tained by usine a sem i-variance 
inequalityo To make this clear l et us establish from equation 
2 an exp ression .for Pr (x < x 1 I x 1 < µ ). E quation 2 can 
be rewritten as 
Pr (x s., x 1 ) + Pr (x ~ 
Rearranging equ ation 3 we obtain 
cr 2 
a 
2 
t 
Pr (x s., x 1 ) s., t2 - Pr (x ~ 2 µ - x 1 ) • 
2 
However, the value of Pr (x ~ 2 µ - x
1
) is unknown. 
3 
4 
Sinc e 
2 2 
a / t > 0 and, b y the prob ab ility r ules , .:. r (x ,a 2 µ - x
1
) ~ 0, 
w e can only obtain the following upper-bound probab ility fro rn 
equ ation 4 : 
2 
a 
2 
t 
i.e. the probability of income be ing l ess than or equal to x
1 
2 2 is less than or e qual to cr / t • 
5 
However, the u pper - bound value in equation 5 can b 
reduced if an inequality ased upon the semi-variance is us ed. 
14 The semi-variance inequality theorem is as follows: l et x 
be a random variable with a mean, µ = E (x), and a semi-
variance, S. Then, for any value oft > 0 
14 In the appendix this ine quality is shown to b e a s p ecial 
case of a more gen ral inequality. 
i.e. th e p rob ab ility that a r andom variable will '- e b elow its 
rnean by an amount t, o r g reater , is le sz th an, o r equal to , 
6 
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its semi-variance divide 2 by t • By sub stitution in e quation 6, 
we ob tain an exp r e ssion for the p rob ab ility of incom e be ing 
below o r equal to x
1
• We ob tain 
P r (x :£_ x 1 / x 1 < µ ) ~ ( ) T µ - X • 
l 
s 
In words, the prob ab ility that income will b e less than, or 
equal to x 1 is le~ s than, or qual to the semi-variance 
7 
divided 2 y ( µ - xl) • T his p rob ab ility de pend s ooth u pon the 
semi-v a riance and the rn ean. Inequality 7 is more pow e rful 
than inequality 5 since the semi-variance i s always less than 
the variance. Hence , the u pper-bound p rob a b ility S/ t 2 m ust 
1 2, 2 alw ays e es s than o t • Put differently , 
02 
2 
t 
• 8 
The se1ni-variance inequality is m ore powerful than Cher yshev' s 
if we are concerne d with "one- sided" deviations. Al so , t h e 
semi-variance inequality only requires informat ion ab out 
deviations e low the m ean whereas those b a s d u pon the 
Cherbyshev inequality, since they involve the var iance, require 
information a bout deviations both s i des of the mean. As with 
Cherbyshev 1 s inequality, the semi-variance inequality holds 
so long as the random variable as a p rob ability distribution 
at all. 
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Not only do these ine qualities apply generally to 
p rob ab ility d i s tributions but they als o a pply whatever the nature 
of the laws of p roduction. To each p ro duct- mix there 
co rres ponds a mean l evel of income , a v ariance and a semi-
v ariance. This is sufficient to calcul ate the value of the 
above inequalit i es for ev e ry p roduct - rnix . 
We now apply the semi -va riance inequality to the 
p robl em o f all ocating resources in accordance with the 
criterion that the firm maxirnises expected income sub ject 
to a security restriction. Let the firm have a given value o f 
resources which it n-1ay distrib ute ar,.1.o ng differ e nt p roducts 
in different ways. These "ways" constitute the acts open to 
it. To each of these acts there corres ponds a mean income 
2.nd a semi-variance, and to the set of available acts there 
corresponds a set of mean values of income and sem i-
variances~ The relationship b etween the mean and the sem i-
variance will depend u pon the l aws of p roduction and the 
correlation 0 e tw een returns from different goods. We shall 
not g ive the mean and semi-variance set any particular form . 
Obviously, howeve r, the set can b e shown on a t:\..,o-dimensional 
d i agrarr1 with the mean on one axis and the semi-variance o n 
the other. 
G ive n the firn"l 1 s set o f po ssib ilities in terms of the 
mean and the semi-variance, the p robl em is to divide thes e 
possibilities into those which meet its security restriction 
and tho se which do not. Let the fir m des ire that the 
pro b ab ility of its income b e ing e l ow or equal to x
1 
be l ess 
than or e qual to p . Since our information is lin-iited, w e can 
' 
at bes t dete rmine a sub set of all the satisfactory values. We 
find this satisfactory su set by api)lying the semi-variance 
inequality. 
/ J.l the values (possibilities ) which satisfy the 
inequality 
s 
( µ - xl ) 
2 ~ p 
are satisfactory. This m ust be so since 
s 
< µ ) ~ ----2-· 
( µ - xl) 
Therefore , all of thos e comb inations of the mean and sem i-
variance upon or below the positive ranch of the par abol a 
2 
S = p ( µ - x 1 ) will b e satisfactory. 
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This parabola is shown arb itrarily in figure 1. It 
reaches its minimum at x 1• The negative b ranch is of no 
interest to us s ince we have assumed that x
1 
is less than the 
mean. Let us suppose that the separation parabola intersects 
the availabl e poss ib ilities of the firm which are shown as the 
shaded area BDC in figure 1. Then, some of the poss ibl e values 
of the mean and semi-variance meet the firm ' s security 
restriction. From the values meeting this restriction, we 
select the one which yields the highest expected p rofit. 
This we de rive by finding the highest straight line "indifference" 
curve which is " tangential" to these restricted values. In 
figur e 1, the o ptim al availa l e value is C , and the o ptimal 
product-mix is the one corresponding to C . In this case , 
the firm .maximises expected profit and the security 
restriction is not effective. If, however, the parabola 
;ias s es below C (i t will do thi s if p i s small e nough) b u t 
continue s to cu t the po ss ib ility set, the n the n a ture o f the 
optim u.rn i s changed, In thi s c2.se the s ecurity re stric tion 
' ecornes eff ctive and results in the no n- maxim i sat ion o f 
ex pected p ro fi '" . 
s Figure 1. 
} 
l 
j 
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Sometirne s the r e n1ay e no optim al solut ion in 
te r ms o f t h e fi rm ' s immedi a t aims . T his w ould b e the cas 
2 . if th e positiv e branch of the p a r a ola, S = p ( µ - x
1
) , 1s 
e v eryw her bel ow the possibility s e t of t h e me an and the 
s emi-va riance,, If the firm I s i n itial s e curity r estric tion 
cannot e satis fi ed, th ~ o n ce it re alises this , it may act 
to m inim i s e th prob a b il ity o f its income b e ing b elow x
1
• 
T hi s, how ev er, i s n o t the o nly possi ilityo 
Altho u g h Roy 1 s analy s i s depends u pon C her yshe v ' s 
ine quality , the s epara t io n p r oce ss is m o r e e ffici e n t whe n the 
p rinc i pl e of "s a fety-fi rs t" i s a s ed u pon the semi - v a rianc e 
15 
inequality , In particul ar , this is s o if the p r o ability 
15 On av e r ag w e would clos e r to th true m 1n1m um p rob -
ability o f d is aster if w e u sed the semi - v arianc e ine quality 
r ather than C herb y shev ' s. T his i s becaus e the fo r m r i D 
more ffi c i nt in recording d ev iations bel ow the m an. 
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distrib utions are skewed. Roy 's view can b e re-interpreted 
in terms of the semi-variance anclysis as follows : let x 
1 
corre s pond to the disaster level of income for the firm . Then 
from its possi0le acts the firm should sele ct an a ct such tha t 
Pr (x ~x 1 ) is minimised . If the firm only knows the me an 
and the sem i-varianc e , and if P r (x ~ x
1
) :; r , then it should 
select from the possible ser.ni-variance and rnean value s that 
p air which corres pond s to the l eas t value o f r . Thus in term s 
of figure 1, we let r decrease in the exp r e ssion S :; r ( µ - x
1
) 2 
until the positive b ranch of the parabola just touches the lower 
side of the set B DC . The optimal act corres ponds to the point 
of "tang ency" of the positive b ranch o f the parabola with the 
possible s emi-variance and m ean values. Roy's a pproach can 
b e interpreted as a special case in which the firm desires th e 
prob ability of a disaster l evel of income to ... e zero. Wh e n this 
is unattainable the firm minimises the p ro a::, ility of th 
disaster level. 
III 
The view taken above is not an unqualified s atisficer 
one. The app roach is one of maxim i sation or minimis ation 
sub j ect to restraints or inequalities of the s a tisficer kind. 
Although it was assumed that the firm knew all of the acts 
availab l e to it, this can b e , and ought to b e , relaxed. When 
this is r elnxed , the firm c an search for and a djoin new acts 
in an attempt to satisfy its inequalities. Further, it was 
assumed a bove that the firm knew with certainty all of the 
mean, semi-vari ance and variance paran1ete rs for each o f 
its poss ib l e act~. These will not gen erally e known. It 
will have to act u pon its sub jective cotimates of the true 
parameterso While computations must necessarily be based 
upon subjective estimates of the parameters, it is the tru 
paran1ete rs which w ill determine the final outcom e., 
In the abov e inequalities , incorlle has .. een treated 
d .. l 16 as a r a n om var1a0 e 8 There are three pas si!:;le grounds 
for thi s approach: (a ) there are disturbing factors which 
l ead to irregular and unpredictabl e values of income; (b ) 
the laws which determine future income are so complicated 
that it is imposcib l e to foreca.:.it income exac tly; and (c) 
it is unprofitab le to in cur a cost sufficient to p redict income 
precisely ,, An important characteristic of a r andom varia le 
is the impossibility, relative to some circumstance, of 
predicting the actual value which the variable will assume . 
In case (a) it i s impo ssible to p redict perfectly because the 
p rocess i s inherently random. In case (b ) the dete r m ini stic 
law s are no t precis ely known or the techniques availabl e for 
a pplying them are incapable of yielding answers p rior to their 
date of application, e . g., the re sults of l engthy computations 
or the collection of data m ay not be known until it is too late 
to apply them. In case (c) t he firm is unwilling to incur a 
cost suffic ient to ensure perfect p redic tion even if it were 
poss ib l eo The re would seem to b e many cases in whi ch at 
least one of the above conditions is satisfied. In such 
circumstances, income ought to be treated as a random 
variab le and b e given theoretical attention in thio liJ ht. 
16 A b rief comment on randomness is eiv en b y Harol d 
Cran1er, Mathematical l\riethods of Statistics 
(P rinceton University ... res s , P rinc e ton, 194:6 ), Ch. 13 . 
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The treatment of income as a random variabl e does 
not imply that inc om e can take any value ; nor that it can tak 
every value with an equal p ro ::> ab ility; nor tha t futur e p r o a -
b ility distri~)utions are unrel a ted to p ast events or select ed 
by a random process - in other words, it does not exclude 
prediction completely. ·wha t it do e s exclud e is p recis e 
p r e diction of the future value s which will b e actually realised. 
Markowitz ' s, Roy ' s and the present analysis are all 
cap able of expl aining product diversification under constant 
returns . However, none of the solutions imply that p roduct 
diver s ification is always o ptimal under conditions of 
uncertainty. Indeed, in these circumstances s pecialisation 
may sometimes e optimal. Furthermore, these analyses 
always select p roduct combinations which are efficient in 
terms of the m ean and the variance or, the mean and the 
17 
sem i-variance. F rom the efficient set, however, they 
rn ay s lect different valu e s as b eing o ptim al. 
IV 
Decisions b ased solely upon the rr1 ean and variance 
(or sem i-variance) can b e justified in three ways. First, 
by Markowitz ' s view that the utility function can b e a pproxi-
mated by a quadratic (o r a semi-quadratic ) function. 
Another justification relies on lack of knowledge - i.e. 
the m ean and the variance (or semi-variance) are the 
only known parameters of the p rob ab ility distributions of 
17 This is easily shown for Roy ' s analysis. Relative to 
any member of the inefficient set it is possible to find 
a n1emb er of the efficient set which !ives a smaller 
value for the relation a 2/ ( µ - x 1 ) • Therefore, 
the minimum of o- 2/ ( µ - x 1 ) 2, in view of our definition in footnote 4 , must occur for a member of the efficient 
set. 
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outcomes. Finally , if dec isions are b ased on expec te d p rofit 
and probabl e l oss , then the mean and the semi-variance p rovide 
a convenient summary of the p robab ility distribution which 
can be used to estimate boundary pro0 abilities for losses. 
Therefore , if the firm adopts a p rob ab ility-of-loss criterion 
similar to the one developed in this paper, we can justify the 
application of the semi-variance inequality of the text either 
on the grounds of lack of knowledg e or of convenience. But, 
depending on the circur11stances , we do not deny that the firm ' s 
decision can be improved by the use of parameters additional 
to the rnean and variance (or semi-variance) . 
A PPENDIX T O DECISION MAKING & P R OB AB ILITY OF LOSS. 
T he purpose o f the a ppendix is to p rove inequ al ity {6) 
of the text an d to p resent a m ore general sem.i -variance 
inequality theorem . 
Inequality (6) follows fro m a general inequality, 
namely , the low e r sern i -variance inequality theo r e m . This 
theor e m can b e stated as follows : Letting x e a rando m v ariab l e 
a n d a b e 
any value , the low er sem i -variance S, 
a)-]~}. Then, fo r any value of t > 0, 
(x - a) 
s 
a 
< -
- 2 
a b out a is 
9 
1 . e . the p rob ab ility that x will b e b elow a y t , or greater, is 
l ess than, o r equal t o the lower sem i-variance a ou t the point 
a divided by t 2• 
Proof : 
T he low e r s e m i -variance is de fin ed a bout the point a by 
a seri s comprised s olely of positive term s , since it c ons i sts 
of squared neg ativ e deviations fro m a m ultiplie d y the i r 
p rob ab ility o f occurr n e e . T he del etion of values for which 
(x - a )- j < t cannot increase the value of the low e r semi-
variance s eries . Denoting the sum of the se ri es after del etion 
as L }:c [ (x - a ) ] 2 and thei r p rob ab ility of f(x~'<) , 
s 
a 
- 2 ~ L >:< [ (x - a) ] f(x* ) • 
M oreov r , sine ,:c / (x a )- j ~ t , we have 
H nc , 
f . 
r >!< [ (x - a ) 
s > 
a -
2 
2 2 , 2 f(x >:<) ~ 1 >!< t f(x >o< ) = t 
10 
, * f(x*). 11 
12 
... 
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i . e. 
2 
Pr { I (x - a ) - t } s > t > a 13 
P r { ~t} s • I (x - a) a . . < -
- 2 
t 
14 
In the special case where a:::µ = E (x ) w ob tain from (9) that 
Pr { J (x - µ ) 
s 
> t} <--1:. 
- - 2 
"-
.. 
15 
i . e . the p rob ability that x will e b elow the mean by t , or greater, 
is less than, or equal to , the lower semi-variance about the m ean 
2 
divided by t . This is equivalent to ine quality (6 ) in the text. 
Similarly, an u ppe r semi-variance inequality theo rern 
can be shown to hold • 
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